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The documented threat assessments addressed here by Dr. Stephen Blank are clearly the culmination to date of a long-standing process by which the Russian military and government have forsaken the optimistic Westernizing postures and visions of the initial post-Soviet years and returned in many respects to assessments and demands for specific policies that evoke the Soviet mentality and period. The armed forces and the government have adopted a viewpoint that magnifies both the internal and external threats to Russia that they perceive and regard those threats as growing in number and saliency. This viewpoint is fundamentally at odds with both the post-1985 Soviet and Russian perspective and with Western perspectives on international security. In adopting this heightened sense of threat, the armed forces may well have been guided as much by interests urging higher defense spending and greater visibility for the General Staff and armed forces in the framing of Russian security policy. To the extent that official policy statements accept that assessment, they reflect trends in both internal and external policy that are inimical to notions of democratic reform and stability at home and partnership with the West abroad. Needless to say, such perspectives also make it harder for the overstressed economy, society, and polity to provide genuine security for Russia in a dynamic international context. The future course of Russian security policy is one of the most important and difficult questions in contemporary international affairs. This monograph addresses basic issues pertaining to Russia's future options for policymakers' consideration and reflection as the global debate over Russia's future direction under Vladimir Putin takes shape.
The documented threat assessments addressed here are clearly the culmination to date of a long-standing process by which the Russian military and government have forsaken the optimistic Westernizing postures and visions of the initial post-Soviet years and returned in many respects to assessments and demands for specific policies that evoke the Soviet mentality and period. The armed forces and the government have adopted a viewpoint that magnifies both the internal and external threats to Russia that they perceive and regard those threats as growing in number and saliency. This viewpoint is fundamentally at odds with both the post-1985 Soviet and Russian perspective and with Western perspectives on international security. The future course of Russian security policy is one of the most important and difficult questions in contemporary international affairs. This monograph addresses basic issues pertaining to Russia s future options for policymakers' consideration and reflection as the global debate over Russia s future direction under Vladimir Putin takes shape.
The years 1999-2000 mark a watershed in Russian military policy. During this time President Boris Yeltsin resigned and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who was elected in his own right in March 2000. The Russian Army carried out an operation to descend on Pristina and challenge the NATO campaign in Kosovo, and launched the second Chechen war in August 1999. In addition, the Russian armed forces conducted the biggest and most openly anti-Western exercise of their post-1991 history, known as Zapad (West)-99. The defense establishment published a draft military doctrine in October 1999, and the government published its own draft national security concept and revised official national security concept in January 2000. These developments led the Strategic Studies Institute, along with the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College, to sponsor a conference on the Russian Army in February 2000, at which this paper was presented. A subsequent Institute publication will address the official Russian defense doctrine, which was published in April 2000.
"Increasingly, the armed forces and a vision of security as emphasizing hard rather than soft security have come to the fore in Moscow's national security policy process. Due to this institutionally-driven vision, Russia sees itself facing increasing military-political and strategic threats all along its frontiers. Recent Russian policies reflect that perception and Moscow's adaptation to it. We may think this threat perception to be misguided, even bizarrely misconceived, given our own beliefs about what American policy is and what its goals are. Nevertheless, the strongest forces in the Russian policy community have bought into that vision and have made policy accordingly. Therefore, the key point that readers should take as they read these papers together is that Russian and American perspectives and policies are mutually interactive. They do not take place in a strategic vacuum devoid of all context, and develop to a considerable degree in response to the other side's activities and rhetoric. Neither we nor Russia can act in disregard of the fact that our actions have consequences and that other state actors in Eurasia, as elsewhere, also have a vote in shaping the context of international affairs and in the day-to-day conduct of U.S. and Russian national security policy" -- p. v.
Increasingly, the armed forces and a vision of security as emphasizing hard rather than soft security have come to the fore in Moscow's national security policy process. Due to this institutionally-driven vision, Russia sees itself facing increasing military-political and strategic threats all along its frontiers. Recent Russian policies reflect that perception and Moscow's adaptation to it. We may think this threat perception to be misguided, even bizarrely misconceived, given our own beliefs about what American policy is and what its goals are. Nevertheless, the strongest forces in the Russian policy community have bought into that vision and have made policy accordingly. Therefore, the key point that readers should take as they read these papers together is that Russian and American perspectives and policies are mutually interactive. They do not take place in a strategic vacuum devoid of all context, and develop to a considerable degree in response to the other side's activities and rhetoric. Neither we nor Russia can act in disregard of the fact that our actions have consequences and that other state actors in Eurasia, as elsewhere, also have a vote in shaping the context of international affairs and in the day-to-day conduct of U.S. and Russian national security policy.
Increasingly, the armed forces have a vision of security as emphasising hard rather than soft security, a view which has come to the forefront in Moscow's national security policy process. Due to this institutionally-driven vision, Russia sees itself facing increasing military-political and strategic threats all along its frontiers. Recent Russian policies reflect that perception and Moscow's adaptation to it. Russian and American perspectives and policies are mutually interactive; they do not take place in a strategic vacuum devoid of all context, and develop to a considerable degree in response to the other side's activities and rhetoric. This book is an overview of the Russian political, economic, and security issues, as well as U.S. interests.
From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world—and its place in it—that the West can best meet the Russian challenge. Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a “rational” Western nation—even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow's leaders think—not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors—will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.
This is an anthology of papers presented at a conference titled "Russian National Security: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects" conducted from 4-6 December 2000. The book organizes the papers into six sections - The Russian National Security Community, Russia and Europe, Russian Policy Towards the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia and Asia, Russia and the United States, and Russia's Military Transformation.