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The volume is a collection of articles based on presentations given at a conference titled “Too Big to Fail III: Structural Reform Proposals – Should We Break Up the Banks ?” hosted by the Institute for Law and Finance on January 21, 2014 – the third session of a series on the topic “too big to fail” with the previous conferences “Too Big to Fail – Brauchen wir ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken” and “The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive”.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: Financial Crisis Losses and Potential Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act
Banks were allowed to enter securities markets and become universal banks during two periods in the past century - the 1920s and the late 1990s. Both times the ensuing unsustainable booms led to destructive busts - the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Global Financial Crisis of2007-09. Both times, universal banks made high-risk loans and packaged them into securities that were sold as safe investments to poorly-informed investors. Both times, governments were forced to arrange costly bailouts.Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in response to the Great Depression. The Act broke up universal banks and established a decentralized financial system composed of three separate and independent sectors: banking, securities, and insurance. That system was stable and successful for overfour decades until the big-bank lobby persuaded regulators to open loopholes in Glass-Steagall during the 1980s and convinced Congress to repeal it in 1999.In Taming the Megabanks, Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. argues that we must separate banks from securities markets again to avoid another devastating financial crisis and ensure that our financial system serves Main Street business firms and consumers instead of Wall Street bankers and speculators. Wilmarth'scomprehensive and detailed analysis of the roles played by universal banks in the two worst financial catastrophes of the past century demonstrates that a new Glass-Steagall Act would make our financial system much more stable and less likely to produce boom-and-bust cycles. And giant universalbanks would no longer dominate our financial system or receive enormous subsidies.Congress did not adopt a new Glass-Steagall Act after the Global Financial Crisis. Instead, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank's highly technical reforms tried to make banks safer but left the dangerous universal banking system in place. Universal banks continue to pose unacceptablerisks to financial stability and economic and social welfare. They exert far too much influence over our political and regulatory systems because of their immense size and their undeniable "too-big-to-fail" status.Taming the Megabanks forcefully makes the case for a a new Glass-Steagall Act to break up universal banks. A more decentralized and competitive system of independent banks and securities firms would not only provide better service to Main Street businesses and ordinary consumers but also bringstability to a volatile financial system.
The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.
The book presents arguments against the taxpayers'-funded bailing out of failed financial institutions, and puts forward suggestions to circumvent the TBTF problem, including some preventive measures. It ultimately argues that a failing financial institution should be allowed to fail without fearing an apocalyptic outcome.
The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries—developed and less developed, democratic and autocratic—respond by protecting bank creditors from all or some of the losses they otherwise would face. Failing banks are labeled "too big to fail" (or TBTF). This important new book examines the issues surrounding TBTF, explaining why it is a problem and discussing ways of dealing with it more effectively. Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, officers with the Federal Reserve, warn that not enough has been done to reduce creditors' expectations of TBTF protection. Many of the existing pledges and policies meant to convince creditors that they will bear market losses when large banks fail are not credible, resulting in significant net costs to the economy. The authors recommend that policymakers enact a series of reforms to reduce expectations of bailouts when large banks fail.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
In Misalignment: The New Financial Order and the Failure of Financial Regulation, Joel Seligman provides a broad account of banking, insurance, and securities regulation from the beginning of the United States through the 2007-2009 financial crisis and concludes with a plan for a fundamentally different approach to financial regulation that is more likely to avoid financial meltdowns in the future and minimize financial perturbations. The history of financial regulation in the United States is a history of crisis reaction. Before the New Deal, uncoordinated regulatory systems were established in banking and insurance. In the New Deal period, the U.S. achieved a long-stable model of financial regulation that atomized financial firms and substantially increased investor and depositor protection. After World War II, the New Deal financial regulatory model deteriorated and vast areas of finance evolved outside of regulation. No event better crystalized this deterioration than the financial debacle of 2007-2009. How was such a debacle possible in a nation whose financial regulatory system was long considered the finest in the world? More than any other cause, the misalignment of the Treasury, Federal Reserve System, and regulatory systems designed in earlier crises to address specific industries was overwhelmed by a New Financial Order, financial supermarkets that operated in several financial fields simultaneously. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was at best a partial response to the greatest financial calamity in our history since the 1929-1932 stock market crash. The failure of Dodd-Frank to address the structure of financial regulation was its most conspicuous weakness. Misalignment proposes a plan for a different approach to financial regulation designed to avoid economic failures in the future and minimize financial disorder.
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
In its final report the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) recommended a package of measures, consisting of ring-fencing vital banking services and increasing banks' loss-absorbency. The Government strongly supports the ICB's objectives and dual approach. The Government agrees that vital banking services - in particular, the taking of retail deposits - should only be provided by 'ring-fenced' banks', and that these banks should be prohibited from undertaking certain investment banking activities. On increased loss-absorbency, also supported are the ICB recommendations for higher equity requirements for large ring-fenced banks, a minimum leverage ratio, loss-absorbing debt, insured depositor preference and higher levels of loss-absorbing capacity for banks that are difficult to resolve. With regards to the principle that systemically important banks hold a minimum about of loss-absorbing capacity on a group-wide basis, however, the requirement should not apply to non-UK operations where it can be shown that those operations to do not pose a risk to UK financial stability. The Government also believes that depositor preference needs further analysis and consultation. On competition, the Government also strongly supports all the ICB recommendations. The Government estimates the aggregate private costs to UK banks at £3.5bn - £8bn, producing a gross reduction in GDP of £0.8bn - £1.8bn. Against these costs though should be set the potentially much larger benefits with the ICB's recommendations yielding an estimated incremental economic benefit of £9.5bn per annum. Significantly too the Government wants to see relevant legislation completed by the end of this Parliament in May 2015 as opposed to the ICBs recommended 2019