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This volume presents a framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the authors address how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences.
This volume presents a framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the authors address how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences.
Scholars of economics and business, most from Britain and especially the University of Manchester, consider the political economy of public management reform. They report research findings on privatization and decentralization in both industrialized and aid-dependent countries, concentrating on the meso-level of institutional response. Combining theory, case studies, and institutional analysis, they look at public/private partnerships, public finance, and aid allocation. Academics and researchers in development studies and economics, political economy, and international public management and policy makers may find this volume of interest.
Nearly all countries worldwide are now experimenting with decentralization. Their motivation are diverse. Many countries are decentralizing because they believe this can help stimulate economic growth or reduce rural poverty, goals central government interventions have failed to achieve. Some countries see it as a way to strengthen civil society and deepen democracy. Some perceive it as a way to off-load expensive responsibilities onto lower level governments. Thus, decentralization is seen as a solution to many different kinds of problems. This report examines the origins and implications decentralization from a political economy perspective, with a focus on its promise and limitations. It explores why countries have often chosen not to decentralize, even when evidence suggests that doing so would be in the interests of the government. It seeks to explain why since the early 1980s many countries have undertaken some form of decentralization. This report also evaluates the evidence to understand where decentralization has considerable promise and where it does not. It identifies conditions needed for decentralization to succeed. It identifies the ways in which decentralization can promote rural development. And it names the goals which decentralization will probably not help achieve.
Is decentralisation good for development? This book offers insights and lessons that help us understand when the answer is 'Yes', and when it is No'. It shows us how decentralisation can be designed to drive development forward, and focuses attention on how institutional incentives can be created for governments to improve public sector performance and strengthen economies in ways that enhance citizen well-being. It also draws attention to the political motives behind decentralisation reforms and how these shape the institutions that result. This book brings together academics working at the frontier of research on decentralization with policymakers who have implemented reform at the highest levels of government and international organizations. Its purpose is to marry policymakers' detailed knowledge and insights about real reform processes with academics' conceptual clarity and analytical rigor. This synthesis naturally shifts the analysis towards deeper questions of decentralization, stability, and the strength of the state. These are explored in Part 1, with deep studies of the effects of reform on state capacity, political and fiscal stability, and democratic inclusiveness in Bolivia, Pakistan, India, and Latin America more broadly. These complex questions - crucially important to policymakers but difficult to address with statistics - yield before a multipronged attack of quantitative and qualitative evidence combined with deep practitioner insight. How should reformers design decentralisation? Part 2 examines these issues with evidence from four decades of reform in developing and developed countries. What happens after reform is implemented? Decentralization and local service provision turns to decentralization's effects on health and education services, anti-poverty programs with original evidence from 12 countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Abstract: This thesis addresses two important questions faced by less developed countries: the consequences of high levels of poverty and inequality on violence and human capital accumulation; and the effectiveness of government decentralization reforms in reducing poverty and inequality. The first chapter uses five rounds of a household data-set for four major Colombian cities; it finds that after controlling for various socio-economic characteristics, districts with higher inequality are associated with a higher probability of kidnap victimization among households, and with a significant increase in decisions to migrate abroad. Evidence on positive selection of urban migrants from Colombia is also found; contradicting Borjas's "negative selection theory" and supporting the idea that inequality is fuelling a "brain drain" from the country. The second chapter uses a seven year panel data-set containing political, fiscal and school information at the municipality level, to evaluate the effect of decentralization reforms implemented in 1993 in Colombia on its public education system. The main finding is that the quality gap between private and public schools (measured by results of a standardized high school test) has increased since the reforms took place. No evidence is found for any of the common pitfalls of decentralization discussed in the political economy literature, such as unfunded mandates, local capture or lower technical ability of local governments to manage schools. Instead, the reduction of average test scores in the public schools is explained by a significant reduction in drop-out rates in public schools, suggesting that the reforms had significant effects on households' schooling investment decisions. Finally, chapter three uses an Indonesian household survey to evaluate the impact of decentralization reforms in 2001 on provision of water services. Using a triple difference methodology, and incidence of a water-borne disease (diarrhea) among children as a proxy for service quality, it provides evidence that political design of decentralization crucially affected its impact. Only in cities where devolution was accompanied by reforms ensuring political accountability of local governments to residents was there a negative and significant impact of decentralization reforms on local water quality.
Decentralization has become a fashionable policy prescription among reformers in Latin America. But how does it work in practice? Are the claims that it promotes efficiency, participation, and fiscal responsibility justified? Does the process improve the delivery of social services at thelocal level and encourage the participation of local communities? What conditions allow a positive response to the challenges of decentralization?This book seeks to explore these questions by examining the experience of seven medium sized provincial towns in Colombia and Chile. The overall national context is analyzed and the differences between the two countries emphasized. Colombia embarked on a process of radical decentralization, largelybecause of perceived failures of the state at the central level, while in Chile the process of change was much more cautious, since a relatively efficient central state wished to maintain tight control over reform. The effect on the development and politics of the seven cities is also described, andthe reasons for the very different outcomes assessed. Particular attention is paid to the role of the mayor and the ability to construct a local coalition for reform. Three thematic chapters further explore the impact of decentralization on the local economy and the role of the private sector infostering development; the way in which educational reform has been advanced by local authority and community involvement; and the manner in which the new institutional structures affect the development of policies for local poverty alleviation.The authors draw on extensive fieldwork involving numerous interviews with actors at all levels and from all sectors. The result is a unique test, at the local level in Latin America, of the outcome of reforms to the institutional structure of government.
What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements. The authors of this book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs.
This book provides the reader with the full panoply of political economy tools and concepts necessary to understand, analyze, and integrate how political and social factors may influence the success or failure of their policy goals.
Since the early 2000s, decentralization has been espoused as a major policy goal of successive Zambian governments. With the passing of the 2019 Local Government Act, a greater understanding is needed of how decentralization has progressed thus far in Zambia and how political economy dynamics have constrained the process. As such, a survey was conducted with 153 bureaucrats across 16 councils in four Zambian provinces, complemented by interviews with elected ward councilors. Three key findings emerge. First, the organizational setting in which councils operate undermines the continuity of service provision. In particular, transfers of staff by the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC), partially driven by the growth in the number of councils in recent years, increases pressure on the wage bill of local authorities, creates uncertainty for civil servants, and undermines institutional memory. Second, the unwillingness to cede genuine autonomy to local councils by the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) repeatedly emerged. A perception of low levels of consultation with council bureaucrats and elected councilors, especially when statutory instruments are issued, reinforce that accountability remains upwards to the MLG rather than downwards to citizens. Third, within the councils, there is a mismatch in incentives between the bureaucrats and politicians that can undermine policy implementation; while the former respect authority and attention to procedures, the latter are focused on constituents’ priorities and may bypass formal procedures to deliver to their voters. Based on interviews with market committees and solid waste companies, these dynamics have negative externalities on citizen perceptions and service provision in urban areas. As one of the few analyses conducted with local bureaucrats to assess their experiences with decentralization, the study aims to advance both policy and scholarship about the political economy dynamics surrounding efforts to strengthen subnational capabilities in developing countries.