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This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategic planning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. It focuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at that level provides the critical nexus between the strategic direction provided by the National Command Authorities and its implementation by the unified combatant commands and military departments. The authors' thorough understanding of the statutory requirements for strategic planning and the interactions between the Chairman's complex strategic planning process and other key DOD planning systems enables them to explicate today's strategic planning challenges and offer insightful recommendations. Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to be exceptionally problematic. The plethora of national and international tensions that the east-west confrontation of the Cold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a world replete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equally disturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearly defined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Soviet threat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherent stability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elements of a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on to argue that the elimination of the National Military Strategy Document and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans amounted to recision of the Chairman's strategic plan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.
Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor for any organization, small or large. For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) it is a sacred responsibility to the Nation. President Eisenhower said in 1958, ?No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives.? In spite of its attention to strategic planning, DoD has not enjoyed great success in this area. For example, in 1985, a congressional staff report characterized DoD? s strategic planning in the following manner: Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerous deficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD? s strategic goals. The stated goals are vague and ambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, the clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play an important role in achieving a coordinated effort toward these goals by the various components and individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its strategic goals. To correct this probli and other strategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establish and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process. Following up on this staff finding, Congress, in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), prescribed for DoD a hierarchical process for strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. This process was designed to improve strategic planning by harmonizing strategic direction and planning with the development of defense programs that would enable DoD to achieve its strategic goals. It was also designed to integrate and rationalize the strategic and operational planning conducted by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). To these ends, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was assigned key and specific responsibilities. Since passage of the GNA, which is now codified in Title 10, United States Code (10 USC), the JCS and then the Chairman have developed, impliented, and revised specific processes for fulfilling most of these statutory responsibilities.
The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource decisions.
This comprehensive volume provides a thorough overview of 20th- and 21st-century military doctrines worldwide. Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook takes a thorough look at 20th- and 21st-century military doctrines around the world. It excerpts relevant English-language scholarly and governmental literature to paint a picture of how military doctrine has developed in recent history, what military doctrines are currently operating on the world stage, and where military doctrine is heading in the near future. The book casts a wide net, scanning the relevant government documents, international agreements, monographs, journals, conference papers, and Internet resources to present a thorough overview of the importance of military doctrine in today's highly unstable world. Because military institutions are important formulators of national military doctrine and not merely implementers, this book examines the roles played by military organizations around the world. With the proliferation of independent military scholars and the widespread influence of their work in the Internet age, the book also scans the "gray" literature and describes its effects on military doctrine.
Vols. 4-38, 40-41 include Record of political events, Oct. 1, 1888-Dec. 31, 1925 (issued as a separately paged supplement to no. 3 of v. 31- 38 and to no. 1 of v. 40)
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This is the second in an analytical series on joint issues. It follows the authors' U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, in which they articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans. This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits evident in Australian defense planning. Doctrine and planning share an iterative development process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. As the environment for that action changes, planners address new challenges, and create the demand for better methods of organizing, employing and supporting forces. Evolutionary, occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result. The authors of this monograph explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level. They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective. In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and plans developed to carry out the National Military Strategy. Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.