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The British Expeditionary Force at the start of World War I was tiny by the standards of the other belligerent powers. Yet, when deployed to France in 1914, it prevailed against the German army because of its professionalism and tactical skill, strengths developed through hard lessons learned a dozen years earlier. In October 1899, the British went to war against the South African Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, expecting little resistance. A string of early defeats in the Boer War shook the military’s confidence. Historian Spencer Jones focuses on this bitter combat experience in From Boer War to World War, showing how it crucially shaped the British Army’s tactical development in the years that followed. Before the British Army faced the Boer republics, an aura of complacency had settled over the military. The Victorian era had been marked by years of easy defeats of crudely armed foes. The Boer War, however, brought the British face to face with what would become modern warfare. The sweeping, open terrain and advent of smokeless powder meant soldiers were picked off before they knew where shots had been fired from. The infantry’s standard close-order formations spelled disaster against the well-armed, entrenched Boers. Although the British Army ultimately adapted its strategy and overcame the Boers in 1902, the duration and cost of the war led to public outcry and introspection within the military. Jones draws on previously underutilized sources as he explores the key tactical lessons derived from the war, such as maximizing firepower and using natural cover, and he shows how these new ideas were incorporated in training and used to effect a thorough overhaul of the British Army. The first book to address specific connections between the Boer War and the opening months of World War I, Jones’s fresh interpretation adds to the historiography of both wars by emphasizing the continuity between them.
The regular Mounted Infantry was one of the most important innovations of the late Victorian and Edwardian British Army. Rather than fight on horseback in the traditional manner of cavalry, they used horses primarily to move swiftly about the battlefield, where they would then dismount and fight on foot, thus anticipating the development of mechanised infantry tactics during the twentieth century. Yet despite this apparent foresight, the mounted infantry concept was abandoned by the British Army in 1913, just at the point when it may have made the transition from a colonial to a continental force as part of the British Expeditionary Force. Exploring the historical background to the Mounted Infantry, this book untangles the debates that raged in the army, Parliament and the press between its advocates and the supporters of the established cavalry. With its origins in the extemporised mounted detachments raised during times of crisis from infantry battalions on overseas imperial garrison duties, Dr Winrow reveals how the Mounted Infantry model, unique among European armies, evolved into a formalised and apparently highly successful organisation of non-cavalry mounted troops. He then analyses why the Mounted Infantry concept fell out of favour just eleven years after its apogee during the South African Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. As such the book will be of interest not only to historians of the nineteenth-century British army, but also those tracing the development of modern military doctrine and tactics, to which the Mounted Infantry provided successful - if short lived - inspiration.
Recent studies of the British Army during the First World War have fundamentally overturned historical understandings of its strategy and tactics, yet the chain of command that linked the upper echelons of GHQ to the soldiers in the trenches remains poorly understood. In order to reconnect the lines of communication between the General Staff and the front line, this book examines the British army’s commanders at battalion level, via four key questions: (i) How and where resources were found from the small officer corps of 1914 to cope with the requirement for commanding officers (COs) in the expanding army; (ii) What was the quality of the men who rose to command; (iii) Beyond simple overall quality, exactly what qualities were perceived as making an effective CO; and (iv) To what extent a meritocracy developed in the British army by the Armistice. Based upon a prosopographical analysis of a database over 4,000 officers who commanded infantry battalions during the war, the book tackles one of the central historiographical issues pertaining to the war: the qualities of the senior British officer. In so doing it challenges lingering popular conceptions of callous incompetence, as well more scholarly criticism that has derided the senior British officer, but has done so without a data-driven perspective. Through his thorough statistical analysis Dr Peter Hodgkinson adds a valuable new perspective to the historical debate underway regarding the nature of British officers during the extraordinary expansion of the Army between 1914 and 1918, and the remarkable, yet often forgotten, British victories of The Hundred Days.
In the popular imagination, the battle fields of the Western Front were dominated by the machine gun. Yet soldiers at the time were clear that artillery - not machine guns - dictated the nature, tactics and strategy of the conflict. Only in the last months of the war when the Allies had amassed sufficient numbers of artillery and learned how to use it in an integrated and coherent manner was the stalemate broken and war ended. In this lucid and prize-winning study, the steady development of artillery, and the growing realisation of its primacy within the British Expeditionary Force is charted and analysed. Through an examination of British and Dominion forces operating on the Western Front, the book looks at how tactical and operational changes affected the overall strategy. Chapters cover the role of artillery in supporting infantry attacks, counter-battery work, artillery in defence, training and command and staff arrangements. In line with the 'learning curve' thesis, the work concludes that despite many setbacks and missed opportunities, by 1918 the Royal Artillery had developed effective and coordinated tactics to overcome the defensive advantages of trench warfare that had mired the Western Front in bloody stalemate for the previous three years.
