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On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. Some believe the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons. Appendix A contains Frequently Asked Questions about U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation.
India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401's requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs "arrangements and procedures under which" India may reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed. The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention. The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States "intends to support India's full membership" in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.
As part of the 1950s-era Atoms for Peace program, the United States actively promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India from the mid-1950s, building nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. When other nations joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, however, India refused to join the treaty on the basis that it was discriminatory. In 1974, India exploded a peaceful nuclear device, demonstrating that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a result, the United States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has tried to convince other states to do the same.
India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one. That is why, United States pays closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. The strategic significance of the nuclear deal, signed between India and the US, can be appreciated only in the context of the changing US geopolitical strategy and the evolving US-India relationship. This book addresses the wide-ranging issues concerning the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Making a critical assessment of India's energy policy, it describes in detail the agreement with IAEA, NSG waiver, the political fallouts of the deal, its implications for South Asia, and the China factor. The texts of the agreement, the Hyde Act, and India-IAEA Safeguards Agreements have also been appended.
As part of the 1950s-era Atoms for Peace program, the United States actively promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India from the mid-1950s, building nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. When other nations joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, however, India refused to join the treaty on the basis that it was discriminatory. In 1974, India exploded a peaceful nuclear device, demonstrating that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a result, the United States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has tried to convince other states to do the same.
The Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal July 2005 Is An Epochal Event Setting The Stage For India S Tacit Admission Into The Elite Nuclear Club Of Five . While Opening The Doors For India To The Global Nuclear Energy Market, The Deal Will Have Far-Reaching Impact On Regional As Well As International Relations. Some As China And Pakistan Could See It Detrimental To Their Security Interests. Others As France And Germany, Acknowledging India S Rising Power, Have Preferred To Engage It. Within The Two Nations, India And The U.S., The Opinions Have Been Sharply Divided. The U.S. Non-Proliferation Community Has Attacked President Bush For Opening A Pandora S Box By Cooperating With A State Which Possesses Nuclear Weapons But Is Non-Signatory Of The Npt. In India, Concerns Of Sovereignty Have Overshadowed The Sizeable Gains Accruing To The Country In Its Quest For Energy Sufficiency.The Articles In The Present Book Place The Entire Debate On Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal In Perspective By Examining The Background Which Led The Bush Administration To Propose A Change In The Nuclear Rules In Favor Of India, The Range Of Deliberations That Have Followed And The Final Stages Awaiting Formal Recognition. An Attempt Has Been Made To Cover Both The Objective And Subjective Factors Which Have Driven This Nuclear Debate. In Addition To Articles By Erudite Experts In The Field Of International Affairs, The Book Also Includes Important Documents Relating To The Nuclear Deal Speeches Of The U.S. President, Indian Prime Minister, Senators, Congressmen, Senior Officials, The Viewpoints Of Different Countries, The Nsg, And The Iaea Chief.The Book Is A Seminal Contribution To Indo-U.S. Relations And Will Prove Invaluable To Students And Scholars Of International Affairs, Strategic Analysts, Policy Planners, Diplomats, Parliamentarians As Well As Common Readers Interested In Contemporary World Affairs.