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This book highlights that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the very existence of any society based on democratic values, such as the observance of the rule of law and respect for the human rights of individuals. In order to ensure that the judiciary’s interpretation of the law is not bound by the will of the executive and that it is able to call the executive to account by protecting the life as well as liberty of the governed, it is imperative to guarantee, among other things, a transparent method of appointment and the security of tenure of the judges. Taking into account the importance of an independent judiciary in a democratic society, the framers of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, following in the footsteps of the framers of the Constitutions of India and Pakistan, incorporated in the Constitution the ideal of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary as one of its basic features. This book, however, makes it manifestly evident that the key elements for realising such an ideal have not adequately been guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, this book sheds light on how succeeding generations of executives have sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Accordingly, this book puts forward recommendations for the insertion of detailed norms in the Constitution of Bangladesh for establishing the best means for excluding patronage appointments to the bench and for guaranteeing the security of tenure of the judges. This book asserts that the incorporation of such norms, safeguards the independence of the superior judiciary to decide cases without fear or favour. This book, therefore, seeks to address the gap that exists between the theory and practice concerning the independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh. Since no book is currently available in the market that critically examines these issues in a systematic and structured manner, this research enhances knowledge by not only identifying the flaws, deficiencies and lacunae of the constitutional provisions concerning the method of appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh but also the measures undertaken by the current Bangladeshi regime to dispense with the transparent method of removal of the judges involving a body of judicial character.
This book critically examines the evolving global trend of judicial activism with particular reference to Bangladesh. It constructs judicial activism as a golden-mean adjudicative technology, standing between excessive judicial assertion and unacceptable judicial passivity that may leave injustices un-redressed. It argues that judicial balancing between over-activism and meek administration of justice should essentially be predicated upon domestic conditions, and the needs and fundamental public values of the judges’ respective society. Providing cross-jurisdictional empirical evidence, the study demonstrates that judicial activism, steered towards improving justice and grounded in one’s societal specificities, can be exercised in a morally and legally legitimate form and without rupturing the balance of powers among the state organs. This study has sought to displace the myth of judicial activism as constitutional transgression by “unelected” judges, arguing that judicial activism is quite different from excessivism. It is argued and shown that a particular judge or judiciary turns out to be activist when other public functionaries avoid or breach their constitutional responsibilities and thus generate injustice and inequality. The study treats judicial activism as the conscientious exposition of constitutional norms and enforcement of public duties of those in positions of power. The study assesses whether Bangladeshi judges have been striking the correct balance between over-activism and injudicious passivity. Broadly, the present book reveals judicial under-activism in Bangladesh and offers insights into causes for this. It is argued that the existing milieu of socio-political injustices and over-balance of constitutional powers in Bangladesh calls for increased judicial intervention and guidance, of course in a balanced and pragmatic manner, which is critical for good governance and social justice. “Writing about judicial activism easily gets shackled by fussy and pedestrian debates about what judges may or may not do as unelected agents of governance. The book . . . goes much beyond such reductionist pedestrianisation of law, for it courageously lifts the debate into the skies of global legal realism. The analysis perceptively addresses bottlenecks of justice, identifying shackles and mental blocks in our own minds against activising concerns for justice for the common citizen.” —Prof Werner Menski (Foreword)
This book highlights that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the very existence of any society based on democratic values, such as the observance of the rule of law and respect for the human rights of individuals. In order to ensure that the judiciary’s interpretation of the law is not bound by the will of the executive and that it is able to call the executive to account by protecting the life as well as liberty of the governed, it is imperative to guarantee, among other things, a transparent method of appointment and the security of tenure of the judges. Taking into account the importance of an independent judiciary in a democratic society, the framers of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, following in the footsteps of the framers of the Constitutions of India and Pakistan, incorporated in the Constitution the ideal of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary as one of its basic features. This book, however, makes it manifestly evident that the key elements for realising such an ideal have not adequately been guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, this book sheds light on how succeeding generations of executives have sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Accordingly, this book puts forward recommendations for the insertion of detailed norms in the Constitution of Bangladesh for establishing the best means for excluding patronage appointments to the bench and for guaranteeing the security of tenure of the judges. This book asserts that the incorporation of such norms, safeguards the independence of the superior judiciary to decide cases without fear or favour. This book, therefore, seeks to address the gap that exists between the theory and practice concerning the independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh. Since no book is currently available in the market that critically examines these issues in a systematic and structured manner, this research enhances knowledge by not only identifying the flaws, deficiencies and lacunae of the constitutional provisions concerning the method of appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh but also the measures undertaken by the current Bangladeshi regime to dispense with the transparent method of removal of the judges involving a body of judicial character.
