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The Harmon Memorial Lecture is the oldest and longest-running lecture series at the United States Air Force Academy, occurring continuously on an annual basis since the spring of 1959--before this institution had even graduated its first class. It is a fitting tribute to the man many consider to be the "father" of the Air Force Academy, its first superintendent, Lt Gen Hubert R. Harmon. General Harmon understood that the serious study of military history was an essential element of the military profession, and he was a strong supporter of the two main goals of the series: stimulating "cadets to develop a lifelong interest in the history of the military profession" and promoting the development and dissemination of military history for the benefit of all American citizens.Each year, the Academy's Department of History selects a leading military historian to present the Harmon Memorial Lecture to all cadets enrolled in the military history courses offered that term. For many years, these lectures were printed and disseminated individually across the Academy, the Air Force, and throughout academia. In 1988, Lt Col Harry Borowski, then a faculty member in the Department of History, edited a volume containing the first 30 years of Harmon Lectures. This volume picks up where Lieutenant Colonel Borowski left off, presenting the next 30 years of Harmon Lectures for the benefit of cadets, faculty and staff, the Air Force, scholars throughout academia, and all persons interested in military history throughout the world. Each of these volumes includes the work and wisdom of the finest military historians of their eras; the contributors represent a veritable Hall of Fame of military historians from 1959 to 2017General Harmon understood that military history served a special purpose for those in the American military profession--encouraging a warrior ethos, developing a deeper understanding of the profession of arms, and providing the context so absolutely essential for those entrusted with the security of the American Republic. I'm confident that readers from a wide variety of backgrounds will agree that this volume fully supports its intended purpose.
"Each year, the Academy's Department of History selects a leading military historian to present the Harmon Memorial Lecture to all cadets enrolled in the military history courses offered that term. For many years, these lectures were printed and disseminated individually across the Academy, the Air Force, and throughout academia. In 1988, Lt. Col Harry Borowski, then a faculty member in the Department of History, edited a volume containing the first 30 years of Harmon Lectures. This volume picks up where Lt Col Borowski left off, presenting the next 30 years of Harmon Lectures for the benefit of cadets, faculty and staff, the Air Force, scholars throughout academia, and all persons interested in military history throughout the world. Each of these volumes includes the work and wisdom of the finest military historians of their eras; the contributors represent a veritable Hall of Fame of military historians from 1959 to 2017"--
Explores the identity crisis of the post-Cold War US Army and their struggles to adapt to profound geopolitical and cultural changes.
This second edition of Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower introduces contemporary strategy at the operational level of war. Developed as foundational reading for all US Air Force Academy cadets, this textbook is designed to close the gap between military theory and practice.
Making Makers presents a comprehensive history of a seminal work of scholarship which has exerted a persistent attraction for scholars of war and strategy: Makers of Modern Strategy. It reveals the processes by which scholars conceived and devised the book, considering both successful and failed attempts to make and remake the work across the twentieth century, and illuminating its impact and legacy. It explains how and why these influential volumes took their particular forms, unearths the broader intellectual processes that shaped them, and reflects on the academic parameters of the study of war in the twentieth century. In presenting a complete genesis of the Makers project in the context of intellectual trends and historical contingency, this book reflects on a more complex and nuanced appraisal of the development of scholarship on war. In so doing it also offers contributions to the intellectual biographies of key figures in the history of war in the twentieth century, such as Edward Mead Earle, Peter Paret, Gordon Craig, and Theodore Ropp. Making Makers contributes to an intellectual history of military history and contextualises the place of history and historians in strategic and security studies. It is not only a history of the book, but a history of the networks of scholars involved in its creation, their careers, and lines of patronage, crossing international boundaries, from Europe to the USA, to Asia and Australia. It is an investigation of ideas, individuals, and groups, of work completed and scholarship produced, as well as contingency and opportunities missed.
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
A fighter pilot who flew 75 combat missions in World War I, George C. Kenney was a charismatic leader who established himself as an innovative advocate of air power. As General MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, Kenney played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war, but until now his performance has remained largely unexplored. Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of Kenney's numerous contributions to MacArthur's war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of airpower's ability to shape the outcome of military engagements and a commander who shared MacArthur's strategic vision. He tells how Kenney played a key role in campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines; adapted aircraft, pilots, doctrine, and technology to the demands of aerial warfare in the southwest Pacific; and pursued daring strategies that likely would have failed in the European theater. Kenney is shown to have been an operational and organizational innovator who was willing to scrap doctrine when the situation called for ingenuity, such as shifting to low-level attacks for more effective bombing raids. Griffith tells how Kenney established air superiority in every engagement, provided close air support for troops by bombing enemy supply lines, attacked and destroyed Japanese supply ships, and carried out rapid deployment by airlifting troops and supplies. Griffith draws on Kenney's diary and correspondence, the personal papers of other officers, and previously untapped sources to present a comprehensive portrayal of both the officer and the man. He illuminates Kenney's relationship with MacArthur, General "Hap" Arnold, and other field commanders, and closely examines factors in air warfare often neglected in other accounts, such as intelligence, training, and logistical support. MacArthur's Airman is a rich and insightful study that shows how air, ground, and marine efforts were integrated to achieve major strategic objectives. It firmly establishes the importance of MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea and reveals Kenney's instrumental role in turning the tide against the Japanese.