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Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units - combat, support, and headquarters - that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army's ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army's program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for develop­ing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
These proceedings are the third volume to be published in a series generated by the annual military history symposium sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This year's symposium, hosted by the Combat Studies Institute, was held 2-4 August 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 2005 symposium's theme was An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict. As this title indicates, presentations at this event focused on how an Army changes while concurrently fighting a war. Changing an Army in peacetime is difficult enough. Transformation can include changes to the personnel system, the turning in old and the fielding of new equipment, new training requirements, and at times, learning an entirely new way of viewing the enemy and the battle space in which operations will occur. Practical and cultural changes in an Army always cause tremendous turbulence and angst, both inside and outside of the Army.
As the United States enters a new century, its army confronts the difficult problems associated with transformation in an uncertain world. Moreover, the strategic environment makes it entirely unclear where, or when, or for what strategic purposes U.S. ground forces will find themselves committed to battle in coming decades.1 Yet, both the strategic environment as well as the harsh lessons of the past have a direct bearing on why the Army has begun the processes of transformation.2 The study of the past cannot lead to prediction as to the nature and conduct of war in the 21st century, but it does underline that sometime in the future the Army will find itself committed to a major conflict. Moreover, the nature of the current strategic environment suggests the parameters within which the future Army will have to operate. Finally, history is crucial to understanding what factors and approaches might best prepare the Army to meet future threats.
The current process of military transformation will enable the Armed Forces to do better what they already do superbly well. It is important to excel at decisive maneuver and in the application of precise, yet overwhelming firepower. But those attributes, though key in warfare against regular enemies, tend to be less valuable in conflict with irregulars. In war after war, the United States has been surprised by the poor political reward it has earned for its military effort. The IT-led transformation will do nothing to help correct the persisting American difficulty in functioning strategically and politically in its conduct of war. The author develops a cumulative seven-point argument.
From the Preface: The following pages provide a narrative analysis of the U.S. Army's development of armored organizations and their related doctrine, materiel, and training activities in the period 1917-1945. This period marked the emergence of clear principles of armored warfare that became the underpinning of the Armor Branch, influencing armored developments long after World War II ended. A unique style of mounted maneuver combat emerged that reflected a mix of tradition an innovation. In the process, American military culture changed, particularly through the adoption of combined-arms principles. Conversely, political actions, budgetary considerations, and senior leadership decisions also shaped the course of armor development. The emergence of an American armored force involved more than simply tank development. It included the creation of an armored division structure steeped in combined-arms principles, organizational flexibility, and revolutionary command and control processes. Parallel developments included the establishment of specialized units to provide antitank, reconnaissance, and infantry support capabilities. Several Army branches played a role in determining the precise path of armored development, and one of them-the Cavalry-became a casualty as a result.
An empirically rich account of how the West's main war-fighting armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.