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This paper develops a time series model for aggregate consumption to predict the U.S. personal saving rate. It then uses the model to test whether there has been a structural break in consumption behavior because of the 2008 financial crisis. Before the crisis, the personal saving rate was trending downwards. However, in 2008 there was a significant rise in the saving rate that continued until the end of 2012, suggesting a permanent change in household behavior. To assess this issue formally, the unknown parameters of the model are estimated using data for 1961Q1-2007Q4, a period which precedes the crisis. The model is then used to predict the saving rate from 2008Q1 onwards and to assess whether the rise in the saving rate after 2008 was due to sizable, but transitory, income/wealth shocks or to changes in the underlying elasticities between saving and its determinants (hence structural). The statistical evidence suggests there was no structural break in the household saving behavior, implying that the rise in the saving rate during 2008-2012 was caused by the negative shocks to income, employment and wealth. This result explains why the saving rate resumed its decline in 2013, as real disposable income, employment and net worth recovered. Assuming that the real growth in these determinants remains strong, the estimated model predicts continued negative pressures on the current account deficit and further external imbalances attributable to the U.S. household sector.
Initially published estimates of the personal saving rate from 1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2, which averaged 5.3 percent, have been revised up 2.8 percentage points to 8.1 percent, as we document. We show that much of the initial variation in the personal saving rate across time was meaningless noise. Nominal disposable personal income has been revised upward an average of 8.4 percent: one dollar in 12 was originally missing! We use both conventional and real-time estimates of the personal saving rate to forecast real disposable income, gross domestic product, and personal consumption and show that the personal saving rate in real-time almost invariably makes forecasts worse. Thus, while the personal saving rate may have some forecasting power once we know the true saving rate, as Campbell (1987) and Ireland (1995) have argued, as a practical matter it is useless to forecasters.
A sharp increase in the real interest rates in the U.S. in the 1980s was expected to induce a higher personal saving rate. Actually, between 1981 and 1983 the personal saving rate fell from 7.5 percent to 5.4 percent and for the 1985-1988 period it had averaged only 4 percent even though real interest rates have remained high. We argue that one possible explanation for this negative relation between interest rates and the personal saving rate is the large fraction of wealth, especially financial wealth, held by persons over 65 years old (this group has received more than 50 percent of all interest income in the U.S. during this period). Life cycle theory suggests, as we demonstrate, that the wealth effect created by an increase in the rate of interest reduces the savings of old persons and raises savings of the young and hence the effect on aggregate savings depends on the age distribution in the population.
Since the mid-1990s, the national income and product accounts personal saving rate for the United States has been trending down, dropping into negative territory for three months during the past two years. This paper examines measurement problems surrounding two of the standard definitions of the personal saving rate. The authors conclude that, despite these measurement problems, the recent decline of the United States personal saving rate to low levels seems to be a real economic phenomenon and may be a cause for concern for several reasons. After examining several possible explanations for the trend advanced in the recent literature, the authors conclude that none of them provides a compelling explanation for the steep decline and negative levels of the United States personal saving rate.
Many people mistakenly believe that Social Security (SS) will pay for all or most of their retire. needs, but the fact is, since its inception, SS has provided little protection. A comfortable retire. usually requires SS, pensions, personal savings & invest. The key tool for making a secure retire. a reality is financial planning. It will help clarify your retire. goals as well as other financial goals you want to ¿buy¿ along the way. It will show you how to manage your money so you can afford today¿s needs yet still fund tomorrow¿s. You¿ll learn how to save your money to make it work for you & how to protect it so it will be there when you need it. Explains how you can take the best advantage of retire. plans at work, & what to do if you¿re on your own. Illustrations.
There is probably no concept other than saving for which U.S. official agencies issue annual estimates that differ by more than a third, as they have done for net household saving, or for which reputable scholars claim that the correct measure is close to ten times the officially published one. Yet despite agreement among economists and policymakers on the importance of this measure, huge inconsistencies persist. Contributors to this volume investigate ways to improve aggregate and sectoral saving and investment estimates and analyze microdata from recent household wealth surveys. They provide analyses of National Income and Product Account (NIPA) and Flow-of-Funds measures and of saving and survey-based wealth estimates. Conceptual and methodological questions are discussed regarding long-term trends in the U.S. wealth inequality, age-wealth profiles, pensions and wealth distribution, and biases in inferences about life-cycle changes in saving and wealth. Some new assessments are offered for investment in human and nonhuman capital, the government contribution to national wealth, NIPA personal and corporate saving, and banking imputation.
Life-Cycle Savings and Public Policy examines data on many households from a number of different countries. The hope is that through these observations we can learn about the ways policies affect savings, and that other differences among savers can be controlled for, instead of being blamed on cultural differences. This book features a consistent framework among chapters. It reaches a harmony between measurement and analysis to compare accurately the resulting data and statistics. It provides econometric methodology to reveal the way policies affect savings. The book features data on household savings in Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. This book is recommended reading for anyone interested in saving, social insurance policy, or capital formation. Features a consistent framework among chapters Reaches a harmony between measurement and analysis to compare accurately the resulting data and statistics Provides econometric methodology to reveal the way policies affect savings
The declining U.S. national saving rate has prompted economists and policymakers to ask, should the federal government encourage household saving, and if so, through which policies? In order to better understand saving programs, this volume provides a systematic and detailed description of saving policies in the G-7 industrialized nations: the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Each of the seven chapters focuses on one country and addresses a core set of topics: types of accumulated household savings and debt; tax policies toward capital income; saving in the form of public and private pensions, including Social Security and similar programs; saving programs that receive special tax treatment; and saving through insurance. This detailed summary of the saving incentives of the G-7 nations will be an invaluable reference for policymakers and academics interested in personal saving behavior.