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China has achieved alarming success in accelerating the economic growth rate since it started economic reform about 16 years ago.However, its state sector is still running severe deficits. Even though its productivity might be improved since the reform started, its financial situation, nevertheless, has been worsening mainly as a result of increased competition from the rapidly expanding non-state sector. Therefore, the reform of this sector has become an urgent problem.All the papers collected in this book are closely related to the various issues that the reform of the state sector has to solve.Among the contributors are Professor Merton H Miller, a Nobel laureate and expert on firm finance and governauce, Mr Ji Lin, the vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Dr Justin Y Lin, the director of Center of China's Economic Research at Beijing University, Professor Gang Fan, the well-known Chinese Economist and vice director of the Institute of Economic Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Guoqiang Tian, an expert on mechanism design at Texas A & M University, and many other researchers and professors from China and the North America's research institutes and universities. Therefore, this book will be extremely useful and relevant to those economists as well as government decision-makers working in the field of the transitional economy.
China's breathtaking economic growth, has often led observers to assume that the country's economic system has been transformed into a capitalist economy dominated by private enterprise. Although China's reliance on private enterprise and market-based incentives has been growing, and the CCP's treatment of private enterprises and entrepreneurs has been changing, it would be a mistake to minimize the current role of the State and the CCP in shaping economic outcomes in China and beyond. The Chinese government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain potent economic forces. Indeed, some of China's SOEs are among the largest firms in China and the world. They are major investors in foreign countries. They have been involved in some of the largest initial public offerings in recent years and remain the controlling owners of many major firms listed on Chinese and foreign stock exchanges.
This volume explores how Chinese institutions have adapted to the new challenges of 'state capitalism'.
How China Became Capitalist details the extraordinary, and often unanticipated, journey that China has taken over the past thirty five years in transforming itself from a closed agrarian socialist economy to an indomitable economic force in the international arena. The authors revitalise the debate around the rise of the Chinese economy through the use of primary sources, persuasively arguing that the reforms implemented by the Chinese leaders did not represent a concerted attempt to create a capitalist economy, and that it was 'marginal revolutions' that introduced the market and entrepreneurship back to China. Lessons from the West were guided by the traditional Chinese principle of 'seeking truth from facts'. By turning to capitalism, China re-embraced her own cultural roots. How China Became Capitalist challenges received wisdom about the future of the Chinese economy, warning that while China has enormous potential for further growth, the future is clouded by the government's monopoly of ideas and power. Coase and Wang argue that the development of a market for ideas which has a long and revered tradition in China would be integral in bringing about the Chinese dream of social harmony.
This book focuses on the nature and significance of China’s state enterprises which have undergone substantial changes since China’s economic liberalization in 1978. It argues that much of the criticism is based on mistaken premises, where even the term ‘state-owned enterprises’ is a misnomer given that the emphasis is much less on ownership than on control. Using numerous case studies, this book highlights the extent to which these enterprises have evolved in response to reforms, and provides an in-depth analysis of their role in China’s outward investment strategy in the “Belt and Road” initiative. This role speaks to their growing influence as China expands her global footprint.
The rise of China is no doubt one of the most important events in world economic history since the Industrial Revolution. Mainstream economics, especially the institutional theory of economic development based on a dichotomy of extractive vs. inclusive political institutions, is highly inadequate in explaining China's rise. This book argues that only a radical reinterpretation of the history of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the West (as incorrectly portrayed by the institutional theory) can fully explain China's growth miracle and why the determined rise of China is unstoppable despite its current 'backward' financial system and political institutions. Conversely, China's spectacular and rapid transformation from an impoverished agrarian society to a formidable industrial superpower sheds considerable light on the fundamental shortcomings of the institutional theory and mainstream 'blackboard' economic models, and provides more-accurate reevaluations of historical episodes such as Africa's enduring poverty trap despite radical political and economic reforms, Latin America's lost decades and frequent debt crises, 19th century Europe's great escape from the Malthusian trap, and the Industrial Revolution itself.
This book comprehensively analyses public sector reform in all parts of China's public sector - government bureaucracy, public service units and state-owned enterprises. It argues that Chinese leaders increasingly realise that efficient public administration is key to securing the regime's governing capacity and its future survival. The book shows how large state-owned enterprises continue to play an important and increasing role in the economy and in business. However, state-owned enterprises can no longer provide care for all from cradle to grave - finding alternative, efficient ways to deliver basic welfare and health care is the big challenge facing China's public sector.
The economic and geopolitical implications of China's rise have been the subject of vast commentary. However, the institutional implications of China's transformative development under state capitalism have not been examined extensively and comprehensively. Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism examines the domestic and global consequences of Chinese state capitalism, focusing on the impact of state-owned enterprises on regulation and policy, while placing China's variety of state capitalism in comparative perspective. It first examines the domestic governance of Chinese state capitalism, looking at institutional design and regulatory policy in areas ranging from the environment and antitrust to corporate law and taxation. It then analyses the global consequences for the regulation of trade, investment and finance. Contributors address such questions as: What are the implications of state capitalism for China's domestic institutional trajectory? What are the global implications of Chinese state capitalism? What can be learned from a comparative analysis of state capitalism?
Why and how has China succeeded as a developmental state despite a seemingly rents-ridden bureaucracy? Following conventional wisdom, "Weberian" bureaucracies are an institutional precondition for development, especially in interventionist states like China. However, my research finds that China's fast-growing economy has not been governed by a purely salaried civil service. Instead, Chinese bureaucracies still remain partially prebendal; at every level of government, each office systematically appropriates authority to generate income for itself. My study unravels the paradox of "developmentalism without Weberianness" by illuminating China's unique path of bureaucratic adaptation in the reform era -- labeled as bureau-contracting -- where contracting takes place within the state bureaucracy. In a bureau-contracting structure, the state at each level contracts the tasks of governance to its own bureaucracies, assigning them revenue-making privileges and property rights over income earned in exchange for services rendered. Contrasting previous emphases on the prevalence of illicit corruption in China, my study shows how and why bureaucracies in this context are actually authorized by the state to profit from public office. Specifically, I identify two factors that constrain arbitrary and excessively predatory behavior among Chinese bureaucracies: first, mechanisms of rents management, and second, the mediation of narrow departmental interests by local developmental incentives. In short, I argue that it is the combination of an incentive-compatible fiscal design and increasingly sophisticated instruments of oversight that have sustained an otherwise unorthodox structure of governance in China. In a phrase, bureau-contracting presents a high-powered but opportunistic alternative to the Weberian ideal-type. The Chinese experience suggests that "market-compatible" bureaucratic institutions need not necessarily conform to -- and may even diverge significantly -- from standard Western models, at least at early stages of development. My research draws on interviews with 165 cadres across different regions and governmental sectors, as well as statistical analysis of previously unavailable budget data.