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This book examines corporate governance rules in China, and highlights the deficiencies in current company law, with the purpose of arguing for a more effective derivative action mechanism, for the benefit of shareholders and their companies.
Despite the high expectation for the shareholder derivative action to play an important role in improving corporate governance in China, only one lawsuit has ever been brought since it was formally introduced in 2005, so far as listed companies are concerned. Above all, the 1% minimum shareholding that plaintiffs are required to satisfy by law is a barrier to derivative suits. However, it is impossible to establish and reduce the threshold figure to an appropriate level, and actually the minimum shareholding requirement as a mechanism for screening out frivolous litigation is inherently flawed. On the other hand, the nature of the derivative action determines that the strategy based upon judicial control rather than a minimum shareholding requirement cannot work properly in China, where the judiciary is weak, unsophisticated and riddled with corruption. When the judicial system is in such a state of condition, it is unrealistic that the derivative action -- and, indeed, the private enforcement of law in general -- can play a significant role in corporate governance. The findings in this paper raise a question of how corporate governance can indeed be improved in a country where the judiciary is incompetent to perform its role.
In-depth analysis of the derivative action in Asia - a critical part of Asian corporate law and governance.
Good corporate governance is crucial for the long- term success of Chinese economy. To achieve good corporate governance, legal liability is essential, because only legal liability can deter serious managerial misbehavior. Legal liability comes from both public and private enforcement of law, but public enforcement of law has various limitations. In private enforcement of law, the derivative action is preferable to the securities class action, not just because the later is unrealistic in China. For the derivative action to become a reality, appropriate legal rules should be in place. The traditional common law is problematic. The strategy adopted under the Chinese derivative action setting a minimum shareholding requirement as a condition for bringing a suit entails that derivative actions would not be vigorously pursued. The admission of derivative actions should be decided case by case according to the interests of the company and the responsibility of assessing the admissibility of cases should be assigned to the court rather than to the company. The assessment should be based on the probability of success and the potential net recoveries from the case.
Examining derivative action, which enables shareholders to gain redress for wrongs done to their company and deters breaches of directors' fiduciary duties, this book considers the use of such measures in China, which lacks adequate corporate governance tools.
Using detailed case studies of the first nine mainland Chinese companies to be listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (1993 94), Alice de Jonge examines the evolution of corporate governance law and culture in China s H-share market. A story emerges not of tensions between ideas of corporate governance from two different legal systems Hong Kong vs. mainland Chinese nor about legal convergence as China adopts concepts from Anglo-American jurisdictions. Rather, it is a story of individual firms being pragmatic in mediating the different agendas of state-agencies that own or control them. Corporate Governance and China s H-Share Market looks at corporate governance in a cross-border context is unique in providing a detailed understanding of China s H-share market reveals why a beer company was the first ever Chinese firm to be listed overseas. This fascinating work will appeal to postgraduate students and scholars of corporate governance, Asian law and legal systems and Asian business, as well as Chinese scholars more generally. Professionals such as law practitioners working in Chinese law will also find the book of interest.
Taking an agency perspective, this insightful text explores a range of issues and their role in corporate governance models, including executive compensation, takeover markets, the securities market, insolvency issues, and the venture capital market.
This book considers the derivative action, an important corporate governance tool which is commonly considered to serve two basic functions, i.e., enabling shareholders to gain redress for a wrong done to their company and deterring potential breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties. This book critically examines the derivative action from theoretical, evolutionary, and comparative perspectives. It considers how controversial issues such as locus standi, demand requirements, indemnity cost orders, information asymmetry and res judicata are approached in selected civil law countries as well as throughout the Commonwealth. The book also assesses whether derivative litigation could fulfill a similar role in China, which is one of the most rapidly developing economies in the world, yet lacks adequate corporate governance mechanisms. The ultimate aim discussed in the book is how to establish a remedial mechanism which makes derivative actions more accessible and consistent, while maintaining the balance between corporate efficiency and protecting minority shareholders’ interests. Lastly, based on different approaches in the latest reforming infrastructure, it explores whether there is a general converging trend for derivative actions between the two major legal systems.
Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Law - Civil / Private, Trade, Anti Trust Law, Business Law, grade: B+, Tsinghua University, language: English, abstract: The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China was revised in the year 2005. This paper analyses the protection of the minority shareholders under the new law.