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The Committee of Public Accounts scrutinises the reasons behind individual Departments exceeding their allocated resources, and reports to the House of Commons on whether it has any objection to the amounts needed to rectify the reported excesses. The Committee may also make recommendations to Departments concerning the causes of these excesses. In 2010-11, two bodies breached their expenditure limits: The Department for Transport breached its Net Cash Requirement by £335.2 million, primarily because of weaknesses in monitoring its budget for the operation of its rail franchises; The Teachers' Pension Scheme (England & Wales) breached its Net Cash Requirement by £11.9 million because the Department for Education underestimated the number of members that would retire in 2010-11 and overestimated the contributions that would be collected from employers. On the basis of an examination of the reasons why these two bodies exceeded their voted provisions, the Committee has no objection to Parliament providing the necessary amounts by means of an Excess Vote. Nevertheless, it expects both bodies to set out what actions they have taken to improve their financial management and avoid exceeding their allocated resources in the future.
In November 2011, HM Treasury published the first audited Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), covering the year 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 (HC 1601, ISBN 9780102975192). The Committee welcomes this major step forward in improving transparency and accountability and highlights some of the information it contains: at 31 March 2010 the government's public service pensions liability was around £1,132 billion; the present value of its future commitments under PFI schemes was £131.5 billion; the government wrote off £10.9 billion in unpaid taxes and expected to have to pay £15.7 billion for outstanding clinical negligence claims; cost of future nuclear decommissioning (£56.7 billion); the need for stronger accountability systems to secure effective responsibility for cost and value for money at local levels - academies, Free Schools, Foundation Trusts and GP consortia. But the WGA will only serve its purpose- showing what the government owns, owes, spends and receives - if it is timely and robust. The figures in the first audited WGA are too dated because Treasury took 20 months to prepare and publish the report. Treasury must address the issues that led the Comptroller and Auditor General to qualify his audit opinion on the WGA 2009-10. A key issue is Treasury's decision to deviate from accounting standards, by omitting Network Rail, the publicly owned banks, and various other government-controlled or owned bodies from the WGA. The Committee sets out a set of principles that future accounts should follow.
The Department for Education provides funding for local authorities to pay for three and four year olds to receive their entitlement to 15 hours of free education each week. The Department devolves delivery to local authorities and providers but it is responsible for the overall value for money from the system. In 2011-12 the Department's estimated funding for the entitlement of £1.9 billion provided over 800,000 three and four year olds with access to free education; an estimated annual allocation of approximately £2,300 per child. While the Department and local authorities have focused on ensuring places for children are available, there has been less attention on how value for money can be secured and improved. While there is evidence of educational improvement at age five, the evidence that this is sustained is questionable. The Department needs to do more to understand how educational benefits can be lasting. There is not enough good information for parents to make informed choices and there is concern at reports that some families are still not receiving the entitlement free of charge. It is important that all parents know what the entitlement is and that it should be provided completely free. Early years education has the greatest benefit for children from disadvantaged backgrounds however these children have the lowest levels of take-up and deprived areas have the lowest levels of high quality services. The Department needs to identify and share good practice from those local authorities which are having the most success.
This report is a follow-up to the Committee's report on Accountability for Public Money (HC 740, session 2010-11 (ISBN 9780215559029)) an issue at the core of the relationship between Parliament and government. Accounting Officers remain accountable to Parliament for funds voted to their departments but the policy intention is that local bodies will have significant discretion over the services they deliver. In the Government's response, 'Accountability: Adapting to Decentralisation', Sir Bob Kerslake drew a distinction between those services that government delivers directly and those that it may fund but are delivered in more decentralised arrangements. He proposed that Accounting Officers set out, in Accountability System Statements, the arrangements they have in place to provide assurance about the probity and value for money of funds spent through devolved systems. All departments are expected to produce Statements by summer 2012. Departments have made a genuine effort to develop arrangements which reconcile accountability and localism but the Statements so far are unwieldy and considerably more needs to be done to improve their clarity, consistency and completeness. There is concern that accountability frameworks must drive value for money and, critically, are sufficiently robust to address the operational or financial failure of service providers. Departments are placing increasing reliance on market mechanisms such as user choice to drive up performance and value for money, but there are limits to what these mechanisms can achieve. The Treasury needs to take ownership of the system and ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General has the necessary powers and rights of access to examine the value for money of funds spent through devolved systems
The Commons Public Accounts Committee publishes its 61st Report of the Session which, on the basis of evidence from the Cabinet Office and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), examined tax disputes. At 31 March 2011 HM Revenue & Customs was seeking to resolve tax issues valued at over £25 billion with large companies, some of which included disputes over outstanding tax. In this report, the Committee expresses concern about how the Department handled some cases involving large settlements and that there needs to be proper separation between the negotiation of tax settlements and the authorization of such settlements. The Committee also states that HMRC made matters worse by trying to avoid scrutiny of these settlements, keeping confidential the details of specific settlements with large companies. This effects Parliament's ability to establish value for money, compounded further by imprecise, inconsistent and potentially misleading answers given by senior departmental officials, including the Permanent Secretary for Tax in particular over his evidence on his relationship with Goldman Sachs, in facilitating a settlement with the company over their tax dispute. HMRC governance processes in these matters were inconsistent and it has now appointed two new Commissioners with tax expertise, and plans to introduce a new assessor role to permit independent review of large settlements before they are finalised. The Committee further states that it saw little evidence of personal accountability within the Department, and that a perception has developed that large companies are treated more favourably, receiving preferential treatment compared to small businesses and individuals.

