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The American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 has affected Turkey's foreign policy in unpredictable ways. On the one hand stood Turkey's vital alliance with the US, stretching back to the early days of the cold war; on the other, the strong opposition of the Turkish people to the invasion of Iraq. One of Iraq's most important neighbours and America's only formal ally in the region, Turkey gave vital support to the US during the first Gulf war. In the second Gulf war, America sought to project itself as the champion of democracy in the Middle East. Turkey, as the only Muslim country in the region with an acceptably democratic form of government, refused to support the US strategy. The challenge faced by the Turkish government has been to sustain good relations with the superpower, while remaining answerable to its own people. To explain Turkey's changing foreign policy, William Hale examines the relationship between Turkey, the US and Iraq since the 1920s, when the Iraqi state was first established. He also analyses Turkey's policies towards Iraqi Kurds and its 'Europeanisation' as the country aligns itself with the EU. Among the first books to assess the ups and downs in relations between Turkey and the U.S. ... Provides the reader a broader perspective from which to understand those relations, especially in the context of Iraq.' Kiliç Bugra Kanat 'This is an excellent and timely book.' B. A. Yesilada, Portland State University
"Throughout the 1990s, Turkey was the anchor in the containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq by the United States. The unpredictable set of events unleashed by Operation Iraqi Freedom has unnerved both Turkish decision makers and the public alike. The U.S.-led coalition's operation in Iraq has also upended Turkey's fundamental interests in Iraq, which are fourfold: (1) Prevent the division of Iraq along sectarian or ethnic lines that would give rise to an independent or confederal Kurdish state (with the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as its capital), thus supporting aspirations for a similar entity in Turkey's own extensive Kurdish population. (2) Protect the Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority, which resides primarily in northern Iraq. (3) Eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Turkish Kurdish insurgent movement, which has sought refuge in the northeast of Iraq following its defeat in 1999. (4) Prevent the emergence of a potentially hostile nondemocratic fundamentalist Iraqi state"--Summary.
Explains the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy behavior vis-...-vis the West, identifying the major factors behind intra-alliance opposition.
Print format not distributed to depository libraries.
Written by the former chief foreign policy advisor to the Turkish president and based on unprecedented access to official documents and communiques, this book gives the inside story of Turkish US relations from the first Gulf War, through debates on the Iraqi Kurdish question, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and into the present day. Using events in Iraq as the basis for a theoretical case study, Gurcan Balik argues that Turkey influenced US foreign policy on several key occasions, and that Turkish support was instrumental in the first intervention in Iraq. After Iraq's 1991 uprisings, however, Turkey's interests in the Middle East began to diverge from those of the US, and their relationship gradually deteriorated, evident in Turkey's refusal to open up its northern border to aid the US advance to Baghdad in 2003. Balik contends that an 'Iraq gap' then emerged, which has since had major implications for the Turkish economy and for the future of the Middle East.Turkey and the US in the Middle East contains hitherto unpublished primary source material, and is an essential addition to the scholarship of the period."
On March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. forces to Turkey to open a northern front in a war against Iraq. The rejection resulted from strains within the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), an inexperienced leadership, competing influences, and the overwhelming opposition of Turkish public opinion. Moreover, the powerful Turkish military had not actively supported the government's position before the vote, and the President had suggested that the resolution would be unconstitutional. For a long time, Turkey had serious concerns about the prospect of a second Gulf war, and these affected the vote in parliament and the negotiations with the United States for the troop deployment. Concerns included fear that a war would lead to an independent Iraqi Kurdish state and inspire the revival of Turkish Kurdish separatism, worries over the fate of Iraqi Turkomans, who are ethnic kin of the Turks, potential economic losses, a potential refugee crisis on the Turkey-Iraq border, and possible detrimental effects on regional stability. The Bush Administration engaged in intensive diplomacy to gain Turkey's support. The negotiations reportedly produced several tentative agreements. The parliamentary resolution that was rejected would have enabled a U.S. deployment of troops, planes, and helicopters to Turkey. The United States would have provided Turkey with a $6 billion assistance package, some of which could have been used to support $24 billion loan guarantees. Until the funds were available, the Administration would have provided a bridge loan of $8.5 billion. It also would have provided enhanced trade benefits to Turkish businesses. A memorandum of understanding was said to have dealt with Turkish troops in northern Iraq and their coordination with U.S. forces. But the agreements were never concluded. After the war began, the Administration only wanted access to Turkey's airspace, which was granted on March 21, 2003, and to prevent Turkish forces from interfering in northern Iraq. Turkey agreed to provide food, fuel, and other non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in northern Iraq. The United States will give Turkey $1 billion in aid, with which it can leverage $8.5 billion in loans. The Turkish parliament's failure to authorize the troop deployment has significant implications. To govern effectively, the AKP needs to mend strains and rebuild its political standing. Moreover, despite Turkey's increasing democratization, the AKP cannot ignore the military's great influence. The prolonged negotiations and the legislative defeat strained bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations. Both sides developed hard feelings which may take time to overcome. Turkey may be deprived of some influence concerning postwar Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Iraqi Turkomans. It also lost the substantial aid package that had been tied to acceptance of the U.S. deployment, although a smaller one has been appropriated. This report will not be updated. For background, see CRS Report RS21355, Turkey's November 3, 2002 National Election.
