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This book studies the changes that have marked war in the Western World since the thirteenth century.
This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.
A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s.
Information dominance may be defined as superiority in the generation, manipulation, and use of information sufficient to afford its possessors military dominance. It has three sources: Command and control that permits everyone to know where they (and their cohorts) are in the battlespace, and enables them to execute operations when and as quickly as necessary; Intelligence that ranges from knowing the enemy's dispositions to knowing the location of enemy assets in real-time with sufficient precision for a one-shot kill; information warfare that confounds enemy information systems at various points (sensors, communications, processing, and command), while protecting one's own. Technical means, nevertheless, are no substitute for information dominance at the strategic level: knowing oneself and one's enemy; and, at best, inducing them to see things as one does.
Advances in technology can bring about dramatic changes in military operations, often termed revolutions in military affairs or RMAs. Such technology-driven changes in military operations are not merely a recent phenomenon: they have been occurring since the dawn of history, they will continue to occur in the future, and they will continue to bestow a military advantage on the first nation to develop and use them. Accordingly, it is important to the continued vitality and robustness of the U.S. defense posture for the DoD R&D community to be aware of technology developments that could revolutionize military operations in the future, and for the U.S. military services to be on the lookout for revolutionary ways in which to employ those technologies in warfare. This report examines the history of past RMAs, to see what can be learned from them regarding the challenge confronting the DoD today, when it has set out on a concerted effort to bring about a technology-driven transformation of the U.S. military to achieve the operational goals outlined in Joint Vision 2010. Among its many findings are three of particular note: RMAs are rarely brought about by dominant players (such as the U.S. military is today). For a dominant player to bring about an RMA requires a receptive organizational climate, fostering a continually refined vision of how war may change in the future and encouraging vigorous debate regarding the future of the organization; senior officers with traditional credentials willing to sponsor new ways of doing things and able to establish new promotion pathways for junior officers practicing a new way of war; mechanisms for experimentation, to discover, learn, test and demonstrate new ideas; and ways of responding positively to the results of successful experiments, in terms of doctrinal changes, acquisition programs, and force structure modifications. The DoD has some of these elements today, but is missing others. The report makes specific suggestions regarding ways of filling in the missing elements. Doing these things will facilitate DoD's force transformation activities and help ensure that the next RMA is brought about by the United States. and not some other nation.
What happens if we bet too heavily on unmanned systems, cyber warfare, and special operations in our defense? In today's U.S. defense policy debates, big land wars are out. Drones, cyber weapons, special forces, and space weapons are in. Accordingly, Pentagon budget cuts have honed in on the army and ground forces: this, after the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems like an appealing idea. No one really wants American boots on the ground in bloody conflicts abroad. But it is not so easy to simply declare an end to messy land wars. A survey of the world's trouble spots suggests that land warfare has more of a future than many now seem to believe. In The Future of Land Warfare, Michael O'Hanlon offers an analysis of the future of the world's ground forces: Where are large-scale conflicts or other catastrophes most plausible? Which of these could be important enough to require the option of a U.S. military response? And which of these could in turn demand significant numbers of American ground forces in their resolution? O'Hanlon is not predicting or advocating big American roles in such operations—only cautioning against overconfidence that we can and will avoid them. O'Hanlon considers a number of illustrative scenarios in which large conventional forces may be necessary: discouraging Russia from even contemplating attacks against the Baltic states; discouraging China from considering an unfriendly future role on the Korean peninsula; handling an asymmetric threat in the South China Sea with the construction and protection of a number of bases in the Philippines and elsewhere; managing the aftermath of a major and complex humanitarian disaster superimposed on a security crisis—perhaps in South Asia; coping with a severe Ebola outbreak not in the small states of West Africa but in Nigeria, at the same time that country falls further into violence; addressing a further meltdown in security conditions in Central America.
This report surveys opportunities for future Army applications in biotechnology, including sensors, electronics and computers, materials, logistics, and medical therapeutics, by matching commercial trends and developments with enduring Army requirements. Several biotechnology areas are identified as important for the Army to exploit, either by direct funding of research or by indirect influence of commercial sources, to achieve significant gains in combat effectiveness before 2025.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.