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This book explores the vitally important concepts of shared power and shared-power arrangements as fundamental ways in which public issues can be addressed. These power-sharing relationships take many forms, including intergovernmental, interagency, public-private and joint private arrangements.
As Congress and the president battle out the federal deficit, foreign involvements, health care, and other policies of grave national import, the underlying constitutional issue is always the separation of powers doctrine. In The Politics of Shared Power, a classic text in the field of executive-legislative relations, Louis Fisher explains clearly and perceptively the points at which congressional and presidential interests converge and diverge, the institutional patterns that persist from one administration and one Congress to another, and the partisan dimensions resulting from the two-party system. Fisher also discusses the role of the courts in reviewing cases brought to them by members of Congress, the president, agency heads, and political activists, illustrating how court decisions affect the allocation of federal funds and the development and implementation of public policy. He examines how the president participates as legislator and how Congress intervenes in administrative matters. Separate chapters on the bureaucracy, the independent regulatory commissions, and the budgetary process probe these questions from different angles. The new fourth edition addresses the line item veto and its tortuous history and prospects. A chapter on war powers and foreign affairs studies executive-legislative disputes that affect global relations, including the Iran-Contra affair, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and American presence in conflicts such as Haiti and Bosnia. An important new discussion focuses on interbranch collisions and gridlock as they have developed since 1992.
Popular perception holds that presidents act "first and alone," resorting to unilateral orders to promote an agenda and head off unfavorable legislation. Little research, however, has considered the diverse circumstances in which such orders are issued. The Dual Executive reinterprets how and when presidents use unilateral power by illuminating the dual roles of the president. Drawing from an original data set of over 5,000 executive orders and proclamations (the two most frequently used unilateral orders) from the Franklin D. Roosevelt to the George W. Bush administrations (1933–2009), this book situates unilateral orders within the broad scope of executive–legislative relations. Michelle Belco and Brandon Rottinghaus shed light on the shared nature of unilateral power by recasting the executive as both an aggressive "commander" and a cooperative "administrator" who uses unilateral power not only to circumvent Congress, but also to support and facilitate its operations.
In the flush of enthusiasm to make government work better, reformers from both left and right have urged government to turn as many functions as possible over to the private sector and to allow market competition instill efficiency and choice. In fact, government has been doing just this for years: every major policy initiative launched since World War II has been managed by public-private partnerships. Yet such privatization has not solved government's problems. While there have been some positive results, thee has been far less success than advocates of market competition have promised. In a searching examination of why the "competition prescription" has not worked well, Donald F. Kettl finds that government has largely been a poor judge of private markets. Because government rarely operates in truly competitive markets contracting out has not so much solved the problems of inefficiency, but has aggravated them. Government has often not proved to be an intelligent consumer of the goods and services it has purchased. Kettl provides specific recommendations as to how government can become a "smart buyer," knowing what it wants and judging better what it has bought. Through detailed case studies, Kettl shows that as market imperfections increase, so do problems in governance and management. He examines the A-76 program for buying goods and services, the FTS-2000 telecommunications system, the Superfund program, the Department of Energy's production of nuclear weapons, and contracting out by state and local governments. He argues that government must be more aggressive in managing contracts if it is to build successful partnerships with outside contractors. Kettl maintains that the answer is not more government, but a smarter one, which requires strong political leadership to refocus the bureaucracy's mission and to change the bureaucratic culture.
Nearly all the peace accords signed in the last two decades have included power-sharing in one form or another. The notion of both majority and minority segments co-operating for the purposes of political stability has informed both international policy prescriptions for post-conflict zones and home-grown power-sharing pacts across the globe. This book examines the effect of power-sharing forms of governance in bringing about political stability amid deep divisions. It is the first major comparison of two power-sharing designs – consociationalism and centripetalism - and it assesses a number of cases central to the debate, including Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi and Northern Ireland. Drawing on information from a variety of sources, such as political party manifestoes and websites, media coverage, think tank reports, and election results, the author reaches significant conclusions about power-sharing as an invaluable conflict-management device. This text will be of key interest to students and scholars of ethnic conflict management, power-sharing, ethnic politics, democracy and democratization, comparative constitutional design, comparative politics, intervention and peace-building.
Shows how power-sharing practices reduce violence both preventively and after conflicts by giving potential violent challengers access to central and/or regional power.
Presidential power is perhaps one of the most central issues in the study of the American presidency. Since Richard E. Neustadt's classic study, first published in 1960, there has not been a book that thoroughly examines the issue of presidential power. Presidential Power: Theories and Dilemmas by noted scholar John P. Burke provides an updated and comprehensive look at the issues, constraints, and exercise of presidential power. This book considers the enduring question of how presidents can effectively exercise power within our system of shared powers by examining major tools and theories of presidential power, including Neustadt's theory of persuasion and bargaining as power, constitutional and inherent powers, Samuel Kernell's theory of going public, models of historical time, and the notion of internal time. Using illustrative examples from historical and contemporary presidencies, Burke helps students and scholars better understand how presidents can manage the public's expectations, navigate presidential-congressional relations, and exercise influence in order to achieve their policy goals.
Offering a unique comparative perspective, this volume examines the history of women's legislative involvement, clearly addressing the issue of equal opportunities for women in political life on a cross-national basis. It also identifies innovative solutions to redress the power-sharing balance between women and men.
Power-sharing is an important political strategy for managing protracted conflicts and it can also facilitate the democratic accommodation of difference. Despite these benefits, it has been much criticised, with claims that it is unable to produce peace and stability, is ineffective and inefficient, and obstructs other peacebuilding values, including gender equality. This edited collection aims to enhance our understanding of the utility of power-sharing in deeply divided places by subjecting power-sharing theory and practice to empirical and normative analysis and critique. Its overarching questions are: Do power-sharing arrangements enhance stability, peace and cooperation in divided societies? Do they do so in ways that promote effective governance? Do they do so in ways that promote justice, fairness and democracy? Utilising a broad range of global empirical case studies, it provides a space for dialogue between leading and emerging scholars on the normative questions surrounding power-sharing. Distinctively, it asks proponents of power-sharing to think critically about its weaknesses. This text will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners of power-sharing, ethnic politics, democracy and democratization, peacebuilding, comparative constitutional design, and more broadly Comparative Politics, International Relations and Constitutional and Comparative Law.