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From the prelude of the October 1973 Middle East war through the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979, Kenneth W. Stein grippingly traces American involvement in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. He provides an extraordinary range of first-hand accounts, recollections and anecdotes from over eighty bureaucrats, diplomats and military leaders who participated in Arab-Israeli peace talks in the 1970's and since. Since the official public record remains unavailable for reasons of national security, these interviews provide unequaled insight into the internal divisions, political intrigue and untold stories of the peace process. Charting the complex and often contradictory goals of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, the US and the USSR, Stein chronicles the evolution of these negotiations and analyzes the key roles of Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, and Begin. An introduction and epilogue place this period in context of Arab-Israeli history since 1948 and the current status of the peace process.
Most students of the history of Arab-Jewish relations have come to take for granted the stubborn resistance of the continuing dispute to any form of lasting and ‘reasonable’ solution. This book, first published in 1983, examines early Arab-Zionist negotiating experience with the assumption that this has direct relevance to our understanding of the possible outcomes of diplomatic approaches to resolving the conflict. Its main purpose is to assemble (half of the book consists of original souce documents) and discuss some of the raw material which may help readers focus more clearly on the origins of the conflict, and perhaps to eliminate some recurring fallacies about its development and the prospects for its resolution. An examination of the period 1913 to 1931 reveals of wealth of previous negotiating experience which is today largely forgotten, and indicates that there was little or no movement of any of the parties in the direction of modifying its basic minimum demands and aspirations.
These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources, providing an essential reference source for the student of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its long history.
Part of series that aims to provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. It exploits a range of available archive sources, as well as extensive secondary sources.
Examines how Israeli Palestinians have fared under Jewish rule, revealing both Israels attitude toward minorities and Palestinians attitudes toward the Jewish state and analyzes the Israeli state's policy towards its Palestinian citizens.
When the Israeli prime minister and the PLO chairman shook hands on the White House lawn in 1993, Israeli peace activists had good reason to celebrate this major step on the long road to peace.This book tells the story of the Israeli peace movement and the role it played in that pursuit of peace. It is an eloquent, fascinating account of a remarkably diverse and determined cast of activists: from war-weary soldiers to hard-headed politicians, careful scholars to impassioned artists.Drawing on his experience in the peace movement, Bar-On provides intimate portraits of groups like Peace Now, Yesh Gvul, and the Women in Black, he also provides a sweeping historical synthesis of the course of the Israeli-Arab conflict, especially between 1967 and 1993.
Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation examines the escalatory patterns of Israel's relations with Arab countries, paying particular attention to the preconditions, conditions, and ultimate precipitants of wars that have broken out with some repetitiveness in the Middle East. The impact of the October 1973 War (known as the Yom Kippur War in the West and the Ramadan War in Arab countries) on the United States interests in the Middle East is also assessed. This book is comprised of seven chapters and opens with an overview of the October War; those Arab states actually involved in the war, especially Egypt and Syria; and those Arab states having geographical access to either the Mediterranean or Indian Oceans, including the oil-producing states. The wider political and military implications of the war are discussed, with specific reference to super power interests. The following chapters discuss the perceptual context of Arab politics; the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the impact of Arab conflict imagery on an inherently escalatory situation; the consequences and lessons of the June 1967 war, or Six-Day War; and Arab coalition politics between 1970 and 1973. The final two chapters focus on the combined Egyptian-Syrian battle plan, code-named Operation Badr, and the historical and political implications of the 1973 war. This monograph will be of interest to diplomats, policymakers, and government officials concerned with the politics of war and in international relations more generally.
The architects of the Camp David process expected their efforts to become a broad and inclusive framework for peace in the Middle East. Dr. Friedlander's book demonstrates how domestic factors affecting policy decisions made in both Cairo and Jerusalem prevented Sadat and Begin from embracing a structure that would yield a more comprehensive arrangement. Sadat, for example, confronted an antipeace movement in Egypt, strengthened by then-Vice President Mubarak's ties to the military-security establishment and his alliance with members of the Arab nation's diplomatic corps. Begin was opposed by Israeli conservatives who saw the Camp David formulas as leading to a peace that would jeopardize Israel's security. Both leaders, Dr. Friedlander concludes, were able ultimately to guide their nations toward approval of the peace initiative primarily because of their mastery of techniques of domestic intra-elite bargaining.