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A report by the Dept. of Defense¿s Command and Control Research Program. Contents: (1) Complexity in Natural and Economic Systems; (2) Concepts for Warfare from Complexity Theory; (3) Evidence for Complex Emergent Behavior in Historical Data; (4) Mathematical Modeling of Complexity, Knowledge, and Conflict; (5) An Extended Example of the Dynamics of Local Collaboration and Clustering, and Some Final Thoughts. Appendix: Optimal Control with a Unique Control Solution. Tables and figures.
As the world enters a new millennium, the U.S. military simultaneously enters a new era in warfare -- an era in which warfare is affected by a changing strategic environment and rapid technological change. The United States and its multinational partners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. Simultaneously, it is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization. These changes, as well as the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. This document describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow U.S. forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. In sum, the report provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD). A brief description of NCW, including its origins, its central role in force transformation, its tenets and principles, and an implementation strategy, are provided in Chapter 1. An examination of NCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationship to the four domains of Information Age warfare, the growing evidence of its benefits, and the warfighting advantages it can provide are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on network-centric operations (NCO), including the relationship of NCO to the overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the NCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct of NCO case studies. An overview of Joint and Service plans and initiatives to develop and implement network-centric capabilities and the growing investment in these capabilities by our allies and multinational partners are provided in Chapter 4.
Provides answers to some of the fundamental questions regarding network-centric warfare (NCW) as an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. Describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow our forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. Provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD).
The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.
Network Centric Operations (NCO; also known as Network Centric Warfare) is a key component of Dept. of Defense (DOD) planning for transformation of the military. NCO relies on computer equipment and networked communications technology to provide a shared awareness of the battle space for U.S. forces. Proponents say that a shared awareness increases synergy for command and control, resulting in superior decision-making, and the ability to coordinate complex military operations over long distances for an overwhelming war-fighting advantage. NCO technology saw limited deployment in Afghanistan and, more recently, increased deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This report, issued in 2007, provides background information and discusses possible oversight issues for Congress regarding DOD's strategy for implementing NCO, which formed a central part of the Bush Administration's plans for defense transformation. This is a print on demand report.
Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for how we will channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.
4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times – in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan…As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world’s Davids have found a sling and stone that work." – Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century – and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.
Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interests is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. "Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions." They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important.4 National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy. The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. Despite what many academics have maintained, national interests are not only a factor for nation-states. All actors in the international system possess interests. Using Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde's units of analysis, the need to have interests is equally applicable to international subsystems (groups or units that can be distinguished from the overall system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or independence on each other) like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, individual units (actors consisting of various subgroups, orga¬nizations, and communities) such as nations of people that transcend state boundaries and multi¬national corporations, subunits (organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect the behavior of the unit as a whole) like bureaucracies and lobbies, and finally, individuals that all possess separate personal interests as they participate in the overall system.5 Some academ¬ics choose to distinguish between national interests (interests involved in the external relations of the actor) and public interests (interests related within the boundaries of the actor).6 For purposes of this essay, given the closing gap between the influence of external and internal issues in the 21st century international system brought about by the associated components of a rapidly globalized world, there will be no distinction made between external and internal interests. In effect, they all fall under the concept of the national interest. There is a generally accepted consensus among academics that interests are designed to be of value to the entity or actor responsible for determining the interest for itself. This could include 4 those interests that are intended to be "a standard of conduct or a state of affairs worthy of achieve¬ment by virtue of its universal moral value."7 However, there is less agreement over the question of whether all nation-state interests are enduring, politically bi-partisan, permanent conditions that represent core interests that transcend changes in government,8 in contrast to those interests that may be altered over time and or respond to change in the international system.