HM Treasury

Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Committee of Public Accounts

Published: 2013-04-29

Total Pages: 44


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Infrastructure UK, an advisory unit within the Treasury, was established in 2010 with a remit to specify what economic infrastructure is needed in the UK, to identify the key barriers to achieving that investment and to mobilise systems and resources, both public and private to make it happen. The first National Infrastructure Plan was published in 2010. The latest update of the plan, published in December 2012, comprised over 500 prospective programmes and projects for new economic infrastructure expected to cost £310 billion. Some 64% of this amount is expected to be spent on infrastructure that will be wholly owned and financed by the private sector with households bearing the costs through higher bills or fares. Many of the investment proposals impact on energy supply and are therefore particularly time critical. The Committee believes that this will lead to higher costs which will be borne by consumers and are particularly concerned at the impact of higher energy bills on those with low incomes. Many of the programmes are broad categories and in total they include more than 200 individual projects. This does not suggest a properly targeted and prioritised infrastructure plan. Furthermore, the statutory framework provided by the Energy Bill is coming rather late in the day when the energy crunch is fast approaching. It is likely that the UK will buy ever more energy from overseas and at a higher price due to the failure to secure investment. In these circumstances greater transparency is needed over investors' costs, risks and rewards

DFID

Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Committee of Public Accounts

Published: 2012-02-03

Total Pages: 56


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The DFiD's transfer programmes deliver cash, food and assets, such as livestock, directly to people living in poverty. Transfers can be used to tackle a range of issues, such as hunger and malnutrition, or access to health and education services, in a variety of contexts. In 2010-11 the Department spent £192 million on social protection programmes, which includes its transfer programmes. The evidence heard suggests transfer programmes are effective in targeting aid, and ensuring the money goes directly to the poorest and most vulnerable people. It is therefore surprising that the use of transfer programmes has not increased. The Department only plans to support transfer programmes in 17 of its 28 priority countries. It does not have an overall strategy for the use of transfers and its decisions on where to support transfer programmes look reactive. The decision as to whether or not to propose a transfer programme is taken by staff working in the country and it is not clear why there are extensive programmes in some countries and none in others. The Department does not collect data on all the costs of the transfer programmes it supports and the Department is therefore unable to say whether it is lifting more people out of poverty for every pound spent on transfers compared to other programmes. The Department's long-term objective is for the governments of recipient countries to take on the responsibility of owning and funding transfers as part of a sustainable social security system. However, the Department has not been clear about how individual programmes will be sustained
The Stationery Office annual catalogue 2011 provides a comprehensive source of bibliographic information on over 4900 Parliamentary, statutory and official publications - from the UK Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and many government departments and agencies - which were issued in 2011.
This report examines the Department for International Development's financial management capability, its increasing focus on value for money, and the challenges it faces in managing its increasing programme budget while reducing its overall running costs. DFID is protected from overall expenditure reductions as the Government has committed to increasing the UK's aid spending to 0.7% of gross national income by 2013. The Department faces a substantial challenge to improve its financial management while reducing its administration costs by a third over the next four years. The Committee welcomes the planned introduction, in 2011, of a finance improvement plan. DFID must now keep up the focus on better financial management. There is concern that the Department does not quantify the likely level of leakage through fraud and corruption. And DFID is only considering fraud risk at the level of delivery method rather than at a country level. Management of fraud risk will require a stronger framework for ensuring money is properly spent on the ground, with effective monitoring and pro-active anti-fraud work. The likely increase in funding via multilateral organisations (which then determine how to distribute the aid worldwide) might not ensure value for money as DFID does not have the same visibility over the cost and performance of multilaterals' programmes as it does over its own bilateral programmes. Finally, the Committee is concerned that the Department still has insufficient data to make informed investment decisions based on value for money.
This report examines existing approaches to formula funding across government, and the principles that should be carried forward to new arrangements. Government departments distributed £152 billion, one-fifth of all government spending, to local public bodies in 2011-12 based on the three grants considered: Primary Care Trust Allocations; Dedicated Schools Grant; and the Department for Communities and Local Government's Formula Grant. These distribute funding to local public bodies in a range of sectors, including health, education, local government, police and fire and rescue services. The formula funding systems are complex, difficult to understand, and have led to inequitable allocations. For Dedicated Schools Grant, based mainly on historical spending patterns, per pupil funding for schools with similar characteristics can vary by as much as 40%. Under Formula Grant, nearly 20% of authorities received allocations which are more than 10% different from calculated needs. The priorities accorded to different elements of the formulae are judgements which have a direct impact on the distribution of funds. In some cases the basis for the judgement is guided by authoritative, published independent advice. In other cases, the basis for judgement lacks transparency, and external advice lacks status and influence. Only 4% of respondents to DCLG's consultation supported the current version of the model used to calculate Formula Grant. Some of the data used by departments in calculating relative needs is inaccurate and out of date. Current reviews of formula funding provide opportunities to address the weaknesses identified in this report.