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The persistent dominance of US digital platforms relates to strategies that can be justified on efficiency grounds. However, these strategies might also offset competition and have ambiguous welfare effects. Overall, though, the economic literature does not provide a clear theoretical ground for a systematic regulation of their dominance, rather it advocates a targeting of specific unlawful anticompetitive practices. The examination of the rationale of major antitrust cases vis-à-vis global digital platforms suggests that EU authorities should adjust their doctrine and practice of competition policy to make it closer to the US approach. This realigning would serve the purpose of building a competitive EU digital ecosystem and a more balanced and efficient worldwide competition between all digital providers. In addition, EU competition authorities should also support price caps as welfare enhancing forms of cooperation, which could allow the emergence of platform pricing strategies within competitive markets and not only within monopolies.
In the networked twenty-first century, digital platforms have significantly influenced capital accumulation and digital culture. Platforms, such as social network sites (e.g. Facebook), search engines (e.g. Google), and smartphones (e.g. iPhone), are increasingly crucial because they function as major digital media intermediaries. Emerging companies in non-Western countries have created unique platforms, controlling their own national markets and competing with Western-based platform empires in the global markets. The reality though is that only a handful of Western countries, primarily the U.S., have dominated the global platform markets, resulting in capital accumulation in the hands of a few mega platform owners. This book contributes to the platform imperialism discourse by mapping out several core areas of platform imperialism, such as intellectual property, the global digital divide, and free labor, focusing on the role of the nation-state alongside transnational capital.
A trio of experts on high-tech business strategy and innovation reveal the principles that have made platform businesses the most valuable firms in the world and the first trillion-dollar companies. Managers and entrepreneurs in the digital era must learn to live in two worlds—the conventional economy and the platform economy. Platforms that operate for business purposes usually exist at the level of an industry or ecosystem, bringing together individuals and organizations so they can innovate and interact in ways not otherwise possible. Platforms create economic value far beyond what we see in conventional companies. The Business of Platforms is an invaluable, in-depth look at platform strategy and digital innovation. Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie address how a small number of companies have come to exert extraordinary influence over every dimension of our personal, professional, and political lives. They explain how these new entities differ from the powerful corporations of the past. They also question whether there are limits to the market dominance and expansion of these digital juggernauts. Finally, they discuss the role governments should play in rethinking data privacy laws, antitrust, and other regulations that could reign in abuses from these powerful businesses. Their goal is to help managers and entrepreneurs build platform businesses that can stand the test of time and win their share of battles with both digital and conventional competitors. As experts who have studied and worked with these firms for some thirty years, this book is the most authoritative and timely investigation yet of the powerful economic and technological forces that make platform businesses, from Amazon and Apple to Microsoft, Facebook, and Google—all dominant players in shaping the global economy, the future of work, and the political world we now face.
Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.
All are agreed that the digital economy contributes to a dynamic evolution of markets and competition. Nonetheless, concerns are increasingly raised about the market dominance of a few key players. Because these companies hold the power to drive rivals out of business, regulators have begun to seek scope for competition enforcement in cases where companies claim that withholding data is needed to satisfy customers and cut costs. This book is the first focus on how competition law enforcement tools can be applied to refusals of dominant firms to give access data on online platforms such as search engines, social networks, and e-commerce platforms – commonly referred to as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Internet. The question arises whether the denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors access to its data could constitute a ‘refusal to deal’ and lead to competition law liability under the so-called ‘essential facilities doctrine', according to which firms need access to shared knowledge in order to be able to compete. A possible duty to share data with rivals also brings to the forefront the interaction of competition law with data protection legislation considering that the required information may include personal data of individuals. Building on the refusal to deal concept, and using a multidisciplinary approach, the analysis covers such issues and topics as the following: – data portability; – interoperability; – data as a competitive advantage or entry barrier in digital markets; – market definition and dominance with respect to data; – disruptive versus sustaining innovation; – role of intellectual property regimes; – economic trade-off in essential facilities cases; – relationship of competition enforcement with data protection law and – data-related competition concerns in merger cases. The author draws on a wealth of relevant material, including EU and US decision-making practice, case law, and policy documents, as well as economic and empirical literature on the link between competition and innovation. The book concludes with a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to potential forms of abuse of dominance relating to data. In addition, it makes suggestions as to how data protection interests can be integrated into competition policy. An invaluable contribution to ongoing academic and policy discussions about how data-related competition concerns should be addressed under competition law, the analysis clearly demonstrates how existing competition tools for market definition and assessment of dominance can be applied to online platforms. It will be of immeasurable value to the many jurists, business persons, and academics concerned with this very timely subject.
