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''A clear and comprehensive introduction to contemporary philosophy of science.'' -- American Scientist ''The best account of scientific theory now available, one that surely commends itself to every philosopher of science with the slightest interest in metaphysics.'' -- Review of Mathematics ''It should certainly be of interest to those teaching graduate courses in philosophy of science and to scientists wishing to gain a further appreciation of the approach used by philosophers of science.'' -- Science Activities
Thomas Kuhn's celebrated work, 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' revolutionized thinking in the philosophy of science and to a large extent his 'paradigm shift' view has replaced logical positivism and the philosophy of Karl Popper. This book goes beyond Kuhn by explicating the non-deductive notion of 'paradigm shift' in terms of the new concept of representational space. In doing so, Edwin H.-C. Hung is able to produce the first-ever unitary theory that solves the five central problems in the philosophy of science: scientific explanation, the structure of scientific theories, incommensurability, scientific change and physical necessity. The book identifies the main task of science as representing reality. This involves the construction of a representational space and the subsequent modeling of reality with configurations of 'objects' in that space. Newton's mechanics, Einstein's relativity and quantum mechanics, then, all serve as representational spaces. 'Beyond Kuhn' is a significant progression in scientific methodology. Other than serving as a sequel to Kuhn's 'Scientific Revolutions', it will be of great use in the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology and education.
What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years.
The concept of gravity provides a natural phenomenon that is simultaneously obvious and obscure; we all know what it is, but rarely question why it is. The simple observation that 'what goes up must come down' contrasts starkly with our current scientific explanation of gravity, which involves challenging and sometimes counterintuitive concepts. With such extremes between the plain and the perplexing, gravity forces a sharp focus on scientific method. Following the history of gravity from Aristotle to Einstein, this clear account highlights the logic of scientific method for non-specialists. Successive theories of gravity and the evidence for each are presented clearly and rationally, focusing on the fundamental ideas behind them. Using only high-school level algebra and geometry, the author emphasizes what the equations mean rather than how they are derived, making this accessible for all those curious about gravity and how science really works.
In 1962, the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure ‘revolutionized’ the way one conducts philosophical and historical studies of science. Through the introduction of both memorable and controversial notions, such as paradigms, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability, Kuhn argued against the traditionally accepted notion of scientific change as a progression towards the truth about nature, and instead substituted the idea that science is a puzzle solving activity, operating under paradigms, which become discarded after it fails to respond accordingly to anomalous challenges and a rival paradigm. Kuhn’s Structure has sold over 1.4 million copies and the Times Literary Supplement named it one of the “Hundred Most Influential Books since the Second World War.” Now, fifty years after this groundbreaking work was published, this volume offers a timely reappraisal of the legacy of Kuhn’s book and an investigation into what Structure offers philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of science in the future.
An impressive characteristic of Dudley Shapere's studies in the philosophy of the sciences has been his dogged reasonableness. He sorts things out, with logical care and mastery of the materials, and with an epistemological curiosity for the historical happenings which is both critical and respectful. Science changes, and the philosopher had better not link philosophical standards too tightly to either the latest orthodox or the provocative up start in scientific fashions; and yet, as critic, the philosopher must not only master the sciences but also explicate their meanings, not those of a cognitive never-never land. Neither dreamer nor pedant, Professor Shapere has been able to practice the modern empiricist's exercises with the sober and stimulat ing results shown in this volume: he sees that he can be faithful to philosoph ical analysis, engage in the boldest 'rational reconstruction' of theories and experimental measurements, and faithful too, empirically faithful we may say, to both the direct super-highways and the winding pathways of conceptual evolutions and metaphysical revolutions. Not least, Shapere listens! To Einstein and Calileo of course, but to the workings of the engineers and the scientific apprentices too, and to the various philosophers, now and of old, who have also worked to make sense of what has been learned and how that has happened and where we might go wrong.
Thomas S. Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' was a watershed event when it was published in 1962, upending the previous understanding of science as a slow, logical accumulation of facts and introducing, with the concept of the 'paradigm shift,' social and psychological considerations into the heart of the scientific process. The essays in this book exhume important historical context for Kuhn's work, critically analyzing its foundations in twentieth-century science, politics and Kuhn's own intellectual biography.
Scientists use concepts and principles that are partly specific for their subject matter, but they also share part of them with colleagues working in different fields. Compare the biological notion of a 'natural kind' with the general notion of 'confirmation' of a hypothesis by certain evidence. Or compare the physical principle of the 'conservation of energy' and the general principle of 'the unity of science'. Scientists agree that all such notions and principles aren't as crystal clear as one might wish. An important task of the philosophy of the special sciences, such as philosophy of physics, of biology and of economics, to mention only a few of the many flourishing examples, is the clarification of such subject specific concepts and principles. Similarly, an important task of 'general' philosophy of science is the clarification of concepts like 'confirmation' and principles like 'the unity of science'. It is evident that clarfication of concepts and principles only makes sense if one tries to do justice, as much as possible, to the actual use of these notions by scientists, without however following this use slavishly. That is, occasionally a philosopher may have good reasons for suggesting to scientists that they should deviate from a standard use. Frequently, this amounts to a plea for differentiation in order to stop debates at cross-purposes due to the conflation of different meanings. While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific discipline, this general volume deals with focal issues of a general nature. After an editorial introduction about the dominant method of clarifying concepts and principles in philosophy of science, called explication, the first five chapters deal with the following subjects. Laws, theories, and research programs as units of empirical knowledge (Theo Kuipers), various past and contemporary perspectives on explanation (Stathis Psillos), the evaluation of theories in terms of their virtues (Ilkka Niiniluto), and the role of experiments in the natural sciences, notably physics and biology (Allan Franklin), and their role in the social sciences, notably economics (Wenceslao Gonzalez). In the subsequent three chapters there is even more attention to various positions and methods that philosophers of science and scientists may favor: ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions (James Ladyman), reduction, integration, and the unity of science as aims in the sciences and the humanities (William Bechtel and Andrew Hamilton), and logical, historical and computational approaches to the philosophy of science (Atocha Aliseda and Donald Gillies).The volume concludes with the much debated question of demarcating science from nonscience (Martin Mahner) and the rich European-American history of the philosophy of science in the 20th century (Friedrich Stadler). - Comprehensive coverage of the philosophy of science written by leading philosophers in this field - Clear style of writing for an interdisciplinary audience - No specific pre-knowledge required