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Notes commenting adversely on the conduct of the United States Army, and North Americans generally, in Mexico during the period indicated. Particular attention is given to newspapers published under the auspices of the Unted States Army at that time.
The Mexican-American War of the 1840s, precipitated by border disputes and the U.S. annexation of Texas, ended with the military occupation of Mexico City by General Winfield Scott. In the subsequent treaty, the United States gained territory that would become California, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. In this highly readable account, John S.D. Eisenhower provides a comprehensive survey of this frequently overlooked war.
This occasional paper is a concise overview of the history of the US Army's involvement along the Mexican border and offers a fundamental understanding of problems associated with such a mission. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the historic themes addressed disapproving public reaction, Mexican governmental instability, and insufficient US military personnel to effectively secure the expansive boundary are still prevalent today.
"Much has been written about the Mexican war, but this . . . is the best military history of that conflict. . . . Leading personalities, civilian and military, Mexican and American, are given incisive and fair evaluations. The coming of war is seen as unavoidable, given American expansion and Mexican resistance to loss of territory, compounded by the fact that neither side understood the other. The events that led to war are described with reference to military strengths and weaknesses, and every military campaign and engagement is explained in clear detail and illustrated with good maps. . . . Problems of large numbers of untrained volunteers, discipline and desertion, logistics, diseases and sanitation, relations with Mexican civilians in occupied territory, and Mexican guerrilla operations are all explained, as are the negotiations which led to war's end and the Mexican cession. . . . This is an outstanding contribution to military history and a model of writing which will be admired and emulated."-Journal of American History. K. Jack Bauer was also the author of Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest (1985) and Other Works. Robert W. Johannsen, who introduces this Bison Books edition of The Mexican War, is a professor of history at the University of Illinois, Urbana, and the author of To the Halls of Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination (1985).
Abstract: This study examines the U.S. Army's execution of counterinsurgency in central Mexico during the Mexican American War (1 846-1848). It focuses on the leadership of General Winfield Scott and several of his key subordinates. In central Mexico, the U.S. Army anticipated the insurgency and instituted measures to destroy it from the beginning of the campaign. They overcame the resistance by conciliating the population then using Mexican civilians for intelligence to guide raids on guerrilla bases. These efforts successfully eliminated the insurgents as a factor in the peace negotiations so that the U.S. could achieve the terms they desired. U.S. success against the guerrillas convinced the Mexican leadership that the only way they could potentially defeat the Americans was through a long and painful insurgency, which most feared the nation could not endure. The only option that remained was to accept the U.S. peace proposal and cede the land they demanded. The Americans facilitated their success by setting reasonable goals for the conflict and once they were achieved rapidly evacuating the country. By keeping the occupation brief, they did not allow the resistance time to adapt their tactics or attain outside support. This thesis challenges the assertions of some historians that the U.S. defeated the insurgents by using "scorched-earth tactics" and that U.S. atrocities undermined their efforts to gain the support of the Mexican population. By "scorched earth tactics" they mean the Americans indiscriminately destroyed any residence on or near their supply routes to prevent the populace from abetting guerrilla warfare. The evidence does not support these assessments. While Winfield Scott's conciliatory policies were imperfectly executed and U.S. soldiers occasionally committed atrocities, the harsh disciplinary measures Scott enforced on his men, combined with the clear military superiority of the U.S. Army, were good enough to convince many Mexicans to provide the necessary information to crush the insurgency. Finally, the conclusion compares the Army's execution of counterinsurgency in Mexico to modem American military doctrine and draws out lessons that can be learned from the experience. The American Army won the counterinsurgency in Mexico because good leadership prevented the insurgents from affecting the war's outcome.
CMH Pub 73-1. The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War. At head of title on cover: The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War. One of a series of eight brochures about the Mexican War. Discusses Brig. General Zachary Taylor's campaign for Monterrey, Mexico
The Occupation of Mexico is the third in a series of pamphlets on the Mexican War, which was the U.S. Army's first experience waging an extended conflict in a foreign land. This brief war is often overlooked by casual students of history since it occurred so close to the American Civil War and is overshadowed by the latter's sheer size and scope. Yet, the Mexican War was instrumental in shaping the geographical boundaries of the United States. At the conclusion of this conflict, the U.S. had added some one million square miles of territory. The Mexican War still has much to teach us about projecting force, conducting operations in hostile territory with a small force that is dwarfed by the local population, urban combat, the difficulties of occupation, and the courage and perseverance of individual soldiers. This is one of eight pamphlets by Stephen A. Carney planned to provide an accessible and readable account of the U.S. Army's role and achievements in the conflict.