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In these essays Stephen White examines the forms of psychological integration that give rise to self-knowable and self-conscious individuals who are responsible, concerned for the future, and capable of moral commitment. The essays cover a wide range of basic issues in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, moral psychology, and political philosophy, providing a coherent, sophisticated, and forcefully argued view of the nature of the self. Beginning with mental content and ending with Rawls and utilitarianism, each essay argues a distinctive line. Together they are a unified and powerful philosophical position of considerable scope, one that provides a unique vision of the mind, consciousness, personhood, and morality. White argues that the unity of the self revealed in personal identity and moral responsibility is best understood in normative terms. Basic to such features of the self are the patterns of self-concern in which they are characteristically displayed and the internal justification that supports such concern. The treatment of intentionality and consciousness that grounds this account emphasizes privileged selfknowledge and practical rationality and their corresponding contributions to the unity of the self. A final source of unity emerges from the analysis of our fundamental commitments, an analysis that ensures a central place in moral theory for the notion of the self. Stephen L. White is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University.
In The Unity of Consciousness Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part of the book Bayne develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. Bayne argues that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self. In one of the most comprehensive examinations of the topic available, The Unity of Consciousness draws on a wide range of findings within philosophy and the sciences of the mind to construct an account of the unity of consciousness that is both conceptually sophisticated and scientifically informed.
This book explores the relationships between intellectual development, self and personality, and proposes a comprehensive theory which answers such fundamental questions as: how do humans become aware of themselves? How do people come to know and influence each other? These questions are answered on the basis of four empirical studies, highlighting the development of self-awareness in those aged from 10 to 20 years.
Self and identity have been important yet volatile notions in psychology since its formative years as a scientific discipline. Recently, psychologists and other social scientists have begun to develop and refine the conceptual and empirical tools for studying the complex nature of self. This volume presents a critical analysis of fundamental issues in the scientific study of self and identity. These chapters go much farther than merely taking stock of recent scientific progress. World-class social scientists from psychology, sociology and anthropology present new and contrasting perspectives on these fundamental issues. Topics include the personal versus social nature of self and identity, multiplicity of selves versus unity of identity, and the societal, cultural, and historical formation and expression of selves. These creative contributions provide new insights into the major issues involved in understanding self and identity. As the first volume in the Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity, the book sets the stage for a productive second century of scientific analysis and heightened understanding of self and identity. Scholars and advanced students in the social sciences will find this highly informative and provocative reading. Dr. Richard D. Ashmore is a professor and Dr. Lee Jussim is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Investigates Plato's account of the tripartite soul, looking at how the theory evolved over the Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus.
Strong collection on a perennial topic in philosophy Distinctive in bringing together three approaches to personal identity: metaphysical, phenomenological and social
Judgments of personal identity stand at the heart of our daily transactions. Family life, friendships, institutions of justice, and systems of compensation all rely on our ability to reidentify people. It is not as obvious as it might at first appear just how to express this relation between facts about personal identity and practical interests in a philosophical account of personal identity. A natural thought is that whatever relation is proposed as the one which constitutes the sameness of a person must be important to us in just the way identity is. This simple understanding of the connection between personal identity and practical concerns has serious difficulties, however. One is that the relations that underlie our practical judgments do not seem suited to providing a metaphysical account of the basic, literal continuation of an entity. Another is that the practical interests we associate with identity are many and varied and it seems impossible that a single relation could simultaneously capture what is necessary and sufficient for all of them. Staying Alive offers a new way of thinking about the relation between personal identity and practical interests which allows us to overcome these difficulties and to offer a view in which the most basic and literal facts about personal identity are inherently connected to practical concerns. This account, the 'Person Life View', sees persons as unified loci of practical interaction, and defines the identity of a person in terms of the unity of a characteristic kind of life made up of dynamic interactions among biological, psychological, and social attributes and functions mediated through social and cultural infrastructure.
From its Presocratic beginnings, Western philosophy concerned itself with a quest for unity both in terms of the systematization of knowledge and as a metaphysical search for a unity of being—two trends that can be regarded as converging and culminating in Hegel's system of absolute idealism. Since Hegel, however, the philosophical quest for unity has become increasingly problematic. Jussi Backman returns to that question in this book, examining the place of the unity of being in the work of Heidegger. Backman sketches a consistent picture of Heidegger as a thinker of unity who throughout his career in different ways attempted to come to terms with both Parmenides's and Aristotle's fundamental questions concerning the singularity or multiplicity of being—attempting to do so, however, in a "postmetaphysical" manner rooted in rather than above and beyond particular, situated beings. Through his analysis, Backman offers a new way of understanding the basic continuity of Heidegger's philosophical project and the interconnectedness of such key Heideggerian concepts as ecstatic temporality, the ontological difference, the turn (Kehre), the event (Ereignis), the fourfold (Geviert), and the analysis of modern technology.
Most African countries suffer from crises of national identity that are rooted in the formation of pluralistic states, characterised by gross inequities among the component groups. This situation has its roots in colonialism, but instead of seeking remedies and addressing these disparities, many post-independent African governments adopted wholesale the constitutional models of their colonisers. United Nations Advisor Francis M. Deng addresses the challenge faced by these countries and attempts to tackle the difficulties inherent in managing such diversity.
This Routledge Revival reissues Oliver Letwin’s philosophical treatise: Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of the Self, first published in 1987, which concerns the applicability of the artistic classifications of romanticism and classicism to philosophical doctrine. Dr Letwin examines three particular theses associated with philosophical romanticism: that there is within us a high self and a low self; that there is a moral self in inevitable conflict with an amoral self; and that there is a rational self disjoined from and in tension with a passionate self. He argues that these notions of philosophical romanticism are, in fact, radically false, and instead takes the view that man can be a unified being of the sort described by philosophical classicists. But man has to work to achieve this status. The intrinsic unity of the human personality is not a guarantee of a coherent life, but a challenge to be met.