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British Energy was the largest independent energy generator in the UK and owner of sites viewed by industry as the most suitable for new nuclear power stations. The Government sold its 36 per cent interest in the company to EDF Energy for £4.4 billion in January 2009. The final cash offer from EDF was 774 pence per share - 10 per cent higher than the valuation by the Shareholder Executive, the Government agency that managed the sale. Movement in energy prices after completion of the sale show that EDF put forward its offer when energy prices were at a peak. The Government's primary strategic objective for the sale was to ensure nuclear operators are able to build and operate new nuclear stations from the earliest date with no public subsidy. There was no binding commitment to build new nuclear power stations as a condition of the sale so it is too early to say whether the sale will enable the Government to achieve its strategic objective. But EDF's acquisition of British Energy has improved the prospect of investment in new nuclear power stations. While the Government no longer has a direct financial interest in British Energy, it remains responsible for funding any shortfall in the future cost of decommissioning British Energy's existing nuclear power stations. The Shareholder Executive did not carry out a formal assessment of the impact of the sale on the risks that taxpayers might have to bear if, for example, the new owner operated British Energy's power stations in a way that required earlier decommissioning.
This report, the 22nd from the Public Accounts Committee (HCP 356, session 2009-10, ISBN 9780215545084), looks at the sale of the Government's interest in British Energy. In January 2009, the Government sold its 36 per cent interest in British Energy, as part of EDF's purchase of the Company. The sale had potentially important implications for future energy security as British Energy, though not financially strong enough to invest in new nuclear power stations itself, owned land viewed by industry as being in the most suitable places for them. The Department did not, however, secure a binding commitment from EDF to build new nuclear power stations. The report adds it also failed to establish whether EDF had previously built any new nuclear power stations without public subsidy. A number of factors, including planning decisions, could result in EDF abandoning its plans to build new nuclear powers stations, with or without public subsidy. The Shareholder Executive hired investment bankers UBS at a cost of £4 million, equivalent to a monthly payment of around £400,000, to advise on sale tactics, assist with negotiations and provide valuations of British Energy. The Committee considers it unacceptable that the Shareholder Executive considered it necessary to spend so much on external advice when it is supposed to possess expertise in these areas. The Government was fortunate in selling its interest in British Energy when energy prices were at a peak. The £4.4 billion sale proceeds were allocated to the Nuclear Liabilities Fund, to put towards the future cost of decommissioning British Energy's existing power stations.
There has been little analysis of the constitutional framework for management of the UK economy, either in constitutional law or regulatory studies. This is in contrast to many other countries where the concept of an 'economic constitution' is well established, as it is in the law of the European Union. Given the extensive role of the state in attempting to resolve recent financial crises in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, it is particularly important to develop such an analysis. This book sets out different meanings of an economic constitution, and applies them to key areas of economic management, including taxation and public borrowing, the management of public spending, (including the Spending Review), monetary policy, financial services regulation, industrial policy (including state shareholdings) and government contracting. It analyses the key institutions involved such as the Treasury and the Bank of England, also including a number of less well-known bodies such as the Office for Budget Responsibility. There is also coverage of the international context in which these institutions operate especially the European Union and the World Trade Organisation. It thus provides an account of the public law applying to economic management in the UK. This book also adopts a critical approach, assessing the degree to which there is coherence in the arrangements for economic management, the degree to which economic policy-making is constrained by constitutional norms, and the degree to which economic management is subject to deliberation and accountability through Parliament, the courts and other institutions.
On cover and title page: House, committees of the whole House, general committees and select committees
The Olympic Delivery Authority continues to make good progress with its delivery programme and the main construction projects are on track to be completed in time for testing in early 2011. The Department has committed to delivering the Games within the £9,325 million budget set in March 2007. Most of the budget is for the Olympic Delivery Authority which has done well to control its costs and find savings across its programme, enabling it to absorb additional costs for the Olympic Village and Media Centre projects. These two projects are now being publicly funded, contrary to original plans. While £1,270 million of the original £2,747 million contingency within the Olympic budget now remains and is available to the Olympic Delivery Authority, the majority is earmarked to meet known risks, leaving only £194 million 'headroom'. It may be that not all of the known risks will materialise, but new cost pressures continue to emerge. Staying within the budget also depends on receiving some £600 million receipts from the Olympic Village development. There is the risk of a deficit in the London Organising Committee (LOCOG) and there is no contingency fund in its budget. Some £400 million of the income LOCOG still needs is to come from the sale of tickets. It is still not clear what will happen to major assets, including the Stadium and Media Centre, after the Games, and the consequent timing and value of any reimbursements to funders, including the National Lottery.
Incorporating HC 359-i and 494-i of session 2009-10, this report draws on the work of the Committee and the National Audit Office since 2003 in examining the BBC's approach to financial matters.
A NAO report published as HC 30, Session 2009-10.
This report examines the experience to date of delivering the debt advice project, and how the overall strategy for support to the over-indebted has been managed. Consumer debt stands at around £1,500 billion, and some 11% of the UK population struggle to manage their debts. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills shares responsibility for co-ordinating the strategy with the Department for Work and Pensions and the Ministry of Justice, and is responsible for the strategy's evaluation. There has been a complete failure to manage delivery of the strategy. Since 2006 the Department has also managed a project to provide face-to-face advice for those struggling with debt. The £130 million project is funded primarily from the Treasury's Financial Inclusion Fund, and delivered locally by Citizens Advice and other third sector organisations. Whilst greater success has been achieved in managing this particular project, which is delivering more debt advice than planned at a lower cost per person than budgeted, the project is currently unable to meet all the demand from those users it is intended to help. More people could be reached if the Department better understood consumer needs, the effectiveness of different methods of delivering debt advice, and the most efficient ways of providing advice. In addition, much debt advice is already provided by the private sector and the Department needs to consider both the quality of the advice provided and the contribution that private sector advice could make in the future.
This report (HCP 405, session 2009-10, ISBN 9780215553195), looks at the "Progress in improving stroke care" and follows an NAO report (HCP 291, ISBN 9780102963441) on the same topic. Stroke is one of the top three causes of death and the largest cause of adult disability in England, costing the NHS at least £3 billion a year in direct care costs, with wider economic costs of around £8 billion. A 2006 report (HCP 911, session 2005-06, ISBN 9780215029683) highlighted serious shortcomings across the whole stroke care pathway. The Committee welcomes demonstrable improvements in stroke care which the Department of Health has achieved since. The Department and NHS have increased the priority given to stroke, particularly the speed of the acute hospital response. However, improvements have not been universal. The Committee finds it totally unacceptable that the likelihood of receiving a timely brain scan or accessing specialist care is dependent on where and when you have a stroke. Also the improvements in hospital care are not yet matched by progress in delivering more effective support once stroke survivors leave hospital with many patients discharged from hospital continuing to struggle to obtain follow-up care and access to community rehabilitation services remains a post-code lottery. The Committee has set out a number of conclusions and recommendations.