This paper explores the background to Turkey's Kurdish perspectives, an account and analysis of more recent developments, and a consideration of some possible futures and the factors that might encourage or thwart their emergence.
Until a few years ago, the relationship between Washington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perennially troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks strongly opposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have subsequently complained that the Pentagon was allowing Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorating security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagreements over how to respond to Iran's nuclear program, U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey's outreach efforts to Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Palestinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties and contributed to further anti-Americanism in Turkey. Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local challenges by moving closer to the West, leading to the advent of a "Golden Era" in Turkish-U.S. relations. Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship a "model partnership" and Turkey "a critical ally." Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties have improved during the last few years. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tension and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with Washington to influence developments in Iraq. Furthermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries to partner in support of the positive agenda of promoting democracy and security in the Middle East. Americans and Turks both want to see democratic secular governments in the region rather than religiously sanctioned authoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey's reconciliation efforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankara to realize that having good relations with the United States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle East and beyond. Even though Turkey's role as a provider of security and stability in the region is weakened as a result of the recent developments in Syria and the ensuing negative consequences in its relations to other countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and resume its position. Partnering with the United States is not always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuaded Turkey's leaders that they need to backstop their new economic strength and cultural attractiveness with the kind of hard power that is most readily available to the United States. For a partnership between Turkey and the United States to endure, however, Turkey must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspective, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and resolve a domestic democratic deficit. At the same time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting Turkey's security concerns regarding the European Union, while the United States should adopt a more proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of tensions between Ankara and Washington that could significantly worsen at any time.
This study investigates the impact of United States-Turkish relations on Iraqi Kurdistan during 2003-2011, where the relations between US-Turkey deteriorated after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, and following the Turkish Parliament's decision not to allow US troops to pass through its territory into Iraq and open a front in the north. The Iraqi Kurds took advantage of this opportunity and provided support and backing of the US forces and participated with the Americans in the fight against Baghdad. This study attempts to answer important questions regarding the impact of US-Turkish relations on Iraqi Kurdistan. It points out the ensuing rift in US-Turkish relations and the US dispensing of Turkey as a strategic ally in the region and the stepping up of the Iraqi Kurds to fill this role. Furthermore, this study identifies the historical ties and strategic interests between the US and Turkey and the importance of the latter's geo-strategic position in US foreign policy. All these factors have justified America's view that Turkey is an indispensible ally and led them to sacrifice the Kurds and their cause once again in 2007, as it has done in the past. The passing and enforcement of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which relates to solving the problem of Kirkuk and other disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil has been postponed indefinitely to appease Turkey. On the other hand, this study has found that US-Turkish relations witnessed a positive impact on the Kurdistan region of Iraq and have gone through phases of engagement and estrangement between the two countries. The Kurds exploited the deterioration of relations between the US and Turkey in 2003; they approached the US and relations normalized in 2007. This allied status with the US has had a positive impact on the Iraqi Kurds and the US has been able to convince Turkey to acknowledge the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. Subsequently, the Prime Minster of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Erbil and participated in the opening of Erbil International Airport in 2011. This study recommends that the United States to work towards consolidation of democracy in Iraq and not to allow the emergence of new dictators in Iraq. It turns specifically to the authority of a single party, the Da'wa party of Prime Minister Nūrī al-Malik, as it is dedicated to improving the Iraqi Constitution and resolving outstanding disputes between Baghdad and Erbil is considered to be a source of strength and unity in Iraqi society. Without such a foundation, interests of the US and its ally in the region, Turkey, are at risk.