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A recent surge in natural disaster losses in the United States has created widespread disruptions in the property insurance market and generated calls for federal protection against natural disaster risk. This article examines the market for disaster insurance in the United States and finds that insurance markets are limited in their ability to intertemporally diversify catastrophic risk. In a targeted response, this article proposes a new form of federal reinsurance based on the auctioning of multiple peril catastrophe call spread options that cover industry losses in the range of $25 - $50 billion. This article argues that the sale of these catastrophe excess-of-loss contracts utilizes the unique intertemporal diversification capabilities of the federal government to expand the market for natural disaster risk while enhancing the private market equilibrium for insurance.
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the roles that the private sector and federal government play in providing insurance and financial aid before and after catastrophic events. In this context, GAO examined (1) the rationale for and resources of federal and state programs that provide natural catastrophe insurance; (2) the extent to which Americans living in catastrophe-prone areas of the United States are uninsured and underinsured, and the types and amounts of federal payments to such individuals since the 2005 hurricanes; and (3) public policy options for revising the federal role in natural catastrophe insurance markets. To address these questions, GAO analyzed state and federal programs, examined studies of uninsured and underinsured homeowners and federal payments to them, identified and analyzed policy options, and interviewed officials from private and public sectors in both high- and low-risk areas of the United States. GAO also developed a four-goal framework to help analyze the available options.
The authors propose a financial model to address the design of efficient risk financing strategies against natural disasters at the country level. It is simple enough to shed analytical light on some of the key issues but flexible and realistic enough to provide some quantitative guidance on the ex ante financing of catastrophic losses. The risk financing problem is decomposed into two steps. First, the resource gap, defined as the difference between losses and available ex-post resources (such as post-disaster aid), is identified. It determines the losses to be financed by ex ante financial instruments (reserves, catastrophe insurance, and contingent debt). Second, the cost-minimizing financial arrangements are derived from the marginal costs of the financial instruments. The model is solved through a series of graphical analyses that make this complex financial problem easier to apprehend. This model captures and explains the main impacts of financial parameters (such as insurance premium, cost of capital) on efficient risk financing structures.
Is it possible that the insurance and reinsurance industries cannot handle a major catastrophe? Ten years ago, the notion that the overall cost of a single catastrophic event might exceed $10 billion was unthinkable. With ever increasing property-casualty risks and unabated growth in hazard-prone areas, insurers and reinsurers now envision the possibility of disaster losses of $50 to $100 billion in the United States. Against this backdrop, the capitalization of the insurance and reinsurance industries has become a crucial concern. While it remains unlikely that a single event might entirely bankrupt these industries, a big catastrophe could place firms under severe stress, jeopardizing both policy holders and investors and causing profound ripple effects throughout the U.S. economy. The Financing of Catastrophe Risk assembles an impressive roster of experts from academia and industry to explore the disturbing yet realistic assumption that a large catastrophic event is inevitable. The essays offer tangible means of both reassessing and raising the level of preparedness throughout the insurance and reinsurance industries.
The methods of disaster research are indistinguishable from those used throughout the social sciences. Yet these methods must be applied under unique circumstances. Researchers new to this field need to understand how the disaster context affects the application of the methods of research. This volume, written by some of the worlds leading specialists in disaster research, provides for the first time a primer on disaster research methods. Among the topics covered are qualitative field studies and survey research; underutilized approaches such as cross-national studies, simulations, and historical methods; and newer tools utilizing geographic information systems, the Internet, and economic modeling.
A clear understanding of what we know, don't know, and can't know should guide any reasonable approach to managing financial risk, yet the most widely used measure in finance today--Value at Risk, or VaR--reduces these risks to a single number, creating a false sense of security among risk managers, executives, and regulators. This book introduces a more realistic and holistic framework called KuU --the K nown, the u nknown, and the U nknowable--that enables one to conceptualize the different kinds of financial risks and design effective strategies for managing them. Bringing together contributions by leaders in finance and economics, this book pushes toward robustifying policies, portfolios, contracts, and organizations to a wide variety of KuU risks. Along the way, the strengths and limitations of "quantitative" risk management are revealed. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Ashok Bardhan, Dan Borge, Charles N. Bralver, Riccardo Colacito, Robert H. Edelstein, Robert F. Engle, Charles A. E. Goodhart, Clive W. J. Granger, Paul R. Kleindorfer, Donald L. Kohn, Howard Kunreuther, Andrew Kuritzkes, Robert H. Litzenberger, Benoit B. Mandelbrot, David M. Modest, Alex Muermann, Mark V. Pauly, Til Schuermann, Kenneth E. Scott, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. Introduces a new risk-management paradigm Features contributions by leaders in finance and economics Demonstrates how "killer risks" are often more economic than statistical, and crucially linked to incentives Shows how to invest and design policies amid financial uncertainty
The fields of insurance law and insurance economics have long and distinguished scholarly histories, but participants in the two disciplines have not always communicated well across academic silos. This Handbook encourages more policy-relevant insurance e