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Sir Henry McMahon, a British colonial administrator, drew a line along the Himalayas at the Simla Convention of 1913-14, demarcating what would in later years become the effective boundary between China and India. The boundary, disputed by India's northern neighbour, has had a profound effect on the relations between the two Asian giants, resulting most prominently in the war of 1962 but also in several skirmishes and stand-offs both before and after that. It continues to be a thorn in the side - reaching a flashpoint at the tri-junction between Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan in Doklam in 2017 - and may derail all the progress in bilateral ties if left unattended. General J.J. Singh examines the evolution of the boundary and the nuances of British India's Tibet policy from the eighteenth century through to India's Independence, analyses the repercussions for contemporary times and puts forth recommendations for the way ahead.
Fifty years ago, India went through a tragic event which has remained a deep scar in the country’s psyche: a border war with China. During the author’s archival peregrinations on the Himalayan border, he goes into some relatively little known issues, such as the checkered history of Tawang; the British India policy towards Tibet and even the possibility for India to militarily defend the Roof of the World. The author also looks into why the Government still keeps the Henderson Brooks Report under wraps and what were Mao’s motivations for ‘teaching India a lesson’. Throughout this series of essays, the thread remains the Tibet-India frontier in the North-East and the Indo-Chinese conflict. The more one digs into this question, the more one discovers that the entire issue is intimately linked with the history of modern Tibet; particularly the status of the Roof of the World as a de facto independent nation. British India had a Tibet Policy, Independent India, did not. This led to the unfortunate events of 1962.
This book explores Sino-Indian tensions from the angle of state-building, showing how they stem from their competition for the Himalayan people's allegiance.
This is one of those rare books that puts an entirely new light on a chapter of history, and it must be read by anyone concerned with international affairs. Although cool and scholarly it unrolls like a fascinating thriller. It is an important work of revisionist history and a gruesome study of the way in which wars start, superbly documented (largely from official Indian sources but also from secret Indian papers) and beautifully sustained. By showing how India led the world up the garden path it demolishes and throws to the wind a pillar of the 'contain China' doctrine -- the belief that in 1962 India was the victim of unprovoked Chinese aggression. Maxwell's book is magnificent on every count, an historical achievement of the first rank.
India and China Ð the inheritors of two ancient civilizations and aeons of neighbourly bonds cemented by Buddhism and the bridge-building missions of Fa-Hien, Huen Tsang, Tagore and Kotnis Ð never witnessed strife between themselves till the fateful autumn of 1962, when they fought a short but bitter border war on the desolate heights of the Himalayas. Mutual suspicion and sporadic face-offs have ever since bedevilled relations between the two Asian giants, based on their still-unsettled borders. What caused the tragic estrangement of AsiaÕs leading lights? In this cogent and comprehensive analysis, the author traces the origins of the discord to a legacy flawed by the flip-flops of imperial BritainÕs unilateral border delineation, and the ebbs and flows of Chinese activism in Tibet. The gripping narrative carries us from the post-1947 scenario of initial Panchsheel bonhomie, yielding place to mutual distrust, aggravated, among other causes, by Chinese paranoia over Tibet and the unrelenting pressure of Indian public opinion. IndiaÕs cataclysmic defeat in the war, which remains a young nationÕs humiliation, is attributed to the ill-advised Ôforward policyÕ and failure of the politico-military leadership of the time, revalidating ClemenceauÕs adage, that Ôwar is too important a matter to be left to generalsÕ.