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Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the last two centuries.
Winner of the Eugene Feit Award in Civil War Studies by the New York Military Affairs Symposium During the Civil War, neither the Union nor the Confederate army could have operated without effective transportation systems. Moving men, supplies, and equipment required coordination on a massive scale, and Earl J. Hess’s Civil War Logistics offers the first comprehensive analysis of this vital process. Utilizing an enormous array of reports, dispatches, and personal accounts by quartermasters involved in transporting war materials, Hess reveals how each conveyance system operated as well as the degree to which both armies accomplished their logistical goals. In a society just realizing the benefits of modern travel technology, both sides of the conflict faced challenges in maintaining national and regional lines of transportation. Union and Confederate quartermasters used riverboats, steamers, coastal shipping, railroads, wagon trains, pack trains, cattle herds, and their soldiers in the long and complicated chain that supported the military operations of their forces. Soldiers in blue and gray alike tried to destroy the transportation facilities of their enemy, firing on river boats and dismantling rails to disrupt opposing supply lines while defending their own means of transport. According to Hess, Union logistical efforts proved far more successful than Confederate attempts to move and supply its fighting forces, due mainly to the North’s superior administrative management and willingness to seize transportation resources when needed. As the war went on, the Union’s protean system grew in complexity, size, and efficiency, while that of the Confederates steadily declined in size and effectiveness until it hardly met the needs of its army. Indeed, Hess concludes that in its use of all types of military transportation, the Federal government far surpassed its opponent and thus laid the foundation for Union victory in the Civil War.
This work is devoted to a study fo Roman logistics from the Punic Wars through the Principate. It explores various aspects of supply: rations, trains, foraging, supply lines; administration and logistics in warfare. The book traces the increasing sophistication of the Roman military supply system.
Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations explores military logistics in terms of the theoretical foundations of operational logistics (OpLog) and its applications. The theoretical foundations are examined with regard to two dimensions. First, the artistic or qualitative aspects of contemporary logistics are looked at in the context of the operational level of war. These OpLog aspects include principles, imperatives and tenets, which are stated and analyzed. The second dimension relates to the scientific aspects of logistics. It is manifested by a formal network model that represents the structural and operational features of an OpLog system. Hence the book examines both artistic and scientific dimensions of military logistics and integrates the respective qualitative and quantitative aspects into a unified and definitive presentation of operational logistics. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to military logistics. Chapter 2 discusses the general structure and characteristics of logistics and describes its three levels - strategic, operational and tactical. Chapter 3 focuses on Operational Logistics (OpLog). Chapter 4 deals with the logistics planning process. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of logistics information. Chapter 6 deals with forecasting logistics demands. Chapter 7 introduces the first version of the logistics network model. Chapter 8 addresses an important property of an OpLog system - Flexibility. Chapter 9 discusses two major (and dual) issues in OpLog practice: force accumulation and medical treatment and evacuation. Chapter 10 presents an inter-temporal network optimization model that is designed to determine deployment and employment of the support chain in an OpLog system.
The author of this book traces the pattern of the part played by logistics in armed conflict, from antiquity to the present day. The main emphasis of the book is on campaigns dating from the Korean War of 1950 onwards, but three selected campaigns from World War II produce a run-in for what is to follow - as indeed does his briefer coverage of earlier conflicts. As a former brigade commander in the Falklands War of 1982, Thompson draws a picture of what was, in effect, a microcosm of a much larger affair, the special circumstances of that experience offering a wide spectrum of logistic problems. He concludes with a look at the war on the Central Front that never was, and casts a glance into the future in the light of the impending changes for the defence of Europe.
This is a study of the logistical system that supported the Union armies in the Civil War, focusing on the Army of the Cumberland under the command of Major General William S. Rosecrans in 1863. It begins with a description of the logistical bureaus in the War Department in Washington, D.C. and the challenges they had in developing the national logistical support structure in the first years of the war. Next, the support structure in the Department of the Cumberland is described, to include the challenges in maintaining the rail link from Nashville, Tennessee, back to Louisville, Kentucky. Finally, the performances of the commanders and logisticians in the field during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns are explored, with an emphasis on the problems with transportation. This study concludes that the logisticians overcame enormous problems to create a logistical system that allowed the commanders to win the war. In the Army of the Cumberland, the support was exceptional when compared to the challenges that were faced. Logistics became a limiting factor because of the senior leadership’s poor planning, disregarded orders, and unrealistic expectations which doomed both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns from achieving decisive results even before they had begun. This study attempts to put the rarely explored, but extremely significant, field of logistics in its proper place of importance in the study of military history. Logistics is inextricably tied with strategy and tactics; without logistics, victory is not possible.
The historiography of the First Gulf War does not examine logistics at the divisional level; rather, only high-echelon logistics, those at the Corps and Theater level, are covered. This leaves a significant gap in how the upper-echelon logistics affected the combat units of the coalition. This case study seeks to rectify this gap by examining historical logistics from World War II to the Gulf War and the logistics of the First Gulf War as a whole, and subsequently placing the specific logistics of the 101st in the correct context.