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The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address.
Until quite recently questions about methodology in legal research have been largely confined to understanding the role of doctrinal research as a scholarly discipline. In turn this has involved asking questions not only about coverage but, fundamentally, questions about the identity of the discipline. Is it (mainly) descriptive, hermeneutical, or normative? Should it also be explanatory? Legal scholarship has been torn between, on the one hand, grasping the expanding reality of law and its context, and, on the other, reducing this complex whole to manageable proportions. The purely internal analysis of a legal system, isolated from any societal context, remains an option, and is still seen in the approach of the French academy, but as law aims at ordering society and influencing human behaviour, this approach is felt by many scholars to be insufficient. Consequently many attempts have been made to conceive legal research differently. Social scientific and comparative approaches have proven fruitful. However, does the introduction of other approaches leave merely a residue of 'legal doctrine', to which pockets of social sciences can be added, or should legal doctrine be merged with the social sciences? What would such a broad interdisciplinary field look like and what would its methods be? This book is an attempt to answer some of these questions.
If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Razs position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkins contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.
Drawing on a range of approaches from the social sciences and humanities, this handbook explores theoretical and empirical perspectives that address the articulation of law in society, and the social character of the rule of law. The vast field of socio-legal studies provides multiple lenses through which law can be considered. Rather than seeking to define the field of socio-legal studies, this book takes up the experiences of researchers within the field. First-hand accounts of socio-legal research projects allow the reader to engage with diverse theoretical and methodological approaches within this fluid interdisciplinary area. The book provides a rich resource for those interested in deepening their understanding of the variety of theories and methods available when law is studied in its broadest social context, as well as setting those within the history of the socio-legal movement. The chapters consider multiple disciplinary lenses – including feminism, anthropology and sociology – as well as a variety of methodologies, including: narrative, visual and spatial, psychological, economic and epidemiological approaches. Moreover, these are applied in a range of substantive contexts such as online hate speech, environmental law, biotechnology, research in post-conflict situations, race and LGBT+ lawyers. The handbook brings together younger contributors and some of the best-known names in the socio-legal field. It offers a fresh perspective on the past, present and future of sociolegal studies that will appeal to students and scholars with relevant interests in a range of subjects, including law, sociology and politics. Chapter 7 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.
This book argues that at the core of legal philosophys principal debates there is essentially one issue judicial impartiality. Keeping this issue to the forefront, Raban's approach sheds much light on many difficult and seemingly perplexing jurisprudential debates. Modern Legal Theory and Judicial Impartiality offers a fresh and penetrating examination of two of the most celebrated modern legal theorists: HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. The book explains the relations between these two scholars and other theorists and schools of thought (including Max Weber, Lon Fuller, and the law and economics movement), offering both novices and experts an innovative and lucid look at modern legal theory. The book is written in an engaging and conversational style, tackling highly sophisticated issues in a concise and accessible manner. Undergraduates in jurisprudence and legal theory, as well as more advanced readers, will find it clear and challenging.
Raymond Wacks reveals the intriguing and challenging nature of legal philosophy, exploring the notion of law and its role in our lives. He refers to key thinkers from Aristotle to Rawls, from Bentham to Derrida and looks at the central questions behind legal theory, and law's relation to justice, morality, and democracy.
Understanding the Nature of Law explores methodological questions about how best to explain law. Among these questions, one is central: is there something about law which determines how it should be theorized? This novel book explains the importance of
Ever since H.L.A. Hart's self-description of The Concept of Law as an 'exercise in descriptive sociology', contemporary legal theorists have been debating the relationship between legal theory and sociology, and between legal theory and social science more generally. There have been some who have insisted on a clear divide between legal theory and the social sciences, citing fundamental methodological differences. Others have attempted to bridge gaps, revealing common challenges and similar objects of inquiry. Collecting the work of authors such as Martin Krygier, David Nelken, Brian Tamanaha, Lewis Kornhauser, Gunther Teubner and Nicola Lacey, this volume - the second in a three volume series - provides an overview of the major developments in the last thirty years. The volume is divided into three sections, each discussing an aspect of the relationship of legal theory and the social sciences: 1) methodological disputes and collaboration; 2) common problems, especially as they concern different modes of explanation of social behaviour; and 3) common objects, including, most prominently, the study of language in its social context and normative pluralism.
This is a revised and extensively rewritten edition of one of the most influential monographs on legal philosophy published in recent years. Writing in the introduction to the first edition the author characterized Anglophone philosophers as being ..."divided, and often waver[ing] between two main philosophical objectives: the moral evaluation of law and legal institutions, and an account of its actual nature." Questions of methodology have therefore tended to be sidelined, but were bound to surface sooner or later, as they have in the later work of Ronald Dworkin. The main purpose of this book is to provide a critical assessment of Dworkin's methodological turn, away from analytical jurisprudence towards a theory of interpretation, and the issues it gives rise to. The author argues that the importance of Dworkin's interpretative turn is not that it provides a substitute for 'semantic theories of law' (a dubious concept), but that it provides a new conception of jurisprudence, aiming to present itself as a comprehensive rival to the conventionalism manifest in legal positivism. Furthermore, once the interpretative turn is regarded as an overall challenge to conventionalism, it is easier to see why it does not confine itself to a critique of method. Law as interpretation calls into question the main tenets of its positivist rival, in substance as well as method. The book re-examines conventionalism in the light of this interpretative challenge.
This volume examines power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy and their compatibility with human rights law. Providing a clear, accessible introduction to the political science and human rights law on the issue, the book is an invaluable guide to all those engaged with transitional justice, peace agreements, and human rights.