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By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[laced to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing.
Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in Evil or Ill? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of character change. In introducing this third excuse, Reznek raises a controversial possibility - the abolition of the insanity defence.
Philosophy has much to offer psychiatry, not least regarding ethical issues, but also issues regarding the mind, identity, values, and volition. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry offers the most comprehensive reference resource for this area every published - one that is essential for both students and researchers in this field.
It is only in the past 20 years that the concept of 'recovery' from mental health has been more widely considered and researched. Before then, it was generally considered that 'stability' was the best that anyone suffering from a mental disorder could hope for. But now it is recognised that, throughout their mental illness, many patients develop new beliefs, feelings, values, attitudes, and ways of dealing with their disorder. The notion of recovery from mental illness is thus rapidly being accepted and is inserting more hope into mainstream psychiatry and other parts of the mental health care system around the world. Yet, in spite of conceptual and other challenges that this notion raises, including a variety of interpretations, there is scarcely any systematic philosophical discussion of it. This book is unique in addressing philosophical issues - including conceptual challenges and opportunities - raised by the notion of recovery of people with mental illness. Such recovery - particularly in relation to serious mental illness such as schizophrenia - is often not about cure and can mean different things to different people. For example, it can mean symptom alleviation, ability to work, or the striving toward mental well-being (with or without symptoms). The book addresses these different meanings and their philosophical grounds, bringing to the fore perspectives of people with mental illness and their families as well as perspectives of philosophers, mental health care providers and researchers, among others. The important new work will contribute to further research, reflective practice and policy making in relation to the recovery of people with mental illness.It is essential reading for philosophers of health, psychiatrists, and other mental care providers, as well as policy makers.
"Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" explores conceptual issues in psychiatry from the perspective of analytic philosophy of science. Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, its multiple different theoretical frameworks, and its research links with big business - Rachel Cooper explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry. She shows how these pose interesting challenges for the philosopher of science while also showing how ideas from the philosophy of science can help to solve conceptual problems within psychiatry. Cooper's discussion ranges over such topics as the nature of mental illnesses, the treatment decisions and diagnostic categories of psychiatry, the case-history as a form of explanation, how psychiatry might be value-laden, the claim that psychiatry is a multi-paradigm science, the distortion of psychiatric research by pharmaceutical industries, as well as engaging with the fundamental question whether the mind is reducible to something at the physical level. "Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" demonstrates that cross-disciplinary contact between philosophy of science and psychiatry can be immensely productive for both subjects and it will be required reading for mental health professionals and philosophers alike.
This multidisciplinary collection explores three key concepts underpinning psychiatry—explanation, phenomenology, and nosology—and their continuing relevance in an age of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. This book opens with Dr. Kenneth S. Kendler’s introduction to the philosophical grounding of psychiatric practice. Chapters in the first section of the book then address the concept of explanation, from the difficulties in describing complex behavior to the categorization of psychological and biological causality. In the second section, contributors discuss experience, including the complex and vexing issue of how self-agency and free will affect mental health. The third and final section examines the organizational difficulties in psychiatric nosology and the instability of the existing diagnostic system. Each chapter includes both an introduction by the editors and a concluding comment by another of the book’s contributors. Contributors: John Campbell, PhD; Thomas Fuchs, MD, PhD; Shaun Gallagher, PhD; Kenneth S. Kendler, MD; Sandra D. Mitchell, PhD; Dominic P. Murphy, PhD; Josef Parnas, MD, DrMedSci; Louis A. Sass, PhD; Kenneth F. Schaffner, MD, PhD; James F. Woodward, PhD; Peter Zachar, PhD "This is a serious and important book . . . it is certainly one that researchers, scholars and anyone involved in trying to explain the nature of psychiatric disorders to a skeptical audience ought to read."—British Journal of Psychiatry Kenneth S. Kendler, MD, is the Rachel Brown Banks Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry at the Medical College of Virginia, where he is also a professor of human genetics and the director of the Virginia Institute for Psychiatric and Behavioral Genetics. He is the author of Genes, Environment, and Psychopathology. Josef Parnas, MD, DrMedSci, is a professor of psychiatry and the consultant medical director for the Department of Psychiatry at Copenhagen University. He is the codirector of the National Danish Research Foundation's Center for Subjectivity Research.
Philosophy and psychiatry share many topics and problems. For example, the "solutions" of the psychiatry of the philosophical body-soul problem have direct effects on the self-image of the discipline. Despite these obvious overlappings, and unlike the English-speaking countries, interdisciplinary research on "philosophical psychopathology" has been scarce in Germany. The current anthology closes these gaps, because the authors - renowned experts as well as young scientists, whose new approaches open promising perspectives - come from both disciplines. The individual contributions deal with philosophical debates as they arise within the context of psychiatric theory and practice.
This book offers an ability-based view of mental disorders. It develops a detailed analysis of the concept of inability that is relevant in the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic context by drawing on the most recent literature on the concepts of ability, reasons, and harm. What is it to have a mental disorder? This book contends that an individual has a mental disorder if and only if (1) they are・in the relevant sense・unable to respond adequately to their available (apparent) reasons in their thinking, feeling, or acting, and (2) they are harmed by the condition underlying or resulting from that inability. The author calls this the “Rehability View.” This view can account for what is “mental” about mental disorders: it is the rational relations among an individual’s attitudes and actions that are “disordered,” and the relevant norms are the norms of reasons. This view is compatible with explanations of mental disorders in terms of biological dysfunctions, without reducing the former to the latter. The aim is not to offer just another conception of mental disorder, but to develop a systematic approach that incorporates insights from the philosophy of psychiatry and adjacent philosophical disciplines. Philosophy of Mental Disorder will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and mental health.
'Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience' is a philosophical analysis of the study of psychpathology, considering how cognitive neuroscience has been applied in psychiatry. The text examines many neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging, and a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, and schizophrenia.