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The trend of retail concentration across the European Union has raised concerns on the buyer power that retailers may have in the relation with their suppliers. Following calls that the changing nature of competition demands a change in EU competition policy, this book investigates whether there is a 'gap' in current EU competition law concerning the potential harmful effects of buyer power from an economic efficiency perspective. Using a Law and Economics approach, the book identifies the potential concerns and assesses whether they can be addressed under the existing rules. While some critical comments are in place with regard to the consumer welfare standard that is applied, the book's analysis does not indicate that the current substantive legal framework of EU competition law is unfit to address the (potential) harmful effects of buyer power. *** Librarians: ebook available on ProQuest and EBSCO [Subject: EU Law, Competition Law, Commercial Law, Trade Law, Law and Economics]
The thesis presents a comprehensive and cross-sectional discussion of buyer power to determine the legal regulation of buyer conducts under EU competition law. It focuses on four main research areas: understanding buyer power; analysing the legal treatment given to the exertion of anticompetitive buyer power under EU competition law; exploring theories of harm applicable to buyer power abuse, and ascertaining the welfare standard employed for buyer power cases.
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.
This Handbook grapples conceptually and practically with what the sharing economy - which includes entities ranging from large for-profit firms like Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, Taskrabbit, and Upwork to smaller, non-profit collaborative initiatives - means for law, and how law, in turn, is shaping critical aspects of the sharing economy. Featuring a diverse set of contributors from many academic disciplines and countries, the book compiles the most important, up-to-date research on the regulation of the sharing economy. The first part surveys the nature of the sharing economy, explores the central challenge of balancing innovation and regulatory concerns, and examines the institutions confronting these regulatory challenges, and the second part turns to a series of specific regulatory domains, including labor and employment law, consumer protection, tax, and civil rights. This groundbreaking work should be read by anyone interested in the dynamic relationship between law and the sharing economy.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Despite the continuing inter-government cooperation over the regulation of international commerce, significant cross-country differences persist in areas such as merger control, notification to authorities, and remedies deemed appropriate for antitrust enforcement. Accordingly, companies must be aware of the rules that apply in the countries in which they do business. This fourth edition of the Kintner-Joelson classic International Antitrust Primerprovides a thorough update of the status of competition regulation in a number of key jurisdictions, including up-to-date case law involving the technology giants Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook. Coverage focuses on the European Union and the United States — which continue to be foremost in the enforcement and refinement of comprehensive competition laws — but also takes into account the vast strides that are being made elsewhere, with chapters on South Korea, Japan, and India, as well as a chapter on the United Kingdom with a section on the post-Brexit implications. The book provides essential guidance on such issues of concern to business persons and their counsel as the following: • intellectual property rights; • extent and kind of criminal sanctions; • extraterritorial reach; • mergers and acquisitions; • level and type of enforcement activity; • effects of national foreign or domestic policy; • permissible cooperation among competitors; and • public procurement. Business persons, government officials, students, lawyers, and others who have been relying on this preeminent resource for years will greatly appreciate this thoroughly updated edition. There is nothing else that so lucidly and helpfully explains competition law for those who require a working knowledge of the subject to proceed confidently in their day-to-day work.
The maintenance of a fair, competitive market among member states is critical to the functioning of the EU economy. In this book, the first comprehensive, unifying view of market definition, Miguel Ferro adeptly explores the different economic-legal issues that arise in EU competition law.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
Succinct and concise, this textbook covers all the procedural and substantive aspects of EU competition law. It explores primary and secondary law through the prism of ECJ case law. Abuse of a dominant position and merger control are discussed and a separate chapter on cartels ensures the student receives the broadest possible perspective on the subject. In addition, the book's consistent structure aids understanding: section summaries underline key principles, questions reinforce learning and essay discussion topics encourage further exploration. By setting out the economic principles which underpin the subject, the author allows the student to engage with the complexity of competition law with confidence. Integrated examples and an uncluttered writing style make this required reading for all students of the subject.
Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.