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Alexander L. George is a paragon of scholarship-an academic who successfully crosses boundaries between theory and policy, political science and several different disciplines, and case study analysis and theory building. Most of all, he bridges the gap between the ivory tower of research and the world of people, power, and politics. In these original essays, former students, colleagues, and admirers collaborate in portraying the research program of Alexander George's scholarship in all its diversity and complexity, examining subjects ranging from the role of beliefs in foreign policy-making to the factors involved in diplomacy and the use of force. Taken together, these essays offer strong testimony to Alexander George's extraordinary vision, erudition, and humanity.
Admiral Dennison's memoir is an especially valuable one, because of his close contacts with prominent individuals, notably service from 1948 through 1953 as naval aide to President Harry Truman. Early in his career, Dennison was a submarine officer and acquired postgraduate education, including a doctorate in engineering. He had contact with General MacArthur while on the staff of Admiral Thomas Hart at the outbreak of World War II in the Far East, later served in the Aleutians campaign and with JCS in Washington. Postwar he commanded the battleship Missouri (BB-63). In the 1950s, Dennison was in OpNav and various fleet commands; capped career with 1960-1963 tour as CinCLantFlt/CinCLant/SACLant during Bay of Pigs invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis.
Lars Schoultz offers a comprehensive chronicle of U.S. policy toward the Cuban Revolution. Using a rich array of documents and firsthand interviews with U.S. and Cuban officials, he tells the story of the attempts and failures of ten U.S. administrations to end the Cuban Revolution. He concludes that despite the overwhelming advantage in size and power that the United States enjoys over its neighbor, the Cubans' historical insistence on their right to self-determination has been a constant thorn in the side of American administrations, influenced both U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy on a much larger stage, and resulted in a freeze in diplomatic relations of unprecedented longevity.
This is the first book-length study of U.S. naval operations in the Mediterranean from 1945 to 1947, a period that is crucial for understanding the Cold War and its origins. Edward J. Sheehy shows how America assumed the traditionally British role of providing Western naval strength in the area, detailing how an American squadron grew from skeleton size in 1945 into a powerful armada by the end of 1947. His analysis of the cautious, but effective, use of naval power to counter the Soviet Union is intended for students of military and diplomatic history. Using extensive records of the U.S. Departments of Navy and State, Dr. Sheehy examines decisions to assign naval vessels to the Mediterranean, governmental communications, the rationale for the naval presence in the area, and the working relationships between diplomatic and naval officials. The history begins with a brief summary of Western naval activity in the Mediterranean including the final months of World War II. The region witnessed a continual increase in activity from a cruiser's visit to Greece in late 1945 to developments toward a Sixth Fleet at the end of 1947. The naval build-up is thoroughly chronicled with accounts of the battleship Missouri's journey to the area, numerous destroyer and carrier cruises, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's September 1946 announcement affirming America's permanent presence in the Mediterranean, and President Harry S. Truman's August 1947 directive regarding visits to Greece.
Dino A. Brugioni, author of the best-selling account of the Cuban Missile crisis, Eyeball to Eyeball, draws on his long CIA career as one of the world's premier experts on aerial reconnaissance to provide the inside story of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts to use spy planes and satellites to gather intelligence. He reveals Eisenhower to be a hands-on president who, contrary to popular belief, took an active role in assuring that the latest technology was used to gather aerial intelligence. This previously untold story of the secret Cold War program makes full use of the author's firsthand knowledge of the program and of information he gained from interviews with important participants. As a founder and senior officer of the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, Brugioni was a key player in keeping Eisenhower informed of developments, and he sheds new light on the president's contributions toward building an effective and technologically advanced intelligence organization. The book provides details of the president's backing of the U-2's development and its use to dispel the bomber gap and to provide data on Soviet missile and nuclear efforts and to deal with crises in the Suez, Lebanon, Chinese Off Shore Islands, Tibet, Indonesia, East Germany, and elsewhere. Brugioni offers new information about Eisenhower's order of U-2 flights over Malta, Cyprus, Toulon, and Israel and subsequent warnings to the British, French, and Israelis that the U.S. would not support an invasion of Egypt. He notes that the president also backed the development of the CORONA photographic satellite, which eventually proved the missile gap with the Soviet Union didn't exist, and a variety of other satellite systems that detected and monitored problems around the world. The unsung reconnaissance roles played by Jimmy Doolittle and Edwin Land are also highlighted in this revealing study of Cold War espionage.
This report documents the results of a conference on Military Operations and Crisis Management, held at RAND in January 1990 to explore issues concerning the use of military force in crises. The conference brought together active-duty and retired military officers, analysts, academic experts, and policy officials. Together they examined the constraints on and special requirements for force employment in crises that potentially involve the superpowers in a nuclear escalation. Tension can arise between the conflicting logics and imperatives of force and diplomacy when two nuclear-armed superpowers seek to have a war without shooting at each other. The logic of force employment in crisis thus differs from that in war. Conference participants concluded that the political signal that might be intended by the manipulation of military forces may not be understood by the adversary. Political leaders must understand the possible costs and risks in military terms of actions taken with military forces. Military leaders, on the other hand, must recognize the nature of the crisis management challenge to political leaders. Finally, political leaders must communicate their objectives clearly to those in charge of implementing them.
A fascinating, well-written WWII odyssey--a rare personal account of the outbreak of the war in the Philippines. As one of the few Americans in China during the second World War, Horton experienced a fascinating but little-known aspect of the war . . . from code breaking to Chinese guerrilla warfare.