'An engaging, well-written and meticulously researched military biography ...' – Tim Stapleton, Professor, Department of History, University of Calgary Jan Smuts grabbed the opportunity to realise his ambition of a Greater South Africa when the First World War ushered in a final scramble for Africa. He set his sights firmly northward upon the German colonies of South West Africa and East Africa. Smuts's abilities as a general have been much denigrated by his contemporaries and later historians, but he was no armchair soldier. He first learned his soldier's craft under General Koos de la Rey and General Louis Botha during the South African War (1899−1902). He emerged from that conflict immersed in Boer manoeuvre doctrine. After forming the Union Defence Force in 1912, Smuts played an integral part in the German South West African campaign in 1915. Placed in command of the Allied forces in East Africa in 1916, he led a mixed bag of South Africans and imperial troops against the legendary Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his Schutztruppen. His penchant for manoeuvre warfare and mounted infantry freed most of the vast German territory from Lettow-Vorbeck's grip. General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa provides a long-overdue reassessment of Smuts's generalship and his role in furthering the strategic aims of South Africa and the British Empire during this era.
This book examines the British and German approach to naval air power, describing the creation and development of the two naval air service organizations and doctrine. This work provides new insights as to how two naval air services were influenced by internal and political interventions, and how each was integrated into the organizational structures of the Royal Navy and the Kaiserlichemarine (KM). Both the Admiralty and the KM made substantial alterations to their organizations and doctrine in the process. Principal air doctrines employed are examined chronologically and the application of operational doctrine is described. While they adopted similar air doctrines, there were differences in operational doctrine, which they addressed according to their different requirements. This book is a comparative study about the development of organization and air power doctrine in the RNAS (Royal Naval Air Service) and the IGNAS (Imperial German Naval Air Service). It investigates public and political interventions and early concepts of air power, placing into context the factors which contributed to how naval theorists came to think about the best means of controlling its working medium, air space. Ultimately, it examines the similarities, and differences, between the RNAS and IGNAS understanding of naval air power, within the broader strategic and theoretical framework of their parent organizations. This book will be of great interest to students of air power, naval power, military history, strategic studies and IR in general.
Victorious in its previous campaigns in Africa against native armies, Britain now confronted an altogether different foe. The Boers proved to be formidable opponents, masterfully compensating for inferior numbers with grim determination, resourcefulness and strong religious faith. Their mobility, expert use of cover, and knowledge of the terrain, in which they employed powerful long-range magazine rifles, gave them initial advantages. By contrast the British suffered from inadequate transport, insufficient mounted troops and poor intelligence. Despite marshalling the immense resources of their empire, the British were to be severely tested in a war which one general described as 'the graveyard of many a soldier's reputation'.
The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was fought between the tiny South African Boer republics and the mighty British Empire. For the British it was a foretaste of the devastating power of the modern weaponry they would face in the First World War and they suffered a series of catastrophic defeats. In response Field Marshal Frederick Roberts initiated one of the most audacious manoeuvres of the war. His objective was to outflank General Pieter Cronjé and his Boer army which sat astride the route to the besieged town of Kimberley. The move would culminate in one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war, the Battle of Paardeberg. The outcome of the battle was far from certain for either man. Would it be Lord Roberts or General Cronjé who prevailed?
In this, the first fully documented study of British and Irish popular reactions to the outbreak of the First World War, Catriona Pennell explores UK public opinion of the time, successfully challenging post-war constructions of 'war enthusiasm' in the British case, and disengagement in the Irish. Drawing from a vast array of contemporary diaries, letters, journals, and newspaper accounts from across the UK, A Kingdom United explores what people felt, and how they acted, in response to an unanticipated and unprecedented crisis. It is a history of both ordinary people and elite figures in extraordinary times. Pennell demonstrates that describing the reactions of over 40 million British and Irish people to the outbreak of war as either enthusiastic in the British case, or disengaged in the Irish, is over-simplified and inadequate. Emotional reactions to the war were ambiguous and complex, and changed over time. By the end of 1914 the populations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland had largely embraced the war, but the war had also embraced them and showed no signs of relinquishing its grip. The five months from August to December 1914 set the shape of much that was to follow. A Kingdom United describes and explains the twenty-week formative process in order to deepen our understanding of British and Irish entry into war.
Recasts the role of the Indian Army on the Western Front, questioning why its performance was traditionally deemed a failure.