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In the U.S. Navy, “Wheel Books” were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments. In that same tradition, the new Naval Institute Wheel Books will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute’s vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings, selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects. Command is the pinnacle of leadership in a military organization. Navy regulations define both the authority and the responsibility of command as “absolute.” This Naval Institute Wheel Book provides practical guidance and advice that actual and would-be commanders can use to carry out that absolute authority. Included in this carefully selected collection is the experience of those who have commanded as well as the expectations of those who are commanded. Aspirants as well as practitioners will do well to exploit this selected survey of what Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz described as the “one purpose” for entering the Navy.
In the U.S. Navy, “Wheel Books” were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments. In that same tradition, the new Naval Institute Wheel Books will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute’s vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings, selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects. Strategy is described by the Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics as having “a permanent nature, but an ever-changing character.” For more than a century, both the nature and the character of this essential discipline have been explored in depth by contributors to the Naval Institute’s magazines, books, and oral histories. Drawing from those powerful resources, this collection makes clear why naval strategy has always straddled the boundaries between art and science and why its study and employment are essential components of the sea service profession.
The national conversation regarding the United States Navy has, for far too long, been focused on the popular question of how many ships does the service need? "To Provide and Maintain a Navy," a succinct but encompassing treatise on sea power by Dr. Henry J "Jerry" Hendrix, goes beyond the numbers to reveal the crucial importance of Mare Liberum (Free Sea) to the development of the Western thought and the rules based order that presently governs the global commons that is the high seas. Proceeding from this philosophical basis, Hendrix explores how a "free sea" gave way to free trade and the central role sea borne commercial trade has played in the overall rise in global living standards. This is followed by analysis of how the relative naval balance of power has played out in terms of naval battles and wars over the centuries and how the dominance of the United States Navy following World War II has resulted in seven decades of unprecedented peace on the world's oceans. He further considers how, in the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, both China and Russia began laying the groundwork to challenge the United States maritime leadership and upend five centuries of naval precedents in order to establish a new approach to sovereignty over the world's seas. It is only at this point that Dr. Hendrix approaches the question of the number of ships required for the United States Navy, the industrial base required to build them, and the importance of once again aligning the nation's strategic outlook to that of a "seapower" in order to effectively and efficiently address the rising threat. "To Provide and Maintain a Navy" is brief enough to be read in a weekend but deep enough to inform the reader as to the numerous complexities surrounding what promises to be the most important strategic conversation facing the United States as it enters a new age of great power competition with not one, but two nations who seek nothing less than to close and control the world's seas.
In General Naval Tactics, Naval War College professor and renowned tactical expert Milan Vego describes and explains those aspects of naval tactics most closely related to the human factor. Specifically, he explains in some detail the objectives and methods/elements of tactical employment of naval forces, command and control, combat support, tactical design, decision-making and planning/execution, leadership, doctrine, and training. Vego derives certain commonalities of naval tactics that occurred in recent and distant wars at sea. Many parts of his theoretical constructs are based on works of a number of well-known and influential naval theoreticians such as Admirals Alfred T. Mahan, Bradley A. Fiske, Raoul Castex, and René Daveluy.and influential naval theoreticians. Whenever possible, the author illustrates each aspect of theory by carefully selected examples from naval history--making the theory more understandable and interesting. Vego aims to present theory that is general in nature and therefore, more durable in its validity. The more general the theory, the greater the possibility of accommodating changes based on new interpretations of past events and as a result of gaining fresh insight from the lessons learned.
Operational intelligence, knowledge of the enemy’s location and actions, is crucial to effective military operations. The Admirals’ Advantage offers a revealing look at naval operational intelligence based on the findings of a classified Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Lessons-Learned Project and a 1998 Symposium at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. Participants included senior intelligence and operational leaders who explored the evolution and significance of OPINTEL since World War II. Past and current practices were examined with inputs from fleet and shore commands and insights from interviews and correspondence with senior flag officers and intelligence professionals.
In the U.S. Navy, “Wheel Books” were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments. In that same tradition, the new Naval Institute Wheel Books will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute’s vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings, selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects. Naval tactics were described by Vice Adm. A.K. Cebrowski, a brilliant thinker on the subject of naval warfare, as “the sum of the art and science of the actual application of combat power.” Renowned naval tactician Capt. Wayne Hughes called the study of naval tactics as striving “to bring whatever order and understanding is possible out of the chaos of battle.” With those words of wisdom serving as the “commander’s intent,” this collection sheds a bright light on this sometimes dark and mysterious but unquestionably essential realm, illuminating the principles and concepts of tactics that serve the warrior at the most critical moments.
This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
This book examines President Theodore Roosevelt’s use of the United States naval services as supporting components of his diplomatic efforts to facilitate the emergence of the United States as a Great Power at the dawn of the 20th century. After reviewing the development of Roosevelt’s personal philosophy with regard to naval power, the book traverses four chapters that reveal Roosevelt’s use of the Navy and Marine Corps to support American interests during the historically controversial Venezuelan Crisis (1902-03), Panama’s independence movement (1903), the Morocco-Perciaris Incident (1904) and the choice of a navy yard as the sight for the negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War. The voyage of the Great White Fleet and Roosevelt’s actions to technologically transform the American Navy are also covered. In the end the book details how Roosevelt’s actions combined to thrust the United States forward onto the world’s stage as a major player, and cemented T.R’s place in American history as a great president despite the fact that he did not serve during a time of war or major domestic disturbance. This history provides new information that finally lays to rest the controversy of whether Theodore Roosevelt did or did not issue an ultimatum to the German and British governments in December, 1902, bringing the United States to the brink of war with two of the world’s great powers. It also reveals a secret war plan developed during Panama’s independence movement which envisioned the United States Marine Corps invading Colombia to defend the sovereignty of the new Panamanian republic.
Ninety-four maps provide a historical overview of the U.S. Navy's battles, including information on the deployment of ships, their tracks, shore activity, and military engagements.