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Training of Iraqi security forces (ISF) and employment of transition teams: hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, hearing held, May 22, 2007.
Training of Iraqi security forces (ISF) and employment of transition teams : hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, hearing held, May 22, 2007.
Oversight of the training of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), beyond the larger question of American combat presence in Iraq, will be necessary on an ongoing basis. This report is designed to improve that oversight and the efficiency of congressional-executive information exchanges on this issue. Our most significant finding, one that is reflected throughout this report, is that the Department of Defense (DoD) must do a much better job of reporting meaningful information to Congress on its ISF strategies, plans, and progress. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the subcommittee) started its investigation of DoD's efforts and progress toward developing an independent ISF in late February 2007 with the goal of releasing a report to the full Committee on Armed Services by July 2007. The subcommittee undertook this project because political and economic progress in Iraq "are unlikely, absent a basic level of security." To support the committee's congressional oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee's goals included the following: (1) Understanding the Administration's Iraq strategy and how the ISF development plan supports this strategy; (2) Investigating and assessing the capability and professionalism of the ISF; (3) Assessing the return on the U.S. investment in the ISF; (4) Assessing the plan to transition sustainment funding for security to the Government of Iraq; (5) Contributing to full committee deliberations on the 2007 supplemental budget, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror authorization, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and the nation's Iraq policy; and (6) Presenting information for public debate, and attempting to influence or improve DoD's approach to organizing, training, and equipping the ISF. This report will lay out the factual and analytical support for the following major findings: Strategy and Plans, Cost and Value, ISF, Critical Security Enablers, and Advisory Mission and Transition Teams (TTs).
Why did the United States fail to efficiently establish Iraqi security capability in post-Saddam Iraq, and what lessons can be learned from this failure? The U.S. administration in Iraq was admonished for the planning and execution of the reconstruction portion of Phase IV (post conflict) because it did not establish indigenous forces that could effectively secure Iraq so that the nation could be rebuilt. Initially, the effort to rebuild the Iraqi Army fell to an ad hoc organization consisting of General Eaton, four other soldiers, and a contractor. The effort to rebuild the police and other security forces fell under the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Neither organization was given any time for planning prior to March 2003, nor were they manned to accomplish the task. Policy mistakes that adversely affected the building of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) included disbanding the Iraqi Army, using contractors to train the new Iraq Army, a lack of unity of effort, and insufficient funds for the Coalition Military Assistance Team (CMATT). The building of the ISF evolved through several task adjustments, including increasing the resources allocated to CMATT to allow the training of 1,500 officers in Jordan, the deployment of Army Reserve Institutional Training Divisions (DIV(IT)), and the use of military Advisor Support Teams (AST). In June 2004, CMATT and CPATT were combined under the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Coalition units are now integrating Iraqi forces within their brigades. The author concludes that the DoD should never use ad hoc organizations for missions as important as the building of a nation's security structure. JFCOM Standing Joint Forces Headquarters and DIV(IT)s are resources that should be used. The security effort should be allocated sufficient planning time, weighted appropriately, and have unity of effort. The paper also reviews efforts by Britain to build indigenous forces in Iraq after WWI.
This manuscript describes how US military advisors prepare for and conduct operations in war. Through two separate year-long combat tours as a military advisor in Iraq, the author brings true vignettes into modern military strategy and operational art. Further, the author provides multiple perspectives in command relationships. Through years of personal experience, direct interviews, and Warfighting knowledge, the author challenges conventionally accepted truths and establishes a new standard for understanding the impact of American advisors on the modern battleground.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein¿s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov¿t. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.