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The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.
Between 1960 and 1968 the United States conducted intensive psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam. To date, no comprehensive study of the psychological war there has been conducted. This dissertation fills that void, describing the development of American PSYOP forces and their employment in Vietnam. By looking at the complex interplay of American, North Vietnamese, National Liberation Front (NLF) and South Vietnamese propaganda programs, a deeper understanding of these activities and the larger war emerges. The time period covered is important because it comprises the initial introduction of American PSYOP advisory forces and the transition to active participation in the war. It also allows enough time to determine the long-term effects of both the North Vietnamese/NLF and American/South Vietnamese programs. Ending with the 1968 Tet Offensive is fitting because it marks both a major change in the war and the establishment of the 4th Psychological Operations Group to manage the American PSYOP effort. This dissertation challenges the argument that the Northern/Viet Cong program was much more effective that the opposing one. Contrary to common perceptions, the North Vietnamese propaganda increasingly fell on deaf ears in the south by 1968. This study also provides support for understanding the Tet Offensive as a desperate gamble born out of knowledge the tide of war favored the Allies by mid-1967. The trend was solidly towards the government and the NLF increasingly depended on violence to maintain control. The American PSYOP forces went to Vietnam with little knowledge of the history and culture of Vietnam or experience conducting psychological operations in a counterinsurgency. As this dissertation demonstrates, despite these drawbacks, they had considerable success in the period covered. Although facing an experienced enemy in the psychological war, the U.S. forces made great strides in advising, innovating techniques, and developing equipment. I rely extensively on untapped sources such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service transcripts, Captured Document Exploitation Center files, and access to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives. Additionally, I have digitized databases such as the Hamlet Evaluation System and Terrorist Incident Reporting System for Geographic Information System software analysis. The maps provide examples of the possibilities available to the historian using these datasets.
As the American presence in Vietnam grew in the early 1960s with the introduction of full combat troops in 1965, it became evident that this American War in Vietnam was not like that of World War Two or even Korea. The enemy that American service members fought in South Vietnam was a mix of a tough guerrilla force and regular North Vietnamese soldiers. They controlled the countryside and the local populations of the villages scattered in the jungles and hills. The Vietnamese guerilla tactics required that the American military attempt to pacify the rural countryside and influence guerrilla and regular soldiers to lay down their weapons. The tool to influence the enemy was the psychological operations (PSYOP) units attached to maneuver units. However, the intricacies of the requirements from MAC-V on combat commanders to produce measurable data led to an overall failure to properly use this vital asset.This thesis examines the doctrine, training, and equipment shortages of the PSYOP units in Vietnam. By examining these aspects of PSYOP while using case studies of Operation Junction City and Operation Apache Snow, this thesis suggests that the PSYOP assets on hand for combat commanders were misunderstood and misused. Arguing that the failure of the U.S. Army to provide adequate doctrine and training for its combat commanders led these commanders to equate the effort of PSYOP missions to the effectiveness of it. This narrow understanding of PSYOP damaged its chances to affect the outcome of the war adequately.This work uses Field Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures, After Action Reports, and other primary sources to examine the doctrine and use of PSYOP during the course of the war. While examining the scholarship of other authors, this work expands the current studies to add examples and analysis of PSYOP use in a setting ruled by conventional forces.
Psychological Operations American Style examines the historical use of PSYOP by the Unites States in the twentieth century. Over six years into its War on Terrorism, and over thirty years removed from the Vietnam War, the United States continues to cling to its traditional style of PSYOP. It has remained a tangential weapon in the otherwise conventional arsenal employed by Unites States officials in the War on Terrorism. To the extent that Americans have utilized PSYOP, they have remained wedded to the notion of its use as a tactical offensive weapon meant to instill terror in their enemies. While often successful in the short term for securing defection and surrender, this type of PSYOP does little to win hearts and minds over the long haul. As experience in Vietnam demonstrates, using PSYOP only as a tactical weapon possesses the potential to undermine the nation's position by eroding its credibility. It offers civilian officials and military commanders the means to blur the distinction between information and persuasion in order to achieve immediate and demonstrable results. The use of such tactics by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam destroyed trust in the information given even at official press conferences. Psychological Operations American Style is ideal for military and diplomatic historians and scholars of the Vietnam War.
Although trained as a U.S. Army broadcaster, Albert Viator was quickly diverted into PSYOPS-psychological warfare-and spent his one-year tour of duty during 1968 and 1969 "broadcasting" propaganda from a loudspeaker pack on his back and dropping leaflets from helicopters in support of infantry operations. This fascinating and unique book recounts his experiences in Vietnam. He writes in a personal style that involves the reader rather than simply telling what happened. His attention to detail as well as his obvious appreciation for his fellow soldiers and honesty about his own PTSD bring an intimate view and fresh perspective to the Vietnam War. There is some humor, some irony, some anger, but the narrative basically stays positive and upbeat. Those interested in the Vietnam War, military history, psychological warfare, politics, patriotism, or just plain adventure will be captivated by this book.
United States Army in Vietnam. CMH Pub. 91-13. Draws upon previously unavailable Army and Defense Department records to interpret the part the press played during the Vietnam War. Discusses the roles of the following in the creation of information policy: Military Assistance Command's Office of Information in Saigon; White House; State Department; Defense Department; and the United States Embassy in Saigon.
This anthology serves as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts, principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications. It clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and incorporates it as a psychological instrument of U.S. military and political power, especially given our present budgetary constraints. Presents diverse articles that portray the value of the planned use of human actions to influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace.