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The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.
This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.