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This study examines the operations of the 7th Armored Division from 16 December 1944 through 29 January 1945. The focus is on the nature of combat as seen from the perspective of battalion through division-level commanders. The 7th Armored Division provides data on defensive operations, withdrawal, reconstitution and offensive operations. This data is used to examine the validity of the AirLand Battle concepts of “agility,” “initiative,” “depth” and “synchronization.” The study illuminates the tremendous complexity of high-tempo, continuous operations and the validity of the AirLand Battle doctrine. The study reveals the key to success in such operations is the ability to cope with high levels of friction which stems from the clear communication of intent. The study raises questions on the ability of the US Army to fight at night, the Army’s doctrine for retrograde operations, and its artillery doctrine.
More so than any other operation, the Campaign to seize Okinawa in the closing days of World War II represents the greatest joint effort undertaken by the US Military. From its organization to the way it fought, Tenth Army incorporated every element of the service to a degree never before attempted and never since replicated. This study analyzes the Okinawa Campaign, Operation ICEBERG, using the operational operating systems as a framework for assessing how well the Tenth Army conducted the campaign and for determining what lessons are applicable to joint operations at the field army level. This study first traces the historical background of field armies in the twentieth century and shows that every major conflict has included combat operations at this level. It then outlines the operational operating systems as defined in TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9. Before actually analyzing the campaign, the study provides a battle summary of the Okinawa Campaign which provides the basis for analysis. The study then looks at the campaign through each of the six operational operating systems to determine how Tenth Army planned for the operation, how well it performed, and what lessons can be extracted and applied to today’s joint operational requirements. Although Okinawa was the largest joint operation of the war, it was not the largest planned joint operation. Operation DOWNFALL, the campaign to seize the Japanese islands, was the largest planned. So Okinawa was really a test of how joint operations at the large unit level could be conducted. Although the war ended prior to the invasion of Japan, the lessons the US Military learned in executing ICEBERG are still relevant and still provide insight into how joint operations should be conducted at the field army level.
Well over 2,000 total pages ... INTRODUCTION The Germans called it the “Operation Watch on the Rhine.” The French named it the “Battle of the Ardennes.” And the Western Allies termed it the “Ardennes Counteroffensive.” But because of the way the map of Western Europe looked at the height of the battle, it became known to history as the “Battle of the Bulge.” It was the winter of 1944–1945, months before the war in Europe would end. Despite the protestations of his generals, Adolf Hitler decided on one final attempt to turn World War II in favor of his German Third Reich. For this, he ordered resources diverted from other battle fronts—including his losing campaign against the Russians in the east. The Allies were caught of guard, as Hitler had hoped. Thousands of U.S. troops were surrounded at one point. In the end, the Allies committed enough troops that the tired, ill-equipped German army was overwhelmed. Indeed, the Battle of the Bulge was an important turning point in the war in the Allies’ favor, but it was not without its cost. The Battle of the Bulge is considered one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. CONTENTS 1. Introduction: The Battle of the Bulge Loomed Large 70 Winters Ago 2. BATTLE OF THE BULGE: THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN - A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources 3. The U.S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 4. U.S. Army in Action Bastogne - The First Eight Days 5. The Campaigns of World War II Ardennes-Alsace (75th Anniversary) 6. The Last Offensive 7. THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE 8. Missed Opportunity: Reducing the Bulge 9. THE FAILURE OF GERMAN LOGISTICS DURING THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE OF 1944 10. BEGINNING OF THE END: THE LEADERSHIP OF SS OBERSTURMBANNFÜHRER JOCHEN PEIPER
This study examines the role of U.S. Army Engineers fighting as infantry in AirLand Battle by analyzing the actions of the 1111th Engineer Combat Group during the Battle of the Bulge in Dec. 1944. By manning hasty defensive positions at Malmedy, Stavelot, and Trois Ponts, the 291st Engineers and C Company, 51st Engineers delayed the German advance long enough for 30th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions to reach the area and wrestle the initiative from Sixth Panzer Army. The defense of the Ourthe River line by elements of the 51st Engineers was instrumental in delaying 116th Panzer Division long enough for 3rd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions to reach defensive positions in front of the Meuse River. Engineers were successful as infantry against mechanized forces for several reasons: 1) Infantry missions were limited in scope; 2) They were augmented with additional fire power; 3) They occupied good defensible terrain; 4) World War II engineer units received extensive combat training before deploying overseas. The Battle of the Bulge displays many of the characteristics of a Soviet attack on NATO. Like the Ardennes in Dec. 1944, NATO’s Central Front is held by units which are overextended, untested in combat, and locked into a rigid forward defense with limited tactical reserves and no operational reserves. Under these circumstances, if Soviet forces do penetrate the Main Battle Area, engineer units are likely to be committed as infantry to block or contain the penetration. Like the Battle of the Bulge, we can expect a non-linear battlefield with fragmented, isolated units-a battlefield dominated by confusion and uncertainty. It is in exactly this type of situation that the actions of a few brave, determined men can make the difference between victory and defeat. By manning small, isolated defensive positions, the men of the 1111th Engineer Group provided the extra measure of combat power that tipped the scales of victory in favor of the Allies in Dec. 1944.
