Download Free Three Essays In Energy Economics And Industrial Organization With Applications To Electricity And Distribution Networks Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Three Essays In Energy Economics And Industrial Organization With Applications To Electricity And Distribution Networks and write the review.

This dissertation consists of three chapters that study economic questions related to auction and energy markets. In the first chapter, I measure the extent of (real-time) production misallocation in Texas' main electricity market for 2009, the ERCOT market, and test whether these inefficiencies are generated by the exercise of market power. Using a novel data set that combines plant-level marginal costs, firm bid schedules, and market clearing prices, I construct a set of efficient outcomes and compare them to the measured output, costs, and prices. I find that, relative to the efficient allocation, costs increase by 9.5 and 34 percent, or $160 million to $472 million in 2009. I also find systematic departures from competitive pricing in the spot market that increase revenues by at least $192 million. Finally, I show that most firms exhibit behavior that is consistent with theoretical predictions of strategic behavior in the auction mechanism, which suggests that market distortions are generated by the exercise of market power. The second chapter proposes a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions. We extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction, and illustrate our method on data from eBay auctions. We find that even in auctions for identical "new-in-box" items, auction-level heterogeneity accounts for 41 percent of the price variation, and ignoring this heterogeneity would lead to a 15 percent overestimate in bidder surplus. The third chapter studies the effect of power plant closures on local housing prices. We combine data on power plants with transactional housing price data for the Midwest to estimate the effect of power plant closures on local housing prices using difference-in-differences estimation. We find that the retirement of a fossil fuel power plant leads to an increase in local housing prices of 6 percent. The effect is heterogeneous across fuel type, as we find an increase of 4 to 6 percent for natural gas, an increase of 0 to 11 percent for petroleum, and a decrease of 7 to 8 percent for coal
Increasing renewable capacity demands transmission infrastructure investment. In 2011 to 2013, Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) constructed several high voltage transmission lines from the wind-rich west Texas to demand centers. Using data on electricity production, demand, price and information on grid congestion, this paper shows that an increase of 100MW in the transmission limit from the West to the North reduces the hourly output of fossil fuel generators in the North by 71.1MWh and decreases the price in the North by 0.17$/MWh when the transmission constraint from the West to the North is binding. Meanwhile, the increase of the transmission limit reduces dispatch of coal and combined cycle gas power plants in the North, but increases production of simple cycle and steam gas power plants in the North.
Packed with case studies and practical real-world examples, Electricity Marginal Cost Pricing Principles allows regulators, engineers and energy economists to choose the pricing model that best fits their individual market. Written by an author with 13 years of practical experience, the book begins with a clear and rigorous explanation of the theory of efficient pricing and how it impacts investor-owned, publicly-owned, and cooperatively-owned utilities using tried and true methods such as multiple-output, functional form, and multiproduct cost models. The author then moves on to include self-contained chapters on applying estimating cost models, including a cubic cost specification and policy implications while supplying actual data and examples to allow regulators, energy economists, and engineers to get a feel for the methods with which efficient prices are derived in today's challenging electricity market. - A guide to cost issues surrounding the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity - Clearly explains cost models which can yield the marginal cost of supplying electricity to end-users - Real-world examples that are practical, meaningful, and easy to understand - Explans the policy implications of each example - Provide suggestions to aid in the formation of the optimal market price
Modem industrial society functions with the expectation that electricity will be available when required. By law, electric utilities have the obligation to provide electricity to customers in a "safe and adequate" manner. In exchange for this obligation, utilities are granted a monopoly right to provide electricity to customers within well-defmed service territories. However, utilities are not unfettered in their monopoly power; public utility commissions regulate the relationship between a utility and its customers and limit profits to a "fair rate of return on invested capital. " From its inception through the late 1970s, the electric utility industry's opera tional paradigm was to continue marketing electricity to customers and to build power plants to meet customer needs. This growth was facilitated by a U. S. energy policy predicated upon the assumption that sustained electric growth was causally linked to social welfare (Lovins, 1977). The electric utility industry is now in transition from a vertically integrated monopoly to a more competitive market. Of the three primary components (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the traditional vertically integrated monopoly, generation is leading this transformation. The desired outcome is a more efficient market for the provision of electric service, ultimately resulting in lower costs to customers. This book focuses on impediments to this transformation. In partiCUlar, it argues that information control is a form of market power that inhibits the evolution of the market. The analysis is presented within the context of the transformation of the U. S.
