Published: 1988
Total Pages: 9
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Few people truly understand what the United States is about in its extensive East Asia security policies and defense relationships. Many people harbor serious misconceptions about what we're doing there. The public is being told some misleading things about our security role in Asia which, if not corrected, could erode the foundation of the most successful regional policy the United States has today. I have chosen the National Defense University, and this symposium, as a decidedly sympathetic audience to challenge and rebut this stream of negative thinking before it becomes accepted wisdom in this town. Most of you will have heard of, or read, the new book by Yale historian Paul Kennedy entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers." A survey of the past 500 years, it examines the states or coalitions of states which rose to economic greatness, how their economic power translated into political power and military strength, why they went to war, why the winners won and why the losers lost, and the consequences of their national policies. Professor Kennedy's lesson from history? For a great power to remain great, it must keep reinvesting in its manufacturing base, always looking ahead to the next generation of technology, and at the same time, it should resist the temptation to spend scarce national funds to hang on to far-flung military roles and missions that may have outlived their economic utility in a changing world. It is a provocative thesis. He sees the United States today clinging to a network of military alliances formed at the end of the Second World War, when American supremacy in the international economy was at its peak. He warns that other powers are catching up, growing faster by spending less on defense and more on technologies that may push them past the United States in the years ahead. Professor Kennedy's analysis suggests that we are making the wrong investments as a nation, choosing "guns" when we really need more "butter."