Download Free The Pakistan Trap Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online The Pakistan Trap and write the review.

After recent events and the massive surge of interest in Afghanistan, The Bear Trap is being re-published for the first time in paperback after the last few copies of the hardback were snapped up recently by US Military Intelligence. This is the story of the defeat of Soviet Russia's forces by a guerrilla force known as the Mujahideen, heavily backed by Pakistan and the USA. The Mujahideen paved the way for the Taliban regime, to exist having all but defeated the Russian Army in the late 80's. The author, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, was head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence and as such was effectively the Mujahideens commander-in-chief. He controlled the flow of thousands of tons of arms across Pakistan and into its occupied neighbour, arms that were bought with CIA and Saudi Arabian funds from the USA. One of the Mujahideens close allies was none other than Osama Bin Laden. This compelling book was put together with great skill the by military historian, Mark Adkin in conjunction with Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and is essential reading for anyone interested in the truth behind the Afghanistan War which led to the conditions that exist there today.It describes in detail the terrain over which the war was fought, the training that was needed and how the Mujahideen carried out ambushes, assassinations, raids and rocket attacks deep into Afghanistan territory.
A Collection Of Articles Relating To 250-Pak Relation That Discuss The Form-Diplomatic, Military, Political, Fundamentalist Argues As Well As The Nuclear Issue And Intelligence Aspects. Articles Are By Those Who Have Been Policy Makers At One Time Or The Other. 13 Papers In All. Without Dustjacket.
Winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award for Nonfiction • Nominated for the National Book Award for Nonfiction From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Ghost Wars and The Achilles Trap, the epic and enthralling story of America's intelligence, military, and diplomatic efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 9/11 Prior to 9/11, the United States had been carrying out small-scale covert operations in Afghanistan, ostensibly in cooperation, although often in direct opposition, with I.S.I., the Pakistani intelligence agency. While the US was trying to quell extremists, a highly secretive and compartmentalized wing of I.S.I., known as "Directorate S," was covertly training, arming, and seeking to legitimize the Taliban, in order to enlarge Pakistan's sphere of influence. After 9/11, when fifty-nine countries, led by the U. S., deployed troops or provided aid to Afghanistan in an effort to flush out the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the U.S. was set on an invisible slow-motion collision course with Pakistan. Today we know that the war in Afghanistan would falter badly because of military hubris at the highest levels of the Pentagon, the drain on resources and provocation in the Muslim world caused by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and corruption. But more than anything, as Coll makes painfully clear, the war in Afghanistan was doomed because of the failure of the United States to apprehend the motivations and intentions of I.S.I.'s "Directorate S". This was a swirling and shadowy struggle of historic proportions, which endured over a decade and across both the Bush and Obama administrations, involving multiple secret intelligence agencies, a litany of incongruous strategies and tactics, and dozens of players, including some of the most prominent military and political figures. A sprawling American tragedy, the war was an open clash of arms but also a covert melee of ideas, secrets, and subterranean violence. Coll excavates this grand battle, which took place away from the gaze of the American public. With unsurpassed expertise, original research, and attention to detail, he brings to life a narrative at once vast and intricate, local and global, propulsive and painstaking. This is the definitive explanation of how America came to be so badly ensnared in an elaborate, factional, and seemingly interminable conflict in South Asia. Nothing less than a forensic examination of the personal and political forces that shape world history, Directorate S is a complete masterpiece of both investigative and narrative journalism.
The news-breaking book that has sent schockwaves through the White House, Ghost Wars is the most accurate and revealing account yet of the CIA's secret involvement in al-Qaeada's evolution. Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll has spent years reporting from the Middle East, accessed previously classified government files and interviewed senior US officials and foreign spymasters. Here he gives the full inside story of the CIA's covert funding of an Islamic jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, explores how this sowed the seeds of bn Laden's rise, traces how he built his global network and brings to life the dramatic battles within the US government over national security. Above all, he lays bare American intelligence's continual failure to grasp the rising threat of terrrorism in the years leading to 9/11 - and its devastating consequences.