The Battle of the Bulge lives in history as the U.S. Army's largest and bloodiest battle of World War II. This innovative study of American military leadership in action during the battle examines the performance of six generals in the days and weeks after the German attack in December 1944. • Generals covered include Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, among others • Five levels of command are studied: supreme coalition, army group, army, corps, and division/armored combat command • A unique and important history that will appeal to buffs, scholars, and soldiers
If the Battle of the Bulge was Germany's last gasp, it was also America's proving ground-the largest single action fought by the U.S. Army in World War II. Taking a new approach to an old story, Harold Winton widens our field of vision by showing how victory in this legendary campaign was built upon the remarkable resurrection of our truncated interwar army, an overhaul that produced the effective commanders crucial to GI success in beating back the Ardennes counteroffensive launched by Hitler's forces. Winton's is the first study of the Bulge to examine leadership at the largely neglected level of corps command. Focusing on the decisions and actions of six Army corps commanders—Leonard Gerow, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgway, John Millikin, Manton Eddy, and J. Lawton Collins—he recreates their role in this epic struggle through a mosaic of narratives that take the commanders from the pre-war training grounds of America to the crucible of war in the icy-cold killing fields of Belgium and Luxembourg. Winton introduces the story of each phase of the Bulge with a theater-level overview of the major decisions and events that shaped the corps battles and, for the first time, fully integrates the crucial role of airpower into our understanding of how events unfolded on the ground. Unlike most accounts of the Ardennes that chronicle only the periods of German and American initiative, Winton's study describes an intervening middle phase in which the initiative was fiercely contested by both sides and the outcome uncertain. His inclusion of the principal American and German commanders adds yet another valuable layer to this rich tapestry of narrative and analysis. Ultimately, Winton argues that the flexibility of the corps structure and the competence of the men who commanded the six American corps that fought in the Bulge contributed significantly to the ultimate victory. Chronicling the human drama of commanding large numbers of soldiers in battle, he has produced an artful blend of combat narrative, collective biography, and institutional history that contributes significantly to the broader understanding of World War II as a whole. With the recent modularization of the U.S. Army division, which makes this command echelon a re-creation of the corps of World War II, Corps Commanders of the Bulge also has distinct relevance to current issues of Army transformation.
A new assessment of the Battle of the Bulge, the largest and bloodiest battle fought by U.S. forces in World War II, offers a balanced perspective that considers both the German and American viewpoints and discusses the failings of intelligence; Hitler's strategic grasp; effects of weather and influence of terrain; and differences in weaponry, understanding of aerial warfare, and doctrine.
Loss and Redemption at St Vith closes a gap in the record of the Battle of the Bulge by recounting the exploits of the 7th Armored Division in a way that no other study has. Most accounts of the Battle of the Bulge give short-shrift to the interval during which the German forward progress stopped and the American counterattack began. This narrative centers on the 7th Armored Division for the entire length of the campaign, in so doing reconsidering the story of the whole battle through the lens of a single division and accounting for the reconstitution of the Division while in combat.