Explores judicial independence, integrity and impartiality in Asia-Pacific countries.
Analyzes courts in fourteen selected Asian jurisdictions to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive interdisciplinary book available.
This book illuminates how law and politics interact in the judicial doctrines and explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power.
This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.
Judiciary is an essential and integral part of a state, and its independence is a prerequisite of a liberal democratic state. Bangladesh, which emerged through a war of independence against the Pakistani in 1971, included democracy as one of the state principles in its constitution in 1972, and the constitution ensured the separation of judiciary from executive, and independence of the judiciary. I had the opportunity and honor to observe this transformation and the hindrances as a participant of the Bangladeshi judiciary since 1974 -- rising from a practitioner at a lower court in the north-eastern district of Sylhet to the highest judicial position of the country, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. But, in 2017, after delivering a historic verdict in favor of the independence of judiciary, I was forced to resign and exiled by the current government. The series of unfortunate and unprecedented events, which led to the tension between the executive and judiciary and subsequent improper action against me, began on September 17, 2014 when the Bangladesh Parliament amended the constitution to provide power of impeaching judges to the members of the parliament. The 16th Amendment of the Constitution deleted the provision of removing Judges from office through a highly powerful committee of peers called the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). The SJC, as stipulated in the constitution, also allowed the accused to have self-defense. Most importantly, the process was meant to protect the judiciary from being subjected to political vagaries and serving political leaders than the citizens. On May 5, 2016, a special High Court bench declared the amendment illegal and unconstitutional. Soon after the verdict, the MPs blasted judges for nullifying their legislation and began displaying sheer disrespect to the judiciary. However, the state party opted for an appeal which was heard by a seven-member full appellate bench. It was incumbent on me to head the Bench. On July 3, 2017, the bench unanimously rejected the appeal upholding the High Court verdict. The complete text of the unanimous verdict, including the observations, were made public on August 1, 2018. Following the appellate decision, on September 13 the parliament passed a resolution calling for legal steps to nullify the Supreme Court verdict. Prime Minister and other members of her party and ministers blasted me for going against the parliament. Cabinet members including the Law Minister began smearing me alleging misconduct and corruption. While I remained confined at my official residence and lawyers and judges were prevented to visit me, media were told that I am unwell and have sought medical leave. Various ministers said I will go abroad on medical leave. On October 14, 2017, as I had to leave the country, I tried to clear the air in a public statement that I am neither unwell nor am I leaving the country for good. I was hoping that my physical absence combined with Court's regular vacation will allow the situation to calm down and good sense will prevail; that the government will understand that the essence of the Verdict - upholding the independence of judiciary - is beneficial to the nation and the state. Finally, in the face of intimidation and threats to my family and friends by the country's military intelligence agency called the Directorate General of the Defense Forces Intelligence (DGDFI), I submitted resignation from abroad. This book comprises an introduction, highlighting my judicial life, experiences, challenges before the judiciary in Bangladesh, its struggle for independence, sanctity of the legal profession, erosion of values in judicial services, political interference and the state of nascent democracy.
This study discusses the many different aspects of judicial independence in Israel. It begins with an historical analysis of the concept of judicial independence in a comparative perspective, emphasizing the conceptual roots of the judiciary in Jewish law. Recent decades have witnessed a marked increase in the role played by the judiciary in society. This general trend is apparent in Israel, where the highly significant social role played by the judiciary has been on the increase for some years. The constitutional role of the judiciary in society is more pronounced in countries where the courts are empowered to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. In Israel the power of judicial review, in decisions of the Supreme Court, has been applied in a number of cases in which legislation of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, has been set aside. The increasingly prominent role of the judiciary in Israel is further manifested by the frequent recourse to judicial commissions of inquiry, chaired by judges who are often called upon to examine some of the major public controversies.