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Michael C. Webb explores a central question about postwar economic history: how has the growth of international markets affected the coordination of economic policy among nations? His analysis overturns the popular assumption that policy coordination has eroded as American hegemony has receded. Instead, he argues that the growing mobility of capital forced governments to abandon the strategies they had used in the 1950s and 60s to insulate monetary and fiscal policies from international influences, and to move toward more direct coordination of central economic strategies. Webb shows that since 1945 there has been a crucial shift in the pattern of international collaboration. He focuses on three types of adjustment policy: trade and capital controls, balance-of-payment lending and intervention in foreign-exchange markets, and monetary and fiscal policies. Noting that the first two types are no longer effective, he demonstrates that governments now rely more on monetary and fiscal policy coordination to regulate the global economy. As the expansion of international finance created greater turbulence in the global economy in the 1980s, the liberal system of international trade threatened to collapse. Webb examines in particular how the United States, Japan, and Germany took unprecedented steps to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although domestic political obstacles—not any decline in U.S. power—limited the impact of this policy coordination. He concludes by assessing the effectiveness of these attempts to reconcile the goal of a stronger liberal system of economic exchange with the desire to maintain national autonomy.
The economic rationale for international monetary policy coordination is not strong. This is the conclusion, not only of the traditional Mundell-Fleming literature, but also the more recent New Open-Economy Macroeconomics literature on international monetary coordination. Yet a broader political economy approach illustrates that national currency policy can in fact impose non-pecuniary externalities on partner nations. This is especially the case with major policy-driven misalignments, which cannot easily be countered by other governments. For example, one country's substantially depreciated currency can provoke powerful protectionist pressures in its trading partners, so that exchange rate policy spills over into trade policy in potentially damaging ways. Inasmuch as one government's policies create these sorts of costs for other countries, and for the world economy as a whole, there is a case for global governance. This might include some institutionalized mechanism to monitor and publicize substantial currency misalignments.
Part of the Library of International Political Economy series, this text examines monetary relations. Amongst the areas covered are: sources of conflict in international monetary relations; cooperation and conflict; and regime analysis and the theory of hegemonic stability.
This paper discusses the scope, methods, and effects of international coordination of economic policies. In analyzing the scope for and of coordination, the paper addresses the rationale for coordination, barriers to coordination, the range and specificivity of policies to be coordinated, and the frequency of coordination. In evaluating the methods of coordination, the emphasis is on the broad issues of rules versus discretion, single-indicator versus multi-Indicator systems, and hegemonic versus symmetric systems. Finally, using the MULTIMOD global macroeconomic model, some simulations are presented of several rule-based proposals for coordination.
The idea for this volume was conceived by Frederick Praeger, founder of Westview Press, who asked Roland Vaubel if he would put together a collection of chapters on the public choice approach to the study of international organizations. Vaubel felt it would be useful to have a coeditor from the United States, and Thomas D. Willett enthusiastically agreed to take on these duties.
International Monetary Cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Germany offers a first - and overdue - book- length study of counterproductive cooperation. It takes to task the critical importance of conducting systematic theory-guided empirical research to examine the validity of arguments that international monetary cooperation could be highly counterproductive. This book combines various methods - formal, quantitative, and qualitative - to study the theories of counterproductive monetary cooperation by focusing on the cooperative episodes among the major industrial countries - the United States, Japan, and Germany. For the first time, this book presents all theories of counterproductive cooperation in one place, subjects them to systematic, empirical scrutiny in the light of the experience of G-3 (U.S., Germany, and Japanese) cooperation since the 1970s, and suggests policy recommendations in the light of the findings.
Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.
This is the second of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Trade, Multinational Firms and Globalization, Money and Finance, and Emerging Issues.
It has been argued that “buy-backs” and “debt-equity swaps” allow developing countries to benefit from market discounts on their external debt. It is argued here, however, that if such programs are expected to be successful in increasing the market value of remaining debt, they also lead to a roughly equivalent increase in prices at which a buy-back or debt-equity swap could be carried out.
Examines the problems of international co-operation which have become central in international political economy.