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Our experience of a unified sense of the self is underwritten by a multiplicity of self-aspects having very different metaphysical commitments. Our experience of unity is provided by a process-which, under certain clinical conditions, is rendered inoperative-that enables a person to experience mental states as personally owned.
Everyone has a different answer for what the Self is. But do they have any idea what it really is? Is the Self actually the fundamental unit of existence? Many people are happy to believe that the universe is made of matter. What would it mean to say that the universe is made of mind? If material atoms are made of subatomic particles, what would immaterial minds be made of? The only thing a mind can be made of is thoughts. After all, that's what a mind does. It thinks. What does thinking mean? It means using thoughts. It means combining "atomic" thoughts into "molecular" thoughts. In physics, string theory claims that reality is made up of infinitesimally small, one-dimensional vibrating strings. As the strings vibrate, twist, fold, come together and split apart, they produce all the effects that traditional physics addresses, all the stuff to do with atoms and their interactions, and including large-scale material phenomena like gravity. But what if the real "strings" were actually zero-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, and immaterial rather than material? What if they were actually what thoughts are, and so to say that physics arises out of material strings could be replaced by the statement that physics is made out of immaterial thoughts? Where strings are one-dimensional, extended and material, thoughts are zero-dimensional, unextended and immaterial, but their combinations produce dimensional, material, extended things (thanks to the incredible properties of phase in ontological Fourier mathematics). All you have to do to replace materialism (reality is made of matter) with idealism (reality is made of mind) is to reduce scientific "strings" to their analytic mental equivalents, which turn out to be sinusoidal waves, which exist in the mathematical precursor domain that serves as the origin, the cause, of the domain of physics. Mathematics, in itself, is a dimensionless Singularity system. Ontological mathematics is the subject that deals with the mathematical Singularity that precedes the Big Bang. This Singularity, when properly understood, comprises autonomous selves – called monads – made of basis thoughts, which are none other than sinusoidal waves. The self is an eternal and necessary entity. It has existed forever, and it, with its fellow selves, is the author of everything. We inhabit a universe of mental selves, not of physical matter. Selves create matter. Matter does not create selves.
What is it to see the world, other people, and imagined situations as making personal moral demands of us? What is it to experience stories as speaking to us personally and directly? Kierkegaard's Mirrors explores Kierkegaard's answers to these questions, with a new phenomenological interpretation of Kierkegaardian 'interest'.
The Oxford Handbook of the Self explores a fascinating diversity of questions about our understanding of self from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, ethics, psychology, neuroscience, psychopathology, narrative, and postmodern theories.
The central assertion of this book is that states pursue social actions to serve self-identity needs, even when these actions compromise their physical existence. Three forms of social action, sometimes referred to as ‘motives’ of state behaviour (moral, humanitarian, and honour-driven) are analyzed here through an ontological security approach. Brent J. Steele develops an account of social action which interprets these behaviours as fulfilling a nation-state's drive to secure self-identity through time. The anxiety which consumes all social agents motivates them to secure their sense of being, and thus he posits that transformational possibilities exist in the ‘Self’ of a nation-state. The volume consequently both challenges and complements realist, liberal, constructivist and post-structural accounts to international politics. Using ontological security to interpret three cases - British neutrality during the American Civil War (1861-1865), Belgium’s decision to fight Germany in 1914, and NATO’s (1999) Kosovo intervention - the book concludes by discussing the importance for self-interrogation in both the study and practice of international relations. Ontological Security in International Relations will be of particular interest to students and researchers of international politics, international ethics, international relations and security studies.
In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes (a) that there is always a gap between ‘A is f and g’ and ‘I am f and g’; (b), that a complete description of the world offered without recourse to indexicals will fail to account for the contingent truth that I am one of the persons described; and (c), that an account of conscious perspectives on the world must take into account what it means for an apparently arbitrary one of these perspectives to be mine. Engaging with contemporary positions on the first person, embodiment, psychological continuity, and other ongoing arguments, Madell contends that there can be no such thing as a criterion of personal identity through time, that no bodily or psychological continuity approach to the issue can succeed, and that personal identity through time must be absolute, not a matter of degree. Madell’s view that the nature of the self is substantively different from that of objects in the world will generate significant discussion and debate among philosophers of mind.
What are the foundations of human self-understanding and the value of responsible philosophical questioning? Focusing on Heidegger's early work on facticity, historicity, and the phenomenological hermeneutics of factical-historical life, Hans-Helmuth Gander develops an idea of understanding that reflects our connection with the world and other, and thus invites deep consideration of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and deconstruction. He draws usefully on Husserl's phenomenology and provides grounds for exchange with Descartes, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Foucault. On the way to developing a contemporary hermeneutical philosophy, Gander clarifies the human relation to self in and through conversation with Heidegger's early hermeneutics. Questions about reading and writing then follow as these are the very actions that structure human self-understanding and world understanding.
The aim of this volume is to discuss recent research into self-experience and its disorders, and to contribute to a better integration of the different empirical and conceptual perspectives. Among the topics discussed are questions like 'What is a self?, ' 'What is the relation between the self-givenness of consciousness and the givenness of the conscious self?', 'How should we understand the self-disorders encountered in schizophrenia?' and 'What general insights into the nature of the self can pathological phenomena provide us with?' Most of the contributions are characterized by a distinct phenomenological approach.The chapters by Butterworth, Strawson, Zahavi, and Marbach are general in nature and address different psychological and philosophical aspects of what it means to be a self. Next Eilan, Parnas, and Sass turn to schizophrenia and ask both how we should approach and understand this disorder, and, more specifically, what we can learn about the nature of selfhood and existence from psychopathology. The chapters by Blakemore and Gallagher present a defense and a criticism of the so-called model of self-monitoring, respectively. The final three chapters by Cutting, Stanghellini, Schwartz and Wiggins represent anthropologically oriented attempts to situate pathologies of self-experience.(Series B)
Once celebrated for connecting people and circulating ideas, social media are facing mounting criticisms about their anticompetitive reach, addictive design, and toxicity to democracy. Known cumulatively as the “techlash,” journalists, users, and politicians are asking social media platforms to account for being too big, too engaging, and too unruly. In the age of the techlash, strategies to regulate how platforms operate technically, economically, and legally, are often stacked against individual tactics to manage the effects of social media by disconnecting from them. These disconnection practices—from restricting screen time and detoxing from device use to deleting apps and accounts—often reinforce rather than confront the ways social media organize attention, everyday life, and society. Reckoning with Social Media challenges the prevailing critique of social media that pits small gestures against big changes, that either celebrates personal transformation or champions structural reformation. This edited volume reframes evaluative claims about disconnection practices as either restorative or reformative of current social media systems by beginning where other studies conclude: the ambivalence, commodification, and complicity of separating from social media.
Anthony Rudd presents a striking new account of the self as an ethical, evaluative being. He draws on Kierkegaard's thought to present a case for an ancient and currently neglected view: that the tensions which are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through the understanding of the self as guided by an objective Good.