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The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
This study attempts to trace the development of combined arms concepts, organization, and practices by an examination of five major powers: Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The focus is on developments at and below division level, and as such this survey provides valuable background information for the process of force and doctrinal design. Prior to 1914, the combat arms were integrated within divisions of most armies. Yet each of the arms existed in small units equipped with only one type of weapon and having only limited interaction with the other arms. Most professional soldiers were aware of developments in the firepower of infantry and artillery weapons, but it required the reality of World War I to establish the absolute necessity for infantry-artillery cooperation in all tactical operations. World War I not only witnessed the growth of modern indirect fire techniques and infantry organizations, but also forced armies to develop elaborate command, control, and communications systems to orchestrate the various arms on a complex battlefield. Between the two World wars, major armies evolved in different directions, despite their common recognition of tactical issues such as mechanization and air support. All nations developed new tactics and equipment to some degree, but only Germany synchronized its developments in materiel, doctrine, and training so that it had a temporary advantage in mechanized warfare during the period 1933-41. World War II produced a number of major trends. For example, most armies adjusted their armored formations from an extremely tank-heavy structure towards a relatively balanced combination of infantry, armor, antitank, and artillery elements. Different nations tried different solutions to the problem of task organizing at the small unit and division level, and all experienced difficulties in coordinating close air support. Since 1945, both the Soviet Union and the United States have had to adjust to major challenges posed to mechanized combined arms by the rise of nuclear weapons and of low intensity warfare. At the same time, the Israeli armed forces have followed the same pattern of combined arms use and neglect that Germany covered from 1916 to 1945. In addition to a variety of lesser points about the functions of various arms, this thesis focuses on three major themes: the necessity for combined arms integration at small unit level, the difficulties of achieving such integration by attaching non-divisional units on a temporary basis, and the continuing difficulties in reconciling ground and air force priorities in order to ensure effective close air support.
This thesis traces the development of combined arms concepts and organization by examining Great Britain, Germany, France, the US, and the USSR. It focuses on developments at and below division level, and provides information for the process of force and doctrinal design. Before 1914, the combat arms were integrated within the divisions of most armies. Each existed in small units equipped with one type of weapon and having limited interaction with the other arms. World War I not only witnessed the growth of modern indirect fire techniques and infantry organizations, but also forced armies to develop elaborate command, control, and communications systems to orchestrate the various arms on a battlefield. Germany synchronized its developments in materiel, doctrine, and training so that it had a temporary advantage in mechanized warfare during the period 1939-41. Most armies adjusted their armored formations from a tank-heavy structure towards a relatively balanced combination of infantry, armor, antitank, and artillery elements. They tried solutions to the problem of task organizing at the small unit and division level, and experienced difficulties in coordinating close air support. The USSR and the US have had to adjust to challenges posed to mechanized combined arms by the rise of nuclear weapons and of low intensity warfare. The themes of this thesis are: the necessity for combined arms integration at small unit level, the difficulties of achieving such integration by attaching non-divisional units on a temporary basis, and the continuing difficulties in reconciling ground and air force priorities in order to ensure effective close air support. (author).
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?