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In this magisterial narrative, Zara Steiner traces the twisted road to war that began with Hitler's assumption of power in Germany. Covering a wide geographical canvas, from America to the Far East, Steiner provides an indispensable reassessment of the most disputed events of these tumultuous years. Steiner underlines the far-reaching consequences of the Great Depression, which shifted the initiative in international affairs from those who upheld the status quo to those who were intent on destroying it. In Europe, the l930s were Hitler's years. He moved the major chess pieces on the board, forcing the others to respond. From the start, Steiner argues, he intended war, and he repeatedly gambled on Germany's future to acquire the necessary resources to fulfil his continental ambitions. Only war could have stopped him-an unwelcome message for most of Europe. Misperception, miscomprehension, and misjudgment on the part of the other Great Powers leaders opened the way for Hitler's repeated diplomatic successes. It is ideology that distinguished the Hitler era from previous struggles for the mastery of Europe. Ideological presumptions created false images and raised barriers to understanding that even good intelligence could not penetrate. Only when the leaders of Britain and France realized the scale of Hitler's ambition, and the challenge Germany posed to their Great Power status, did they finally declare war.
The two decades before World War II were some of the most unsettled in modern history. From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir examines one of the most unlikely—and perhaps least studied—relationships to form during that turbulent era: the alliance of the Royal Navy and the French fleet. Beginning from a global perspective and gradually narrowing, George E. Melton brings new insights to the diplomacy that led to this often strained cooperation and reinterprets some of the most important events of early World War II. By the mid-1930s the Royal Navy and French fleet had overextended themselves with global defense commitments, owing mainly to the collapse of the world war alliances and to an ominous shift in the balance of world naval power. To maximize their power, England and France combined their assets in a naval alliance. Successful in keeping both Italy and Japan neutral early in the war, that alliance brought the French and English success against German surface raiders and U-boat operations in the Atlantic. The two powers were on such good terms that in1939, during a joint operation to the north of Scotland, HMS Hood and its escorts served for a week under the command of Vice Admiral Marcel Gensoul, French commander of the Dunkerque. Afterward, the British seamen affectionately referred to the Dunkerque as “the friend of the Hood.” Still, the union was not an altogether happy one. The global defense imperatives of the Admiralty frustrated the regional ambitions of the Rue Royale. The union ultimately came to a violent end when the British attacked the French squadron at Mers el-Kébir in the summer of 1940 after France had signed an armistice with Germany. What followed was a poorly constructed cover up to mask the operation as a regrettable but necessary action. Melton’s study challenges this popular myth. Thoroughly researched and documented, From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir concludes that the operation was a disastrous failure.
This work covers the international importance of the War in Spain through the two organizations that marked the multilateral action towards the conflict: The League of Nations and the Non-Intervention Committee. France and the United Kingdom diverted both deliberations as well as decision-making processes and mechanisms from Geneva. Non-intervention was appeasement’s specific variable applied to Spain. Despite its name, it meant an intervention, depriving the Spanish government from its own defense while the fascist governments provided massive and regular support to the rebels. The League was damaged in its authority through the violation of its Covenant in Manchuria and Abyssinia. Once the War in Spain began, non-intervention was articulated with the main objective to confine the conflict to the Spanish borders. To this end, the designation of the conflict as a civil war (not a mere nominal nor anecdotal issue) in both London and Geneva was essential. By abandoning the Spanish democracy and foreclosing the collective security system, European democracies were also removing all that stood between their own societies and another world war. The failure of the collective security system that the League was supposed to safeguard, prompted by the impossibility of reconciling the British-led policy of appeasement with active anti-fascism, led to a climate of collective insecurity, during which arose a Second World War. This was precisely the main objective to avoid in the international order established in 1919 after the major collective catastrophe on a worldwide scale – soon to be overcome as that. The scholarship herein will prove essential for scholars of the interwar years’ crisis, twentieth-century Spanish history and international relations.
Some of the most formidable names in international history focus on the themes: the League of Nations and collective security, problems in British foreign policy, and European/international security in the interwar years.
This book offers an interpretation of a foreign conflict that has had a greater impact on modern British politics than any other.
This collection of essays reviews the politico-military relationship between Britain and France between the two World Wars. As well as examining the relationship between the two nations' armed services, the book's contributors also analyse key themes in Anglo-French inter-war defence politics - disarmament, intelligence and imperial defence - and joint military, political and economic preparations for a second world war.
This book, which consists of essays by leading scholars in the field of twentieth century international history, examines the wider context of one of the most bitter and bloody civil wars in European history - the Spanish Civil War. The chapters discuss all of the major debates that surround the ideological and political context of the war, including the extent to which it could be regarded as a 'dress rehearsal' for the Second World War. The book also debates the nature of civil war in the twentieth century and as such will be of interest to military and international historians as well as to historians of the history of ideas.
Though more than half a century has passed since the Spaish Civil War began in 1936, it is still the subject of intense controversy. What was it that roused left wing sympathisers from all over the world to fight for a cause for which their governments would not give active support? In his famous history, Hugh Thomas presents an objective analysis of a conflict - where fascism and democracy, communism and Christianity, centralism and regionalism were all at stake - and which was a much an international civil war as a Spanish one.