Download Free Us Army Green Beret In Afghanistan 2001 02 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Us Army Green Beret In Afghanistan 2001 02 and write the review.

In October 2001 the most militarily advanced nation on earth came into conflict with one of the least developed nations as American forces poured into Afghanistan. The tip of the spear was drawn from the US Special Forces community, and largely from the units of the United States Army Special Forces – the famous Green Berets. Together with the Special Activities Division of the CIA and the Afghan Northern Alliance, they overthrew the Taliban in a lightning campaign that redefined modern warfare. This new study reveals the grueling Green Beret training and preparation, the specialized equipment they used in the field and traces their deployment throughout the campaign, from the first insertion of forces through to the fall of Kabul and Kandahar, the Taliban uprising at the notorious Fort of War in Mazar-e-Sharif, and the clearance of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley.
In October 2001 the most militarily advanced nation on earth came into conflict with one of the least developed nations as American forces poured into Afghanistan. The tip of the spear was drawn from the US Special Forces community, and largely from the units of the United States Army Special Forces – the famous Green Berets. Together with the Special Activities Division of the CIA and the Afghan Northern Alliance, they overthrew the Taliban in a lightning campaign that redefined modern warfare. This new study reveals the grueling Green Beret training and preparation, the specialized equipment they used in the field and traces their deployment throughout the campaign, from the first insertion of forces through to the fall of Kabul and Kandahar, the Taliban uprising at the notorious Fort of War in Mazar-e-Sharif, and the clearance of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan chronicles the "boots on the ground" actions by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) from September 11, 2001, until May 15, 2002. What makes this book so significant is that the history was captured as USASOC troops (Green Berets, Rangers, PsyOps, SpecOps Aviation and Civil Affairs) were fighting the war, providing an easily understood snapshot of the war as it happened during those first critical months. The authors include the mistakes, frustrations and failures of the war along with the successes. Rather than an armchair historian's overall strategic view 10 years later, it is an account of what individuals and small teams did with bravery, skill and honor on a day-to-day basis to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists, and assist the Afghan people and begin the vital work of rebuilding the infrastructure of Afghanistan
Vietnam was the US Special Forces most complex and controversial mission, one that began in 1957 and ended in 1973. Camp strike forces, mobile strike forces, mobile guerrilla forces, special reconnaissance projects, training missions and headquarters duty provided vastly differing experiences and circumstances for SF soldiers. Other fluctuating factors were the terrain, the weather and the shifting course of the war itself. Gordon Rottman examines the training, life, weapons and combat experiences of the Special Forces soldier in this challenging environment.
Intelligence specialist Leigh Neville identifies, describes and illustrates the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the British, American and other Coalition forces committed to the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan since 2001, providing a fascinating insight into specific operations detailing weapons, equipment and experiences in combat. With a surprising amount of recently declassified material from government departments that are yet to be published in the mass media, this is a ground-breaking analysis of the largest mobilization of Special Forces in recent history. With extensive first-hand accounts providing an eyewitness perspective of the fighting on the ground and including information on the British SAS, the US Delta Force, Australian and Canadian special forces as well as MI6 and CIA operational units, this book provides a crucial study of their skills and successes amidst the Afghan mountains.
Includes more than 100 maps, plans and illustrations. “This monograph is more than the story of Marine expeditionary operations in Afghanistan. It describes who our nation’s enemies are; how America became involved in the Global War on Terrorism; and how the Marine Corps struggled to acquire a major role in Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the actions of Marines and sailors who helped prosecute the air and ground campaigns against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces.”— Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Director of Marine Corps History
Award-winning combat journalist Sean Naylor reveals a firsthand account of the largest battle fought by American military forces in Afghanistan in an attempt to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. At dawn on March 2, 2002, America's first major battle of the 21st century began. Over 200 soldiers of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division flew into Afghanistan's Shah-i-Kot Valley—and into the mouth of a buzz saw. They were about to pay a bloody price for strategic, high-level miscalculations that underestimated the enemy's strength and willingness to fight. Naylor, an eyewitness to the battle, details the failures of military intelligence and planning, while vividly portraying the astonishing heroism of these young, untested US soldiers. Denied the extra support with which they trained, these troops nevertheless proved their worth in brutal combat and prevented an American military disaster.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.