India's emergence as a nuclear weapon state gave birth to the concept of limited war and therefore, the feasibility of conventional war under the nuclear shadow informs India's military preparations. But is achievement of substantial political objectives possible through war? What are the dangers of escalation caused by what Clausewitz described as the friction and fog of war? In the context of Indo-Pak conflict, can force application by India provide an answer to resolving the contentious issue of Pakistan supported terrorism? Or would it only lead to a temporary change of status quo? This incisive analysis, made by one of the most distinguished military thinkers of India, doesn't just raise these pertinent questions but also brings great clarity to the strategic options available to India. For the Indian military, the author recommends a doctrinal shift from capture of territory to stand off destruction with a concurrent rebalance from west to north which must be accompanied by political leadership understanding that alerting nuclear weapons is a red line which once crossed, has potential for conflict to spiral beyond their control. Nuclear deterrence stands on the loose sands of nuclear strategy that has not been able to answer the query, 'What happens when nuclear deterrence fails?'. A must read not just for defense professionals, strategists and political decision-makers across the globe, this illuminating book would be of great value even to the students of statecraft and the uninitiated.
After two decades and trillions of dollars, the United States’ fight against terrorism has achieved mixed results. Despite the vast resources and attention expended since 9/11, terrorism has increased in many societies that have been caught up in the war on terror. Why have U.S. policies been unable to stem the tide of violence? Harrison Akins reveals how the war on terror has had the unintended consequence of increasing domestic terrorism in U.S. partner states. He examines the results of U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations that targeted al-Qaeda in peripheral regions of partner states, over which their central governments held little control. These operations often provoked a violent backlash from local terrorist groups, leading to a spike in retaliatory attacks against partner states. Senior U.S. officials frequently failed to grasp the implications of the historical conflict between central governments and the targeted peripheries. Instead, they exerted greater pressure on partner states to expand their counterterrorism efforts. This exacerbated the underlying conditions that drove the escalating attacks, trapping these governments in a deadly cycle of tit-for-tat violence with local terrorist groups. This process, Akins demonstrates, accounts for the lion’s share of the al Qaeda network’s global terrorist activity since 2001. Drawing on extensive primary sources—including newly declassified documents, dozens of in-depth interviews with leading government officials in the United States and abroad, and statistical analysis—The Terrorism Trap is a groundbreaking analysis of why counterterrorism has backfired.
Over the past twenty years more citizens in China and India have raised themselves out of poverty than anywhere else at any time in history. They accomplished this through the local business sector the leading source of prosperity for all rich countries. In most of Africa and other poor regions the business sector is weak, but foreign aid continues to fund government and NGOs. Switching aid to the local business sector in order to cultivate a middle class is the oldest, surest, and only way to eliminate poverty in poor countries. A bold fusion of ethics and smart business, The Aid Trap shows how the same energy, goodwill, and money that we devote to charity can help local business thrive. R. Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan, two leading scholars in business and finance, demonstrate that by diverting a major share of charitable aid into the local business sector of poor countries, citizens can take the lead in the growth of their own economies. Although the aid system supports noble goals, a local well-digging company cannot compete with a foreign charity that digs wells for free. By investing in that local company a sustainable system of development can take root.
With the CPEC, Pakistan may have a new infrastructure on its land, but it is for the Chinese goods and lorries; and to advance the Chinese global agenda. Aim of the CPEC is not to empower Pakistan and its people. In view of many Pakistanis, this new relationship is not an economic partnership with China. It is a new form of colonialism, but if the Pakistani ruling elite, and people of Pakistan are happy with this new relationship then no one from outside can help them.
In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush promised a grieving nation that the United States would capture or kill Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind behind the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil. Almost a decade later, the Al Qaeda leader is still alive and free, even after an occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops of more than eight years.In November 2009, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by John F. Kerry, issued a report on what could be characterized as one of the greatest joint military and intelligence failures of recent American history: Bin Laden's escape from his stronghold in the mountains of Tora Bora, and his subsequent flight to a location that remains unknown.Who was responsible for the decision to put too few troops on the ground, and what justification could there have been for such a decision? What alternative plans were available? What can we learn from the flaws of the Afghan occupation?Anyone interested in current affairs-and especially in the beginning of the Global War on Terror-will find this essential reading.