Download Free Theory Of Public Finance In A Federal State Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Theory Of Public Finance In A Federal State and write the review.

The central question of this book is whether the assignment of government functions to the individual jurisdictions in a federal state can ensure an optimal allocation of resources and a fair income distribution. The analysis thereby gives a new answer to the old question about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federal state. It shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance. While the allocative branch of the government benefits from fiscal decentralization, it is difficult to obtain a distribution of incomes that differs from the outcome that the market brings along.
Featuring a general equilibrium framework that is both cohesive and versatile, the Second Edition of Public Finance: A Normative Theory brings new and updated information to this classic text. Through its concentration on the microeconomic theory of the public sector in the context of capitalist market economics it addresses the subjects traditionally at the heart of public sector economics, including public good theory, theory of taxation, welfare analysis, externalities, tax incidence, cost benefit analysis, and fiscal federalism. Its goal of providing a foundation, rather than attempting to present the most recent scholarship in detail, makes this Second Edition both a valuable text and a resource for professionals. * Second edition provides new and updated information * Focuses on the heart of public sector economics, including public expenditure theory and policy, tax theory and policy, cost benefit-analysis, and fiscal federalism * Features a cohesive and versatile general equilibrium framework
The events of the last decade have challenged the contemporary neo-classical synthesis in all branches of economics, but particularly public finance. The most notable feature of the 2nd edition of Public Finance in Theory and Practice is the infusion of behavioral economics throughout the text, with an end of chapter question inviting the student to apply a behavioral lens to some question or issue. There continues to be an emphasis on the importance of the institutional context, drawing on examples from many countries and emphasizing the role of lower level governments in a federal system. The first five chapters establish this context by reviewing the role of government in a market system, the description of government structure from an economic perspective, the basic data about revenue and expenditures, the elements of public choice, and the distributional role of government. The book has been substantially reorganized to put more emphasis on public expenditure. Expanded treatment of public goods includes common property resources and congestible or club goods. Expanded discussion of budgeting and cost-benefit analysis provides some practical application of the theory. Updated discussions of social security, public education and health care address these three major contemporary public finance issues. The traditional emphasis on revenue (taxes, fees and grants) has been retained but follows rather than precedes the discussion of expenditures.
Useful for Graduate and P.G. Students of Economics and Candidates Appearing for Competitive Examinations. It examines every major problem of the economy of public sector first in the context of the developed countries of the western world and then their relevence is looked into from the angle of the developing countries.
Over the past few decades, a clear trend has emerged worldwide toward the devolution of spending and, to a lesser extent, revenue-raising responsibilities to state and local levels of government. One view is that the decentralization of spending responsibilities can entail substantial gains in terms of distributed equity and macroeconomic management. The papers in this volume, edited by Teresa Ter-Minassian, examine the validity of these views in light of theoretical considerations, as well as the experience of a number of countries.
This book discusses the principles of public finance, including public expenditure, the canons of taxation, the measurement of taxable capacity, the distribution of central, provincial, and local revenues, the distribution of the burden of taxation, the shifting and incidence of taxation, the taxation of land, the history of the taxation of income, general principles of the taxation of income, death duties or inheritance taxes, other direct taxes and the taxation of surplus, indirect taxation, customs duties, the burden of taxation, local taxation in various countries, public debts, and financial administration.
The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. In 18 chapters it surveys the state of the art - the tradition and breadth of the field but also its current status and recent developments. The Handbook's intellectual foundation and orientation is truly multidisciplinary. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that material and such neighboring fields as political science, sociology, law, and public administration. The editors and contributors to the Handbook are distinguished scholars who write clearly and accessibly about the political economy of government budgets and their policy implications. To address the needs and interests of international scholars, they place European issues next to the American agenda and give attention to the issues of transformation in Central Eastern Europe and elsewhere. General Editors: Jürgen G. Backhaus, University of Erfurt Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University Contributors: Andy H. Barnett, Charles B. Blankart, Thomas E. Borcherding, Rainald Borck, Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi, J. Stephen Ferris, Fred E. Folvary, Andrea Garzoni, Heinz Grossekettaler, Walter Hettich, Scott Hinds, Randall G. Holcombe, Jean-Michel Josselin, Carla Marchese, Alain Marciano, William S. Peirce, Nicholas Sanchez, David Schap, A. Allan Schmid, Russell S. Sobel, Stanley L. Winer, Bruce Yandle.
COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS systematically explores the hypothesis that, similar to merchandisers, governments are internally competitive and also in their relations with each other, as well as in their relations with other institutions in society.