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Asymmetric wars tend to be highly adaptive, and this war is both regional and global in scope. It is also a struggle fought in a context where it may come to interact with other conflicts such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle and a possible U.S. effort to drive Saddam Hussein from power. So, while it is easier to draw lessons than to validate them, this study begins that process."--BOOK JACKET.
Seeks To Provide An Initial Assessment Of The War In Afghanistan And The Lessons To Be Learn In Terms Of War Fighting, Intelligence And Force Transformation. The Study Is Divided Into-Introduction-Lessons Without Hand Data-A Unique War-Lessons Froma Partial Victory-Power Projection And Force Transformation-In Challenge-Other Lesson-Has An Appendix.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.
In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.
Military alliances provide constraints and opportunities for states seeking to advance their interests around the globe. War, from the Western perspective, is not a solitary endeavor. Partnerships of all types serve as a foundation for the projection of power and the employment of force. These relationships among states provide the foundation upon which hegemony is built. Waging War argues that these institutions of interstate violence—not just the technology, capability, and level of professionalism and training of armed forces—serve as ready mechanisms to employ force. However, these institutions are not always well designed, and do not always augment fighting effectiveness as they could. They sometimes serve as drags on state capacity. At the same time, the net benefit of having this web of partnerships, agreements, and alliances is remarkable. It makes rapid response to crisis possible, and facilitates countering threats wherever they emerge. This book lays out which institutional arrangements lubricate states' abilities to advance their agendas and prevail in wartime, and which components of institutional arrangements undermine effectiveness and cohesion, and increase costs to states. Patricia Weitsman outlines what she calls a realist institutionalist agenda: one that understands institutions as conduits of capability. She demonstrates and tests the argument in five empirical chapters, examining the cases of the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Each case has distinct lessons as well as important generalizations for contemporary multilateral warfighting.
This three-volume reference work provides an up-to-date presentation and analysis of the U.S. wars of the 21st century, addressing their backgrounds, causes, courses, and consequences. It serves as an indispensable resource for students seeking to understand the role of the United States in the world today. Addressing the U.S. conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terror from the year 2001 to the present, this comprehensive, three-volume encyclopedia covers the significant individuals, key events, and important places involved in these recent military events. Beginning with the rise of Al Qaeda in the 1990s and the attacks on September 11, 2001, and covering events through ISIS's dramatic surge in Iraq and Syria, the hundreds of detailed entries also examine historical trends; nations and ethnicities involved in the conflicts; influential figures and organizations; economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural influences; wars, campaigns, and battles; and important weapons systems. The set's A–Z organization makes it an easy-to-use ready reference for high school and college students. Perspective essays on several controversial topics—such as the use of torture and the effects of the Patriot Act—serve to inspire readers to apply critical thinking. A detailed chronology is provided to help students place all the important events that have occurred in the Afghanistan War, Iraq War, and War on Terror. Each of the chronologically arranged primary documents is introduced with a brief overview to provide important background information and context.
A whole generation has grown up in Afghanistan knowing little but the ravages of war. The dramatic overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 was simply one event in a series of interrelated struggles which have blighted ordinary people's lives over the last three decades, and which continue to interfere with reconciliation and reconstruction. This new edition of The Afghanistan Wars provides a meticulously-documented history of these successive waves of conflict. From the roots of Afghanistan's slide into disorder in the late 1970s to the challenges faced by Afghan leaders following the substantial withdrawal of international forces in 2014, it explores military and diplomatic history while also offering valuable insight on humanitarian action, gender, medical and cultural themes. Thoroughly revised in the light of the latest research, the third edition also features a new final chapter which examines recent developments in Afghanistan, bringing the story up to the present day and mounting a strong case for continuing support for this troubled country. New to this Edition: - A final chapter on the recent developments in Afghanistan up to the present day - Revised to take into account the considerable amount of new material published on this topic since 2009 - Refreshed and updated throughout
This reference work covers the history of Middle East nations, addressing military, political, diplomatic, and ideological trends in each respective country and enabling readers to better understand the factors behind the crises shaping the Middle East today. Modern Conflict in the Greater Middle East: A Country-By-Country Guide is a concise reference for students exploring the importance of each nation-state in the Middle East and their level of involvement in major conflicts in the region. It supplies the broad historical background necessary for readers to understand each country's unique role in the conflicts that have characterized the region since the end of World War I. The book also enables readers to grasp the various motives and ideologies that have shaped each nation's military objectives and to appreciate the political and social climates of each of these countries that propelled them into various wars. The book presents a chapter-by-chapter discussion of the origins and impacts of war on specific Middle Eastern countries, giving readers an in-depth understanding of the global importance of the conflicts within the region. These chapters—along with detailed timelines, sidebars, and primary source documents—will help readers grasp the connections between individuals, developments, and conflicts in the Middle East and events and developments such as European imperialism, World Wars I and II, U.S. foreign policy during and after the Cold War, the formation of the state of Israel, Arab nationalism, the emergence of the oil industry in the region, and the origins of radical Islam.