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The tank was arguably the most important technological innovation that developed during World War I; however, without the support of the British Army and the allocation of important wartime resources, it would have remained merely a peripheral weapon. For far too long, the depiction of the British War Office and GHQ, France, as anti-technological and cavalry-oriented has persisted. While some historians have recently challenged this view, much of the traditional versus progressive school of thought, in regard to the production and employment of the tank, still survives. By posing the question: was the tank a peripheral weapon? this work reveals the vital role of the War Office in the production and employment of this stunning new weapon. The War Office was behind the creation of the original Tank Committee, the New or Advisory Tank Committee, the Tank Directorate and the Tank Board. It was these bodies, particularly the Tank Board, established in 1918, that facilitated the crucially important liaison between the users of tanks in France and the producers at the Ministry of Munitions. Without War Office involvement in this way, without its continued orders for more and better tanks, and without the consistently high priority status accorded to tank production by General Haig, it is inconceivable that the tank would have reached the level of technical sophistication, and therefore usefulness, that it had by late 1918.
In 1918, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) played a critical role in defeating the German army and thus winning the First World War. This 'Hundred Days' campaign (August to November 1918) was the greatest series of land victories in British military history. 1918 also saw the creation of the Royal Air Force, the world's first independent air service, from the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. Until recently, British histories of the First World War have tended to concentrate on the earlier battles of 1916 and 1917 and often underplayed this vitally important period. Changing War fills this significant gap in our knowledge by providing in-depth examinations of key aspects of the operations of the British Army, the Royal Air Force and its antecedents in the climactic year of the First World War. Written by a group of established historians and emerging scholars it sheds light not only on 1918, but on the revolutionary changes in warfare that took place at that time.
This book explores how British Army learnt from the pyrrhic victories of 1915-17 and developed the new tactics, leadership and doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate hitherto bedevilling Allied offensives to defeat the
Offering exhaustive coverage, detailed analyses, and the latest historical interpretations of events, this expansive, five-volume encyclopedia is the most comprehensive and detailed reference source on the First World War available today. One hundred years after the beginning of World War I in 1914, this conflict still stands as perhaps the most important event of the 20th century. World War I toppled all of the existing empires at the time, transformed the Middle East, and vaulted the United States to becoming the world's leading economic power. Its effects were profound and lasting—and included outcomes that led to World War II. This multivolume encyclopedia provides a wide-ranging examination of World War I that covers all of the important battles; key individuals, both civilian and military; weapons and technologies; and diplomatic, social, political, cultural, military, and economic developments. Suitable as a reference tool for high school and undergraduate students as well as faculty members and graduate-level researchers, World War I: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection offers accessible, in-depth information and up-to-date analyses in a format that lends itself to quick and easy use. The set comprises alphabetically arranged, cross-referenced entries accompanied by further reading selections as well as a comprehensive bibliography. A fifth volume provides chronologically arranged documents and an A–Z index.
When the Germans requested an armistice in October 1918, it was a shock to the Allied political and military leadership. They had been expecting, and planning for, the war to continue into 1919, the year they hoped to achieve a complete military victory over the Central Powers. Meighen McCrae illuminates how, throughout this planning process, the Supreme War Council evolved to become the predominant mechanism for coalition war-making. She analyses the Council's role in the formulation of an Allied strategy for 1918–1919 across the various theatres of war and compares the perspectives of the British, French, Americans and Italians. In doing so we learn how, in an early example of modern alliance warfare, the Supreme War Council had to coordinate national needs with coalition ones.
By the middle of 1918 the British Army had successfully mastered the concept of ’all arms’ warfare on the Western Front. This doctrine, integrating infantry, artillery, armoured vehicles and - crucially - air power, was to prove highly effective and formed the basis of major military operations for the next hundred years. Yet, whilst much has been written on the utilisation of ground forces, the air element still tends to be studied in isolation from the army as a whole. In order to move beyond the usual 'aircraft and aces' approach, this book explores the conceptual origins of the control of the air and the role of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) within the British army. In so doing it addresses four key themes. First, it explores and defines the most fundamental air power concept - the control of the air - by examining its conceptual origins before and during the First World War. Second, it moves beyond the popular history of air power during the First World War to reveal the complexity of the topic. Third, it reintegrates the study of air power during the First World War, specifically that of the RFC, into the strategic, operational, organisational, and intellectual contexts of the era, as well as embedding the study within the respective scholarly literatures of these contexts. Fourth, the book reinvigorates an entrenched historiography by challenging the usually critical interpretation of the RFC’s approach to the control of the air, providing new perspectives on air power during the First World War. This includes an exploration of the creation of the RAF and its impact on the development of air power concepts.
With so much at stake and so much already lost, why did World War I end with a whimper-an arrangement between two weary opponents to suspend hostilities? After more than four years of desperate fighting, with victories sometimes measured in feet and inches, why did the Allies reject the option of advancing into Germany in 1918 and taking Berlin? Most histories of the Great War focus on the avoidability of its beginning. This book brings a laser-like focus to its ominous end-the Allies' incomplete victory, and the tragic ramifications for world peace just two decades later. In the most comprehensive account to date of the conflict's endgame, David Stevenson approaches the events of 1918 from a truly international perspective, examining the positions and perspectives of combatants on both sides, as well as the impact of the Russian Revolution. Stevenson pays close attention to America's effort in its first twentieth-century war, including its naval and military contribution, army recruitment, industrial mobilization, and home-front politics. Alongside military and political developments, he adds new information about the crucial role of economics and logistics. The Allies' eventual success, Stevenson shows, was due to new organizational methods of managing men and materiel and to increased combat effectiveness resulting partly from technological innovation. These factors, combined with Germany's disastrous military offensive in spring 1918, ensured an Allied victory-but not a conclusive German defeat.