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Twenty-third report of Session 2010-11 : Documents considered by the Committee on 23 March 2011, report, together with formal Minutes
Forty-third report of Session 2010-12 : Documents considered by the Committee on 19th October 2011, including the following recommendations for debate, protecting the financial interests of the EU; establishing a new Schengen evaluation mechanism; Schenge
Twenty-sixth report of Session 2010-12 : Documents considered by the Committee on 27 April 2011, including the following recommendation for debate, an EU agenda for the rights of the child, report, together with formal Minutes
Twenty-ninth report of Session 2010-12 : Documents considered by the Committee on 18 May 2011, including the following recommendations for debate, Roadmap on victims' rights in the EU, report, together with formal Minutes
With correction slip dated December 2013
This report examines the Ministry of Defence's progress in meeting cost, time and performance targets for its 15 top-spending military equipment projects. The Committee has reported before that the defence equipment programme is unaffordable with commitments exceeding forecast budgets over a ten year period by £36 billion. The MoD's short term decisions to keep in year expenditure within voted limits and the need to understand the full cost implications of these decisions have damaging consequences. In this year alone the cost of the major projects rose by £3.3 billion and nearly £5 billion was lost by late cancellations. The scale of problems created by this financial imbalance masks the improved performance of the majority of projects against cost and budget. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) offered the Department an opportunity to bring its plans into balance with the expenditure limits set in the Comprehensive Spending Review. Projects such as the Nimrod MRA4 and Sentinel aircraft have been cancelled, accepting greater operational risks in some areas and writing off nearly £5 billion of taxpayer's money. But implementing the SDSR will require further decisions and the renegotiation or cancellation of a significant number of existing contracts to make the programme affordable. The Department has a poor track record in taking such decisions on the well informed basis necessary to optimise value for money. Other projects examined in detail include the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers and the Typhoon aircraft.
Over the next ten years, development aid in the form of grants should be replaced for lower middle income countries. DFID should continue to channel some of its finance through multilaterals, making greater use of their specialist skills and expertise rather than replicating these within its own bilateral programmes. DFID should also establish a financial instrument team, prepare a development finance strategy and publish a Development Finance White Paper during 2014. This strategy should include consideration of whether to establish a UK development bank. The overwhelming drive in UK aid should continue to focus on lifting people out of poverty and meeting post-2015 development objectives. The UK should continue to fund the development and delivery of key services to the very poorest people in low income countries through a system of grants. We should also continue to channel 0.7 % of GNI into development cooperation. But, to support structural transformation in lower middle income countries a significant proportion of future UK development finance should also be delivered via a system of concessional loans and other financial instruments
This report assesses the Ministry of Defence's performance in managing the supply chain to front line troops. The MoD rightly puts a strong emphasis on ensuring troops get the supplies they need. Equally, providing an efficient supply chain would release resources for the front line. The Committee believes there should be greater emphasis on securing value for money and that there is room for it to find efficiencies in the supply chain without jeopardising operational effectiveness. Previous reports have identified persistent problems with late deliveries, unnecessary costs and missed targets. At present, the MoD does not have the information to identify where savings could be made. It does not know the full costs of its current activities or the cost of alternative supply options. The failure to collect basic data about where supplies are stored has directly contributed to the MoD accounts being qualified for three consecutive years. The MoD is now seeking to resolve these information problems through a major initiative known as the Future Logistics Information Services project, expected to be implemented by 2014. Until then, the Department will continue to store data in systems that are at critical risk of failure. It is vital that the MOD sustains its programme in order to secure value for money. Measures which could improve the efficiency of supply operations include putting more pressure on suppliers to deliver on time, keeping stocks at lower levels to reduce the risk of them deteriorating, and benchmarking performance against relevant comparators such as other armed forces.
The Public Administration Select Committee says special advisers (SpAds) should be 'men and women of standing and experience' with a legitimate and valuable function to play in government, but they need better training and support to prevent future problems and misunderstandings about their role and conduct. Ministers must recognise that they have responsibility, not just accountability, for the conduct of their special advisers, and actively ensure that they are fully aware of what their advisers are doing in their name. The Committee says that it remains concerned that this responsibility has 'proved to be more theoretical than actual' and says it cannot recall any minister ever resigning over the conduct of a special adviser, despite some astonishing cases. PASC says that the special advisers' role protects the impartiality of the Civil Service, by performing tasks which it would be inappropriate for permanent, impartial officials to perform, and helping to ensure that the Government's policy objectives are delivered, but that ministers must be able to justify that the tasks they undertake are in the public interest. Despite concerns raised by PASC's predecessor Committee more than ten years ago, the training and support for new special advisers remains inadequate. The Committee makes a number of recommendations including that the PM's Adviser on Ministers' Interests should be empowered to instigate his own investigations of potential breaches of the Ministerial Code, so that the Prime Minister is not able to protect his ministers from appropriate investigation of the conduct of their advisers, and that the PM's Adviser should himself be independently appointed and subject to a pre-appointment hearing