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Sebastian Dullien gives a novel explanation for unemployment and inflation in the Euro-Zone. He argues that unemployment stems from a lack of co-operation between unions and monetary authorities: In an economy with endogenous money as EMU, wage setters are responsible for price stability while the central bank is responsible for the level of output. Co-operation between both actors is necessary for high employment and low inflation. The current institutional set-up is found to be unable to assure cooperation.
This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on "Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities" This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.
The launch of European Monetary Union (EMU) marked the beginning of a new era, and its establishment has proved an impressive success at the technical, legal, and procedural level. After all, EMU has accelerated economic and political integration in the European Union and tied the economies of the Member States closer together. However, the performance of the euro, high unemployment rates, uneven output and investment growth, and the issue of structural reforms that have yet to be tackled have raised questions about the performance of EMU in practice. There is a general consensus on the justification for economic policy coordination. The existing literature on economic policy coordination, however, seems far from able to provide robust conclusions about how to organize the necessary interaction of institutions and policies. Therefore, there seems to be a case for re-examining the subject under the new framework set by EMU. The objective of such a reassessment is to enhance the understanding of what type of coordination and what institutional setting for policy coordination can be expected to be most favorable. Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union provides an intellectually stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate.
'Monetary Union, Employment and Growth provides a thorough and well-developed analysis of the macroeconomic and microeconomic implications of the single currency.' - Terrence Casey, Journal of European Area Studies 'This book offers an in-depth discussion of two highly topical European issues - the single currency and unemployment - making it suitable for professional economists and post-graduate students in economics, international relations and European studies.' - European Access There exists a twofold relationship between the factors affecting adoption of a single currency in Europe, employment, and growth. On one hand, the operation of the euro will be hindered if rigidities in labour and product markets persist - hence low employment and slow growth may be a cause of poor performance of the single currency. On the other hand, the functioning of the euro will affect future patterns of European employment. Pier Carlo Padoan and his distinguished group of contributing authors go beyond the common European-based debates to consider the impact of the euro as a global currency on the evolution of European labour, product, and regional markets.
This book studies interactions between monetary and wage policies in the Euro area, closely reviewing and discussing the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. On policy competition, the book focuses on competition between the European central bank, the American central bank, the German labour union, and the French labour union. As to policy cooperation, the focus is on the same institutions. Includes numerical simulations and solutions.
This book studies the strategic policy interactions in a monetary union. The leading protagonists are the European Central Bank and national governments. The target of the ECB is low inflation in Europe. The targets of a national government are low unemployment and a low structural deficit. There are demand shocks, supply shocks, and mixed shocks. There are country-specific shocks and common shocks. This book develops a series of basic, intermediate, and more advanced models. Here the focus is on the Nash equilibrium. The key questions are: Given a shock, can policy interactions reduce the existing loss? And to what extent can they do so? Another topical issue is policy cooperation. To illustrate all of this there are a lot of numerical examples. The present book is part of a larger research project on European Monetary Union, see the references given at the back of the book. Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association, at the International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis, at the International Institute of Public Finance, and at the International Atlantic Economic Conference. Other parts were presented at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, at the Göttingen Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg, at the Research Seminar on Economics in Kassel, and at the Passau Workshop on International Economics.
The contributors to this study examine the ways in which monetary union will affect collective bargaining in the six states that are adhering to the principles laid down in the Maastricht Treaty on convergence and monetary union.'
Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between central bank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically, coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraint to non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within the member states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting European inflation will remove a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government?union bargains. The Bundesbank also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: for underlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible that Germany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.
European monetary unification seems to be one of the most important events in international monetary affairs since the breakdown of Bretton Woods. It pos es a major challenge to central banks, governments, and labour unions. It opens up new fields of economic research that are both intriguing and fascinating. European Monetary Union amounts to a switch of regime. Surely the Mundell Fleming model of the open economy does no longer apply to Germany or France. The effects of shocks and policies on output and prices should have changed dramatically in size. Some of them should even work in the opposite direction now. The present book is part of a larger research project on monetary union, see Carlberg (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association in Lisbon. Other parts were presented at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association in Klagenfurt, at the Pass au Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, and at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg. Moreover, book reviews were published in the Economic Journal, Kyklos, the Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Economics and Statistics.
This book explores the new economics of monetary union. It carefully discusses the effects of shocks and policies on output and prices. Shocks and policies are country-specific or common. They occur on the demand or supply side. Countries can differ in behavioural functions. Wages can be fixed, flexible, or slow. In addition, fixed wages and flexible wages can coexist. Take for instance fixed wages in Germany and flexible wages in France. Or take fixed wages in Europe and flexible wages in America. A special feature of this book is the numerical estimation of shock and policy multipliers. Further topics are inflation and disinflation. Take for instance inflation in Germany and price stability in France. Then what policy is needed for disinflation in the union? And what will be the dynamic effects on Germany and France?