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Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interests is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. "Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions." They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important.4 National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy. The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. Despite what many academics have maintained, national interests are not only a factor for nation-states. All actors in the international system possess interests. Using Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde's units of analysis, the need to have interests is equally applicable to international subsystems (groups or units that can be distinguished from the overall system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or independence on each other) like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, individual units (actors consisting of various subgroups, orga¬nizations, and communities) such as nations of people that transcend state boundaries and multi¬national corporations, subunits (organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect the behavior of the unit as a whole) like bureaucracies and lobbies, and finally, individuals that all possess separate personal interests as they participate in the overall system.5 Some academ¬ics choose to distinguish between national interests (interests involved in the external relations of the actor) and public interests (interests related within the boundaries of the actor).6 For purposes of this essay, given the closing gap between the influence of external and internal issues in the 21st century international system brought about by the associated components of a rapidly globalized world, there will be no distinction made between external and internal interests. In effect, they all fall under the concept of the national interest. There is a generally accepted consensus among academics that interests are designed to be of value to the entity or actor responsible for determining the interest for itself. This could include 4 those interests that are intended to be "a standard of conduct or a state of affairs worthy of achieve¬ment by virtue of its universal moral value."7 However, there is less agreement over the question of whether all nation-state interests are enduring, politically bi-partisan, permanent conditions that represent core interests that transcend changes in government,8 in contrast to those interests that may be altered over time and or respond to change in the international system.
In the same week that Union forces triumphed at Gettysburg, they also captured the river fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Although much less memorialized than Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg was every bit as crucial to the Union cause. Pitting Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman against John Pemberton and Joseph Johnston, the victorious Vicksburg Campaign helped revive a war-weary North, gave it absolute control of the Mississippi River, severed the western Confederacy from the East, and further constricted the South's ability to wage war as the Union drove ever deeper into its heartland. It also gave Grant-the campaign's chief architect-a dramatic venue for demonstrating his maturing skills and intelligence as a strategist and field commander. Unlike other volumes in the U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles series, this one examines an entire campaign, looking at many interlinked battles and joint Army-Navy operations as they played out over seven months and thousands of square miles of rivers, streams, swamps, lakes, forests, hills, and plains surrounding Vicksburg. In addition to detailed coverage of the actual Siege of Vicksburg, the book also chronicles the battles at Jackson, Port Gibson, Raymond, Champions Hill, and Big Black Ridge. Like the other volumes in the series, this one combines eyewitness accounts with maps, illustrations, and tour directions to illuminate the events for both tourists and arm-chair travellers. For anyone interested in learning more about this relatively neglected but pivotal Civil War campaign, the Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign is must reading.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
The U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues is the latest edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, which the college has published sporadi¬cally under different titles since 2001. As begun with the last publication, this edition of the Guide is in two volumes that correspond roughly to the two core courses that the Department of Na¬tional Security and Strategy teaches: "Theory of War and Strategy" and "National Security Policy and Strategy." Like its predecessors, this edition is largely an expansion of the existing materials, although about a quarter is new, and the previously published chapters have been updated as necessary. This year we have begun a process we hope to continue in the future of including case studies that might be useful/instructive illustrations of principles we teach. The authors, with one exception all current or former members of the faculty, represent each of the four primary teaching departments of the college. Short biographical sketches of each are in an appendix at the end of each volume. The appendix on the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) strategy formulation model in the second volume reflects the alterations in that fundamental document made for the 2010 academic year (2009-10). The entire model is currently under review, and the version for the 2011 academic year will probably be different-although continuity will probably outweigh change in the versions. Although the Department of National Security and Strategy and other departments uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core courses, this is not a textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner we use to teach the theory of war and the formulation of national security strategy to America's future senior leaders. As we continue to refine and update the Guide, we intend to increase course-oriented essays, and several of the new chapters were writ¬ten specifically to support instruction. The book is also not a comprehensive or exhaustive treat¬ment of either the theory of war, strategy, or the policy making process; there are major topics in all fields that deserve treatment before one could claim to present a comprehensive product. The Guide is organized in broad clusters of chapters addressing general subject areas. Chapters are placed in general blocks for convenience, not as a rigid framework. I made no effort to con¬strain or shape the authors' work based on where I saw the chapter fitting in the book. Thus, some chapters might have been placed in several blocks, and their presence in a specific block should not be considered a restrictive form of categorization. Volume 1 starts with theoretical issues on war and strategy. The second block examines power both conceptually and in terms of the elements of power. The volume concludes with studies on specific theoretical issues. The second volume on national security strategy and policy opens with a look at the U.S. security community and its functions. The second block expands to multinational issues and considerations. The third block presents studies of specific policy issues or considerations. The volume concludes with illustrative case studies.
In the late eighties and early nineties, driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, United States policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community's top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA and DoD instituted policy and organizational changes that altered their relationship with one another. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far. In Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to national intelligence or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.
On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.
Countering the aggression of Russian or Chinese "hegemonic" behavior will require a rapid, ready, and appropriate reaction along anticipated lines of operations to deter rather than accelerate crisis escalation, and to defend the status quo when challenged. Do the central ideas in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028," provide logical counters to hegemonic behavior from Russia or China?This monograph offers a critique of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 to avoid the foundational flaws from its predecessor concepts, AirSea Battle and Multi-Domain Battle, and to reinforce the foundation for continued discussion, analysis, and development to evolving Army and Joint doctrine.Today the United States and its Allies must cooperate to keep our advantageous peace. By keeping the peace between the United States, Russia, and China, and by the logic of our theory of victory, we are all more likely to manage other lesser anticipated and unanticipated dangers ahead.
National secuirty strategy is a vast subject involving a daunting array of interrelated subelements woven in intricate, sometimes vague, and ever-changing patterns. Its processes are often irregular and confusing and are always based on difficult decisions laden with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood by few and confusing to most. It is, at the same time, a subject of overwhelming importance to the fate of the United States and civilization itself. Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow have done a considerable service by drawing together many of the diverse threads of national security strategy into a coherent whole. They consider political and military strategy elements as part of a larger decisionmaking process influenced by economic, technological, cultural, and historical factors. I know of no other recent volume that addresses the entire national security milieu in such a logical manner and yet also manages to address current concerns so thoroughly. It is equally remarkable that they have addressed so many contentious problems in such an evenhanded manner. Although the title suggests that this is an introductory volume - and it is - I am convinced that experienced practitioners in the field of national security strategy would benefit greatly from a close examination of this excellent book. Sidney J. Wise Colonel, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education