This dissertation combines research on three topics in applied Energy and Environmental Economics related to the electricity industry. In the first paper, I study the economic welfare impact of an electricity pricing program that increases the price of electricity for small commercial and industrial customers when the cost of generation is high. The second paper explores an energy efficiency retrofit program that provides free upgrades to low-income households in California. Both of these policy interventions were a result of orders from the California Public Utilities Commission, the energy regulator in California. The final paper examines the cost of air quality regulations on employment in the coal mining sector in Appalachia. These three papers study different important aspects of the electricity sector, from upstream regulation of generation to end use pricing and consumption efficiency. In the first chapter, I study how in electricity markets, the price paid by retail customers during periods of peak demand is far below the cost of supply. This leads to overconsumption during peak periods, requiring the construction of excess generation capacity compared to first-best prices that adjust at short time intervals to reflect changing marginal cost. In this paper, I investigate a second-best policy designed to address this distortion, and compare its effectiveness to the first-best. The policy allows the electricity provider to raise retail price by a set amount (usually 3 to 5 times) during the afternoon hours of a limited number of summer days (usually 9 to 15). Using a quasi-experimental research design and high-frequency electricity consumption data, I test the extent to which small commercial and industrial establishments respond to this temporary increase in retail electricity prices. I find that establishments reduce their peak usage by 13.4% during peak hours. Using a model of capacity investment decisions, these reductions yield $154 million in welfare benefits, driven largely by reduced expenditures on power plant construction. I find the current policy provides of the first-best benefits but that, with improvements in targeting just the days with the highest demand, a modified peak pricing program could achieve 80% welfare gains relative to the first-best pricing policy. In the second chapter, I study energy efficiency retrofits programs, which are increasingly being used to both save on energy bills and as a carbon mitigation strategy. This paper evaluates the California Energy Savings Assistance program, which provides no-cost upgrades to low-income households across the state. I use quasi-experimental variation in program uptake to measure energy savings for a large portion of the treated population in the San Diego Gas & Electric service territory between 2007 and 2012. The results suggest that the overall program is ineffective at delivering energy savings and is not cost-effective. One challenge in implementing efficiency retrofit programs is that each upgrade must be customized to the housing unit on which it is installed. As a consequence, there is a wide range in efficiency upgrade potential across the population of candidate households. To better understand this heterogeneity in measure installation and its potential to drive program outcomes, I use discontinuities in program rules to identify key measure specific savings. This analysis shows that larger upgrades such as refrigerator replacements do provide cost-effective savings when considering the full set of social benefits. Households that do not receive larger upgrades generally see little or no savings. These results suggest that heterogeneity in upgrade potential can drive overall program outcomes when only a small portion of the treated population is eligible for cost-effective efficiency upgrades. In the third chapter, I study the costs of Title IV of the Clean Air Act. This regulation put a cap on sulfur emissions from electric power plants, which reduced the demand for high-sulfur coal. Using a quasi-experimental research design, I estimate how coal mine employment and production in high-sulfur coal-producing counties were impacted by the regulation by comparing them to neighboring counties that produced low-sulfur coal. I find that coal production dropped by 20% and coal sector employment dropped by 14%. I find no evidence of spillovers to employment or wages in the non-coal sectors of the high-sulfur coal counties. The results suggest that the coal sector employment costs of Title IV of the Clean Air Act are highly concentrated in the coal industry, and that the decline does not detectably impact the overall regional economy.
A "quick look up guide," Electricity Cost Modeling Calculations places the relevant formulae and calculations at the reader's finger tips. In this book, theories are explained in a nutshell and then the calculation is presented and solved in an illustrated, step-by-step fashion. A valuable guide for new engineers, economists (or forecasters), regulators, and policy makers who want to further develop their knowledge of best practice calculations techniques or experienced practitioners (and even managers) who desire to acquire more useful tips, this book offers expert advice for using such cost models to determine optimally-sized distribution systems and optimally-structured power supplying entities. In other words, this book provides an Everything-that-you-want-to-know-about-cost-modelling-for-electric-utilities (but were afraid to ask) approach to modelling the cost of supplying electricity. In addition, the author covers the concept of multiproduct and multistage cost functions, which are appropriate in modelling the cost of supplying electricity. The author has done all the heavy number-crunching, and provides the reader with real-world, practical examples of how to properly quantify the costs associated with providing electric service, thus increasing the accuracy of the results and support for the policy initiatives required to ensure the competitiveness of the power suppliers in this new world in which we are living. The principles contained herein could be employed to assist in the determination of the cost-minimizing amount of output (i.e., electricity), which could then be used to determine whether a merger between two entities makes sense (i.e., would increase profitability). Other examples abound: public regulatory commissions also need help in determining whether mergers (or divestitures) are welfare-enhancing or not; ratemaking policies depend on costs and properly determining the costs of supplying electric (or gas, water, and local telephone) service. Policy makers, too, can benefit in terms of optimal market structure; after all, the premise of deregulation of the electric industry was predicated on the idea that generation could be deregulated. Unfortunately, the economies of vertical integration between the generation. - A comprehensive guide to the cost issues surrounding the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity - Real-world examples that are practical, meaningful, and easy to understand - Policy implications and suggestions to aid in the formation of the optimal market structure going forward (thus increasing efficiency of electric power suppliers) - The principles contained herein could be employed to assist in the determination of the cost-minimizing amount of output