Congress ought not enact the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, nor the Open App Markets Act in its current form. Instead, Congress should support antitrust enforcement and consider platform rules that would protect consumers from anticompetitive practices, while allowing desirable conduct.In particular, the current draft of AICOA would deter many desirable practices, including product improvements and conduct for the protection of users. Qualifying provisions (including a "harm to competition" test and the availability of affirmative defenses) appear too weak and narrow to resolve these concerns. In addition, the breadth and vagueness of AICOA's other provisions seem likely to result in an avalanche of litigation and confusion.The current draft of OAMA represents a more promising basis for legislation. Some of its provisions -- including a ban on app price MFN for platforms with market power, and certain transparency requirements -- could benefit consumers. But OAMA's other provisions raise serious concerns. In particular, forcing third-party app stores into digital ecosystems seems likely to result in significant consumer harm.Congress has many options for promoting competition and protecting consumers. Instead of enacting AICOA and OAMA, Congress could fully fund federal and state antitrust enforcement, modernize antitrust doctrine, and consider targeted platform regulations that would prohibit practices by businesses with significant market power that would harm competition and consumers.
Across the globe, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft have accumulated power in ways that existing regulatory and intellectual frameworks struggle to comprehend. A consensus is emerging that the power of these new digital monopolies is unprecedented, and that it has important implications for journalism, politics, and society. It is increasingly clear that democratic societies require new legal and conceptual tools if they are to adequately understand, and if necessary check the economic might of these companies. Equally, that we need to better comprehend the ability of such firms to control personal data and to shape the flow of news, information, and public opinion. In this volume, Martin Moore and Damian Tambini draw together the world's leading researchers to examine the digital dominance of technologies platforms and look at the evidence behind the rising tide of criticism of the tech giants. In fifteen chapters, the authors examine the economic, political, and social impacts of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft, in order to understand the different facets of their power and how it is manifested. Digital Dominance is the first interdisciplinary volume on this topic, contributing to a conversation which is critical to maintaining the health of democracies across the world.
It has taken platforms only twenty years to become digital economy hubs. They have changed markets, enterprises, and society. They have expedited communication, collaboration, and trade for consumers, winning their attention and collecting their data. In doing so, they have made processes, products, and industries obsolete, and disrupted the expectations and behaviours of market players. This raises the question, are digital platforms global innovators or disruptive monopolists? Are they a solution to problems of the past or emissaries of a problematic future? This book provides a multi-faceted approach to platforms and their profound impact on markets and ecosystems. Economic, managerial, social, and political aspects are analysed, and the differentiation of platforms and their disruptive potential is reviewed. The book also examines the mechanism of achieving a monopolistic position, including in the international supply chain, and the greater influence of platforms on political activity and contemporary democracy. With examples from Poland, USA, and China, the contributions offer an international evaluation of disruptive platforms across a multitude of industries. The edited collection, prepared by scholars from the SGH Warsaw School of Economics, will be valuable to researchers and academics across the fields of strategic management, marketing, innovations, international business, and the digital economy.
"The Case for the Digital Platform Act" is a new book from Harold Feld, Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge and longtime communications industry advocate, in collaboration with Public Knowledge and the Roosevelt Institute. This book aims to guide policymakers on what government can do to preserve competition and empower individual users in the huge swath of our economy now referred to as "Big Tech." Many Americans now wonder how they can reassert control over their lives after ceding so many decisions about our economy and our public discourse to private actors like Facebook, Google, and Amazon. But as Feld points out, we have faced similar challenges from new technologies before. Looking at more than a century of disruptive communications technologies from the telegraph to television to Twitter, Feld picks out patterns of what approaches have worked (and what hasn't) to promote competition, empower consumers and protect democracy. "The Case for the Digital Platform Act" provides a deep dive for policymakers on everything from specific recommendations on how to promote competition to a "First Amendment checklist" for content moderation, while remaining accessible to the general reader looking to participate in the debate over our digital future. Feld explains the need for a "Digital Platform Act" and for an agency specifically charged to regulate digital platforms on an ongoing basis. He proposes a new method of assessing a platform's dominance for purposes of new regulation. He also addresses questions around content moderation rights and responsibilities for companies that have found themselves policing the new public square, all while preserving the best things about digital platforms for their users. Praise for "The Case for the Digital Platform Act": "[...] a tour de force of the issues raised by the digital economy and internet capitalism. Whether you agree or disagree with Harold, these thoughts will stretch your intellect and stimulate your thinking." -Tom Wheeler, Former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Visiting Fellow at The Brooking Institution "You'd be shortchanging yourself by not reading the book of such a principled advocate." -Hal Singer, Managing Director at Econ One Research, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business, Senior Fellow at George Washington's Institute of Public Policy "I'd bet you can't listen to Harold Feld talk about the Digital Platform Act and not think we need it as law right now. I'm glad Harold Feld and Public Knowledge are making the case for government to do the job Silicon Valley won't." -Chris Savage, Eclectablog
Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.