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Abstract: This study examines the U.S. Army's execution of counterinsurgency in central Mexico during the Mexican American War (1 846-1848). It focuses on the leadership of General Winfield Scott and several of his key subordinates. In central Mexico, the U.S. Army anticipated the insurgency and instituted measures to destroy it from the beginning of the campaign. They overcame the resistance by conciliating the population then using Mexican civilians for intelligence to guide raids on guerrilla bases. These efforts successfully eliminated the insurgents as a factor in the peace negotiations so that the U.S. could achieve the terms they desired. U.S. success against the guerrillas convinced the Mexican leadership that the only way they could potentially defeat the Americans was through a long and painful insurgency, which most feared the nation could not endure. The only option that remained was to accept the U.S. peace proposal and cede the land they demanded. The Americans facilitated their success by setting reasonable goals for the conflict and once they were achieved rapidly evacuating the country. By keeping the occupation brief, they did not allow the resistance time to adapt their tactics or attain outside support. This thesis challenges the assertions of some historians that the U.S. defeated the insurgents by using "scorched-earth tactics" and that U.S. atrocities undermined their efforts to gain the support of the Mexican population. By "scorched earth tactics" they mean the Americans indiscriminately destroyed any residence on or near their supply routes to prevent the populace from abetting guerrilla warfare. The evidence does not support these assessments. While Winfield Scott's conciliatory policies were imperfectly executed and U.S. soldiers occasionally committed atrocities, the harsh disciplinary measures Scott enforced on his men, combined with the clear military superiority of the U.S. Army, were good enough to convince many Mexicans to provide the necessary information to crush the insurgency. Finally, the conclusion compares the Army's execution of counterinsurgency in Mexico to modem American military doctrine and draws out lessons that can be learned from the experience. The American Army won the counterinsurgency in Mexico because good leadership prevented the insurgents from affecting the war's outcome.
CMH Pub. 73-3. The Occupation of Mexico is the third in a series of pamphlets on the Mexican War, which was the U.S. Army's first experience waging an extended conflict in a foreign land. This brief war is often overlooked by casual students of history since it occurred so close to the American Civil War and is overshadowed by the latter's sheer size and scope. Yet, the Mexican War was instrumental in shaping the geographical boundaries of the United States. At the conclusion of this conflict, the U.S. had added some one million square miles of territory. The Mexican War still has much to teach us about projecting force, conducting operations in hostile territory with a small force that is dwarfed by the local population, urban combat, the difficulties of occupation, and the courage and perseverance of individual soldiers. This is one of eight pamphlets by Stephen A. Carney planned to provide an accessible and readable account of the U.S. Army's role and achievements in the conflict. Other related products: The Mexican Expedition, 1916-1917 can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/node/50877/edit Mexican-American War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/mexican-american-war
Notes commenting adversely on the conduct of the United States Army, and North Americans generally, in Mexico during the period indicated. Particular attention is given to newspapers published under the auspices of the Unted States Army at that time.
This updated edition offers an accessible and richly illustrated study of Mexico's political, social, economic and cultural history.
This occasional paper is a concise overview of the history of the US Army's involvement along the Mexican border and offers a fundamental understanding of problems associated with such a mission. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the historic themes addressed disapproving public reaction, Mexican governmental instability, and insufficient US military personnel to effectively secure the expansive boundary are still prevalent today.
Spearhead of Logistics is a narrative branch history of the U.S. Army's Transportation Corps, first published in 1994 for transportation personnel and reprinted in 2001 for the larger Army community. The Quartermaster Department coordinated transportation support for the Army until World War I revealed the need for a dedicated corps of specialists. The newly established Transportation Corps, however, lasted for only a few years. Its significant utility for coordinating military transportation became again transparent during World War II, and it was resurrected in mid-1942 to meet the unparalleled logistical demands of fighting in distant theaters. Finally becoming a permanent branch in 1950, the Transportation Corps continued to demonstrate its capability of rapidly supporting U.S. Army operations in global theaters over the next fifty years. With useful lessons of high-quality support that validate the necessity of adequate transportation in a viable national defense posture, it is an important resource for those now involved in military transportation and movement for ongoing expeditionary operations. This text should be useful to both officers and noncommissioned officers who can take examples from the past and apply the successful principles to future operations, thus ensuring a continuing legacy of Transportation excellence within Army operations. Additionally, military science students and military historians may be interested in this volume.
Forced Marches is a collection of innovative essays that analyze how the military experience molded Mexican citizens in the years between the initial war for independence in 1810 and the consolidation of the revolutionary order in the 1940s. The contributors—well-regarded scholars from the United States and the United Kingdom—offer fresh interpretations of the Mexican military, caciquismo, and the enduring pervasiveness of violence in Mexican society. Employing the approaches of the new military history, which emphasizes the relationships between the state, society, and the “official” militaries and “unofficial” militias, these provocative essays engage (and occasionally do battle with) recent scholarship on the early national period, the Reform, the Porfiriato, and the Revolution. When Mexico first became a nation, its military and militias were two of the country’s few major institutions besides the Catholic Church. The army and local provincial militias functioned both as political pillars, providing institutional stability of a crude sort, and as springboards for the ambitions of individual officers. Military service provided upward social mobility, and it taught a variety of useful skills, such as mathematics and bookkeeping. In the postcolonial era, however, militia units devoured state budgets, spending most of the national revenue and encouraging locales to incur debts to support them. Men with rifles provided the principal means for maintaining law and order, but they also constituted a breeding-ground for rowdiness and discontent. As these chapters make clear, understanding the history of state-making in Mexico requires coming to terms with its military past.
A fascinating look at the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout history with a concentration on the 20th and 21st centuries. This encyclopedia examines insurgencies—and the counterinsurgency efforts they prompt—through history, addressing military actions and the techniques and technologies employed in each conflict, significant insurgency leaders, and the leading theorists, with emphasis on the "small wars" of the 20th century and most recent decades. The clear, concise entries provide a breadth of coverage that ranges from the Maccabean Revolt in 168–143 BCE and the Peasants' Revolt in Germany in the 1500s to the American Revolutionary War and the ongoing insurgency in Syria. Readers will gain a solid understanding of how insurgency warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has played a key role in the U.S. conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century, and grasp how this important military strategy has evolved during modern times.